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Abstract
This thesis is an exploration of the relationship between 
trade unionism and politics viewed primarily through events 
within the London Borough of Haringey. These events are 
examined through two case studies of local government union 
branches between 1965 and 1987. In these studies I use 
original research data with the aim of unifying what are 
usually deemed separate theoretical approaches, for example 
concern with either the labour process or with the 
bargaining relation. I show that by unifying these different 
strands of analysis a far greater depth of understanding is 
achieved.
The research also examines the development of Labour Party 
politics in the 1980s, and particularly the rise of 'radical 
municipalism' as a response to traditional labourism.
Finally this critical appraisal is extended to provide a 
critique of dominant themes running through radical and 
Marxist literature concerned with labour movement politics 
and in particular the trade unions.
Ill
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Chapter one Part one
Intrgdttgtigp
This thesis is an exploration of the relation 
between local government trade unions, the Labour Party 
and the council in the London borough of Haringey in the 
period 1965 - 1987. This is the period from the formation 
of Haringey council, at a time when relations between 
council, party and unions were uncontentious issues in 
British politics, through the rise, in the late 1970s of 
an assertive trade unionism and a radical political 
practice which threatened to unite the economic and 
political wings of the labour movement around the defence 
of jobs and services; and ending in loss of direction by 
the unions, retrenchment by the council and the 
substantial cutting of jobs and services which began in 
1987.
The centre-piece of this local study is an 
examination of two of the borough's local government 
trade union branches over this period: the National Union 
of Public Employee (NUPE) Education branch, covering 
ancillary workers within schools, and the National and 
Local Government Officers Association (NALGO) which 
organises white collar staff. Through a specific analysis
2of their evolution I shall explore these branches both in 
terms of their own internal dynamic and in the context of 
the wider labour movement, of how the two wings of the 
movement, trade union and political, attempted to come to 
terms with the decline of the post-war consensus. I focus 
on how the interplay of unions and politics formed the 
basis of a new local consensus in the early 1980s, what 
the nature of this new consensus was, and why it began to 
break down in the latter half of the 1980s. Whether this 
outcome represents a reformulation of labourism or the 
beginning of the end of labourism through the separate 
development of party and union, still remains uncertain. 
At one level, then, this is a study of union-party 
relations in Haringey during a period of critical change; 
at another it offers a detailed view of how a breakdown 
of traditional labourism was resolved: at first by a 
partial overcoming of the divisions between the trade 
union and political wings of the labour movement and 
subsequently by an as yet unfinished and open-ended 
process of the splitting apart of these elements.
My background understanding is that the development 
of both local government trade unionism and the Labour 
Party in Haringey should be examined through the lens of
a unified labour movement. I see the labour movement in 
Britain as a single entity with a dual structure: the 
industrial wing of trade unions under the rubric of the 
TUC and the political wing in the form of the Labour 
Party. While the division between the political and 
economic is a common feature of working class movements 
under capitalism, the concept of a unified labour 
movement is premised on the trade unions and the Labour 
Party being bound together by numerous political, 
ideological and organisational ties to such an extent 
that their interrelation is symbiotic. In this 
formulation I do not see the Labour Party and the trade 
unions as representing two distinct principles, but a 
social division of labour within one movement. This means 
two things: first, that there is a unity between trade 
unions and the Labour Party; second, that this is a 
unity-in-separation, that is, a unity affirmed through 
the division between these two wings. The key to 
comprehending the labour movement and one of the elements
of labourism is its unity-in-separation <1>.
The defining characteristic of the two wings of the 
labour movement is their mediating role between capital 
and labour. That mediations exist is not in itself 
remarkable. The working class achieves representation via 
its own institutions in a number of distinct forms from 
nation to nation. For example, in Italy the Communist 
Party's main mediation with the state has been through 
its control of municipalities. It is however the 
mediating role which defines the Janus-faced character of 
the labour movement, expressing at once some degree of 
working class identity and the domination of bourgeois 
ideas within the working class.
As a medium between capital and labour, the labour 
movement is not a fixed entity but reflects the dynamic 
nature of the relation between capital and labour. 
Consequently it has taken on a number of forms. For
1. This relation may be further understood by focussing 
on two potential sources of disruption. On the one hand, 
the unity of the labour movement may be broken, so that 
the linkages binding its two wings come apart or are 
radically weakened. In this case, the unions and the 
party develop separate corporate identities. On the other 
hand, the separation may be overcome, so that the 
division between politics and trade unionism is either 
bridged or narrowed. Each of these hypothetical scenarios 
represents extremes of the continuum on which the labour 
movement functions.
5example, when the labour movement plays a central role in 
administering a contract between the classes, such as in 
the post war consensus, which I characterise as 1945 
labourism <2>. As a social relation, this consensus was a 
contract between labour and capital in which the labour 
movement was able to serve as a transmission belt for the 
'political economy of labour', driven by the increased 
strength of labour, but also as a discipline on labour 
which was premised on its unquestioned subordination to 
capital <3>. The ideology of the labour movement being 
the idealisation of this contract.
The above implicitly diverges from the present day 
usage of the term labourism in the following sense. The 
way in which the term is routinely used elides the 
difference between labourism and reformism are the two 
concepts discrete or is one a synonym for the other?. For 
example D Coates <1989> quotes Hardie from the Labour 
Party founding conference. In doing so he quotes a 
classic reformist statement. If labourism as a term means 
anything apart from reformism it is a term which
2. For example see Middlemas, K. <1979> Politics and 
Industrial Society. Deutsch, London.
3. The term 'political economy of labour' is derived from 
Marx. It and the term 1945 labourism are discussed in 
chapter two.
6encapsulates the above, that is the unitary and symbiotic 
nature of the movement. The other aspect of labourism 
which gives the term meaning is the historical continuity 
which these labour movement institutions represent and 
the continuity of the ideology of labourism which may be 
characterised as a form of radical liberalism, inherited 
from the late nineteenth century and developed through a 
Keynesian doctrine of state intervention, which became 
the ideational expression of the post-war consensus.
In different ways this mediating role applies both to the 
unions and to the party. It is not the case that one wing 
represents the domination of bourgeois ideas and the 
other working class identity; rather this tension is 
present in each wing. This is not, however, how the 
labour movement often appears. I define as the 'radical 
paradigm' that form of ideology which equates either the 
existing trade union movement or some version of a 
perfected trade union movement with working class 
identity and equates the Labour Party essentially as well 
as actually with the domination of bourgeois ideas <4>.
4. For example see Jeffries, S. <1979>: 'Striking into 
the 1980s: modern trade unionism-its limits and 
potential', in International Socialism Vol 5, Summer p. 
1-53. Fairbrother, P. <1984>: All those in Favour The 
Politics at Union Democracy, Pluto, London. Fairbrother, P. <1990>: Union Democracy and Socialism, unpublished.
7By perfection of the trade unions I mean the view that 
there is some element in them which if generalised would 
represent how they should ideally be; the most common 
version identifies the rank and file with this ideal 
element. I call 'left labourism' that form of ideology 
which equates either the existing Labour Party or a 
perfected Labour Party with working class identity and 
equates the trade unions essentially as well as actually 
with the domination of bourgeois ideas. The particular 
form of 'left labourism' with which I am most concerned 
in this work is what I shall call 'radical municipalism'
- a form which locates the socialist core of the Labour 
Party in a reformed local politics and sees the local 
council as a key agency for socialist advancement <5>.
These two ways of thinking within the labour 
movement reflect the separation of the labour movement 
into two distinct parts which are not integrated into a 
single whole. In these versions, the party may appear 
either as an adjunct or an obstacle to the 'real' working 
class interest which lies in the unions; or the unions
5. For example see Wainwright, H. <1985>: 'Sharing power; 
popular planning and the GLC', in Going Local? no 2 
April. Or Blunkett, D. and Green, G. <1983>: Building 
from the Bottom: The Sheffield Experience, Tract 491, 
Fabian Society, London.
may appear as an adjunct or an obstacle to the Labour 
Party. Each of these conceptions is prescriptive to the 
extent that it puts forward an ideal of what the labour 
movement should be rather than exploring what the labour 
movement actually is. One side of the labour movement is 
then conceived as its essence, the other side as a mere 
shadow or epiphenomenon.
The division of the labour movement and the two 
conceptions to which it gives rise are reflected in the 
academic literature on the labour movement <6>. There 
approaches can be found which mirror the poles of the 
'radical paradigm' and 'left labourism': a trade union 
literature which ignores or only externally recognises 
the political, and a political literature (like that on 
municipalism) which ignores or subsumes trade unions <7>. 
Both sides seek to explain why the labour movement is 
imperfect through an ideal type of what it ought to be:
6. The only work which has attempted to provide an 
integrated approach is that of D Coates <1989>: The 
Crisis of Labour: Industrial Relations and tha Stata In 
Contemporary Britain.
7. This theme is taken up throughout this work, the 
shortcomings of the municipal literature are seen for 
example in Gyford, J. <1985>: The Politics of Local 
Socialism. George Allen and Unwin, London. On the trade 
union side in Hyman <1989>: The Political Economy of 
Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in a Cold 
Climate. Macmillan, London.
either an ideal type of trade unionism, the model of 
which comes out of the experience of militancy in the 
manufacturing sector in the 1960s; or an ideal type of 
Labour politics which comes out of the experience of the 
radical municipal experiments of the early to mid-1980s. 
The literature is itself divided along these prescriptive 
lines.
This thesis is divided into twelve with methods 
constituted as an appendix . Chapter two provides the 
reader with a profile of the borough: the Labour council. 
Labour Party, the council's workforce and the trade 
unions. I outline the basic problem confronted by the 
branch reformers in the local government trade unions, 
the shift from what is called in the literature 
'sectional' to 'institutional centrality'.
Chapters three and four are concerned with the 
development of NALGO and NUPE Educational between 1965 
and 1979-1980. I analyse how the branches functioned 
under their established leaderships, how new leaderships 
emerged, and the nature of the radicalism they 
introduced. These chapters end with the shift to 
institutional centrality well underway; in NUPE's case I 
conclude with the low-pay strike in 1979, a year after 
the new leadership had been installed; in NALGO's case I
10
conclude with the installation in 1980 of the new branch 
leadership.
Chapter five has three dimensions; firstly, to show 
how far the alterations seen in chapters three and four 
can be generalised to the other Haringey local government 
branches. Secondly to place these changes within the 
context of attempts to reform local government. Finally 
to show up how the interaction between change generated 
from above and below provided a number of different 
potentials for the branches as the start of the 1980s. 
This brings to a close the first section of my thesis on 
the 'Radicalisation of the Branches'.
Chapter six reviews the literature on municipal 
government and in particular challenges the notion of a 
'new municipal left' as a given and fixed entity. I argue 
first that the apparent unity behind this concept was 
transitory and composed of a variety of different forces 
which were soon to fragment. What became the dominant 
municipal tendency arose in the course of political 
struggles around the role of the council. I review the 
debate on the role of the left in council politics, which 
occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and the 
approach which was finally adopted by the Greater London 
Council (GLC). This chapter runs slightly ahead of events
11
in Haringey by following the politics of the GLC through 
to the mid-1980s; this is because the GLC provided the 
model for radical municipalism within Haringey.
Chapter seven returns the work to Haringey and looks 
at how the borough's labour movement reacted to the 
Conservative Government's policy towards local 
government. In the wake of a debate over confrontation or 
compliance, in which the unions showed themselves through 
strike action against cuts to be an independent force, I 
show how an alliance was formed between the leaders of 
the council and - largely in spite of themselves - the 
militant union leaders, the basis of which lay in the 
raising of rates to protect jobs. This was the basis of a 
new consensus emerging in the borough, which I call 'the 
rate-rise alliance', marginalising both the 
confrontational left and the compliant right wing. This 
ends the second section of the thesis on the 'Rise of 
Radical Municipalism'.
Chapter eight takes the study back to the local 
government unions. I argue that the alliance around rate 
rises and job protection was the culmination of a series 
of defeats for the militant union leaders, when they 
proved unsuccessful in persuading their members to use 
militant industrial action to secure their political and
12
economic ends. I show how these ends were secured not by 
militant means but locally through the unions' alliance 
with the council. The coming together of political and 
economic issues in the unions which the militant branch 
leaders had encouraged by tying defence of jobs and wages 
to opposition to the Government, was unstitched when the 
alliance with the Labour council secured the economic 
position of the union members without political 
confrontation.
Chapters nine and ten follow the evolution of NAIXiO 
and NUPE Education branches from 1979-80 through to 1984- 
85. They review how the process of institutional 
centrality was consolidated within the local government 
union context. Both NUPE and NALGO initiated workplace 
organisation in the form of shop stewards systems; this 
was done largely 'from above' through the 'sponsorship' 
of shop stewards by branch officials and without the 
participation of the membership. The central problem of 
workplace organisation - a lack of members outside a 
narrow circle of radicals volunteering to become shop 
stewards - was unresolved in both cases. I argue that 
this was due to two factors: the continued primacy of the 
occupational group in the unions and the growing 
dependence of the unions on the council in the context of
13
the rate-rise alliance. This led in turn to the 
reconstruction of hierarchy and bureaucracy within the 
branches.
Chapter eleven evaluates the nature and significance 
of the change undergone by my two case study branches. 
This is done in the light of this study of the 
limitations of both 'institutional centrality', and the 
more specific concepts associated with local government 
trade unionism. I argue that the limitations exist 
because they fail to take into account the political 
context in which the union branches operate. It is though 
this view of the branch leaders having suffered a 
political defeat which provides the context in which I 
conclude the narrative by looking at the evolution of the 
political resolution discussed in chapter eight. I argue 
that this resolution created tendencies in the branches 
to cede their independence to the council; in support of 
this argument I trace the inversion of council-union 
relations from the initial dependency of the council on 
the unions through to the increasing dependence of the 
unions on the council. As the council consolidated its 
own bureaucratic and financial apparatus in the context 
of central government cuts and as the unions became more 
reliant on council support for the pursuance of their
14
basic economic functions, the outcome was predictable: 
the beginning of substantial redundancies in 1987.
Chapter twelve argues that these developments pose a 
theoretical problem in relation to what I have called the 
'radical paradigm' in the sociology of labour. The growth 
of hierarchy and bureaucracy within the branches took 
place in spite of the opposition of branch leaders who 
shared the critique of bureaucratisation and 
incorporation prevalent in the literature. The branch 
leaders had a similar analysis and attempted to put into 
practice similar remedies to those found in this 
sociological literature. I argue that this suggests a 
confusion between cause and effect: hierarchy and 
bureaucracy appear as the cause of the unions' 
difficulties but were in fact the effect of independent 
political and economic factors. This brings to a close 
the section on 'The Decline of Trade Union Radicalism'.
The methods appendix is at the end of this work. It 
is primarily concerned with three issues. Firstly I 
discuss the empirical core of this study. This is based 
on forty nine interviews conducted with key trade 
unionists and political actors. I have used extensive 
primary documention, having access to the complete files 
of NALGO, NUPE Education branches, the Haringey Labour
15
Party (including the formal documentation on its 
relations to the council), and Haringey Council 
documents. I also had access to documentation on Haringey 
joint-union committees and relevant council-union 
documents. Secondly I examine my relationship to the 
material and the role that my own experience and 
knowledge of the labour movement and Haringey council 
played. From 1979 until 1986 I worked as a labourer on 
the council's Direct Labour Organisation; from 1980 to 
1986 I was a shop steward and I have been a member of the 
Haringey Labour Party since 1973. Finally I explore the 
problems which engaging in sociological research posed 
for me and the effects the personal questions it raised 
had on this work.
This work has utilised two areas of literature which 
mirror the division between local politics and trade 
unionism: one on local government and radical 
municipalism, the other on trade unionism. What is 
distinctive about the theoretical side of this work is 
that it self-consciously brings together these two bodies 
of knowledge which are often isolated from one another or 
merely externally related. This is important because it 
represents an implicit critique of existing demarcations 
within the literature, which replicate rather than
16
explain the existing demarcation of the actual labour 
movement.
The most substantial body of literature which I 
address is about the unions. Here too I have brought 
together otherwise distinct readings, not as a result of 
a self-conscious theoretical decision but because I have 
in practice found it necessary to merge discussions of 
manufacturing and local government trade unionism. The 
literature on local government trade unionism explains 
the differences from manufacturing unionism in terms 
mainly of the fragmentation of the workforce and the lack 
of importance of the workgroup in relation to the primacy 
of the occupational group. I have found both these 
concepts of 'fragmentation' and the 'occupational group' 
central to my understanding of local government trade 
unions in Haringey, but the weakness of these approaches 
lies in their inability to explain their development in 
spite of the obstacles posed by fragmentation and 
occupational centrality. This literature has tended to 
take static pictures of local government trade unions, 
explaining the remarkable growth shown by unions in this 
area only through external 'sponsorship' and without 
reference to their internal dynamic.
17
The literature on manufacturing unions has provided 
me with a framework for explaining how the unions I have 
studied evolved in practice, though it has been necessary 
for me to modify this framework to recognise the 
specificity of local government unionism. The concepts of 
'sectional' and 'institutional centrality' drawn from the 
manufacturing literature provide a basis for 
understanding the internal dynamic of these union 
branches, since they focus on what is crucial for all 
forms of trade unionism, manufacturing and local 
government, namely bargaining power.
The literature on local government plays a less 
important role in this thesis but is still pertinent to 
it. I have been mainly concerned to use it to explore the 
origins of radical municipalism but I have been 
disappointed to discover how far they have been obscured, 
particularly in the more radical readings. The generally 
state-centred character of this literature, which 
examines the local state in its relation to central 
government, writes out intra-labour movement relations 
between council. Labour Party and local unions. Its 
tendency to adopt an uncritical stance toward the 
policies of radical local government derives from a top- 
down mode of analysis which abstracts the actions of the
18
local council from the wider labour movement and 
ultimately from the borough's population.
I have found that the lines of disciplinary 
demarcation inherent in these separate literatures place 
limitations on their ability to explain the changes that 
have occurred in the local government union branches or 
to grasp their significance for the reform of labourism 
in the 1980s. What I have called the 'unity-in­
separation' of the labour movement makes it imperative to 
integrate the trade union and political literatures if 
the relations between the separate elements are to be 
understood. Because of the different types of literature 
discussed, I have integrated them into the body of the 
text rather than constructing a distinct chapter on 
literature survey. The industrial relations literature is 
discussed throughout chapters two to four and chapters 
nine to twelve. What I have called the 'radical paradigm' 
in the sociology of labour is discussed in chapter 
twelve. The literature on local government and municipal 
politics is discussed in chapter six.
Chapter two 19 part ona
A Profila of the Haringey Labour M o v a n t
Tha borough's working class
In this chapter I shall review some of the key factors 
which affected Haringey's working class in the 1970s: social 
and demographic changes, the effect on the Labour Party, the 
changing role of the council, the main local government 
trade unions and finally the problems which those who wished 
to reform the trade union branches faced in the 1970s <1>.
Haringey was one of the thirty-two new London boroughs 
(see Figure 2:1) created as part of the reorganisation of 
London local government in 1965. It was formed from three 
urban district councils, two of which were predominantly 
Labour areas. Wood Green and Tottenham, and third 
Conservative Hornsey <2>. Figure 2:2 shows the wards in 
1981.
1. The figures I shall use are compiled from a number of 
sources which are listed below. I do not claim any precise 
statistical validity for them, but have used them to offer a 
general impression of the changes undergone by the Haringey 
working class in this period.
2. In 1945 Labour had failed to win the Hornsey 
parliamentary seat due to the Communist Party inspired
'unity' candidate and again in 1966 when the CP stood their 
own candidate. Max Morris. In the 1980s he joined Hornsey 
Labour Party, becoming a councillor and leading opponent of 
Tariq Ali's application to join the Labour Party.
20
The London Boroughs.
Source: Central Research Unit <1982>: Analysis of 
Population Change ip Haringey. Population Working paper 
no. 6, Haringey, London.
21
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In 1983 the three parliamentary constituencies were
merged by the Boundary Commission into two; Hornsey-and-Wood
Green and Tottenham. This created one safe Labour seat,
Tottenham and a new Conservative marginal, Hornsey and Wood
Green. Haringey was in every sense a bureaucratic
construction, as one local history put it:
...historically the various parts of the 
borough have developed independently of each 
other, and communications which are now 
considered desirable, that is, from east to 
west, do not exist to any extent today 
because in the past it was not necessary <3>.
Employment in Haringey has been marked by a rapid decline in
its traditional manufacturing base. Manufacturing was almost
exclusively concentrated along the Lea Valley and dominated
the Tottenham constituency (see figure 2:3). Since the turn
of the century light industry had been attracted to a ready
supply of labour. By 1900 there were 20 firms which rose to
120 by 1930 <4>. This involved the movement of established
firms from the East End of London, and during the 1920-1930S
the establishment of newer electrical industries. By the
time of Haringey's formation this traditional manufacturing
3. London Borough of Haringey Libraries Museum and Art 
Service. <1977>: The Urban Growth of Haringey. Haringey, 
London, p.2.
4. ibid.
figura 2:3: Map of Haringey showing industrial estates 23
Source: Haringey Trades Union Council Support Unit, 
industrial Decline, Haringey Trade's Council, London.
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base was already in decline. Table 2:1 shows that decline 
from 1966.
Table 2:1_________________________________________________
Decline of the borough's manufacturing industry 1966-1981. lluihsrs employed__________________________________________
1966 1971 1978 1981
48,950 46,977 39,877 27,053
Source: 1966: London Countv Census. 1971 figure onwards are 
from: Haringey Trades Union Council Support Unit. <1987>: 
Industry in Haringey 1979-1986: A History of Industrial 
Decline. Haringey Trade's Council, London.
As indicated in table 2:1, the numbers employed in 
manufacturing declined by 44.7 % between 1966 and 1981. A 
clue to the cause of this decline was given in a 1978 study 
by Haringey council. This concluded that between 1965 and 
1975 job losses in this sector were 'overwhelmingly due to 
closure rather than relocation' <5>. Table 2:2 breaks this 
decline down further by industry and sex.
5. Local Development Plan <1978>: Supplementary Information, 
Haringey, London, p. 27.
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Tabi» 2:2
Changes in Employment in Haringey 1971-1981: Industry and 
Sex (numbers and %)
1971 1981 Total % 
sector male female male female 1971 1981 + -
Food,Drink,Tob 2,954 2,066 1,804 1,266 5,020 3,070 -38%
Paper,Print,Pub 1,888 1,647 1,137 826 3,535 1,963 -44%
Furniture,Tim 3,960 557 3,227 440 4,517 3,667 -18%
Clothing/Foot'W 1,070 2,808 891 1,695 3,878 2,586 -33%
Electrical Eng 4,633 4,131 1,627 1,064 8,764 2,691 -70%
Mechanical Eng 5,494 2,148 2,896 933 7,642 3,829 -49%
Metal Goods 4,365 1,801 2,769 1,027 6,166 3,796 -38%
other Man 4.966 2.489 3.569 1,882 7.455 5.451 -26%
Total 29,330 17,647 17,920 9,133 46,977 27,053 -48%
Source:Industry tn Haringey (figs taken from Dept of
Employment)
As table 2:2 shows across the spectrum of manufacturing 
trades decline was dramatic averaging 48% in the ten year 
period between 1971-1981. As table 2:2 reveals this was most 
extensive in the engineering sector. This decline in 
manufacturing jobs was partly offset by the expansion of the 
service sector. By the early 1980s the structure of the 
borough's employment shows that the service sector had 
clearly established itself as the major area of employment, 
as shown by table 2:3.
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Structure of employment in 1981 Persons in employment by Broad Industry % of economically active
%
Executive.................... 0.9
Manufacturing...............25.3
Construction.................8.8
Services....................62.4
Source: London Regional Manpower Intelligence Unit. <1982>: 
Employment Profile of Harinaev. Manpower Services 
Commission, London. Appendix 2.
As table 2:4 shows, from the mid-1970s part of this shift 
away from the manufacturing sector was taken up by an 
increase in the council's workforce
Table 2:4
Haringey Staffing 
full-
Levels:
part-
time total
year on
1969 5,477 2,757 8,234 na
1970 5,807 2,554 8,361 127
1971 5,886 3,198 9,084 723
1972 6,545 3,398 9,852 768
1973 6,575 3,706 10,281 429
1974 6,723 3,809 10,532 251
1975 6,908 3,970 10,878 346
1976 7,145 4,125 11,270 392
1977 7,467 4,356 11,823 553
1978 7,467 4,356 11,823 -
1979 7,775 4,172 11,947 124
Source:: GLC Annual Statistical Abstract.
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Rather than being dramatic, expansion was steady, averaging 
337 per year increasing the workforce by nearly 4,000, a 
trend which continued until 1987 (see chapter six table 6:2) 
when the workforce totalled 14,596. A 6,362 (77%) increase 
from the 1969 figure.
Alongside this changing employment pattern and in 
common with other areas was the breakdown in traditional 
working class community-based organisation. At its heart was 
the breakup of the "traditional" working class family. There 
are a range of indices of this widespread phenomenon; for 
example, by the early 1980s 8% of all households contained 
at least one one-parent family <6>. Part of the changing 
face of the borough's working class has also been an 
increase in the black and ethnic minority population. By 
1981 50.5% of Tottenham's head of household was born outside 
of the UK, 37.8% of whom were from the New Commonwealth and 
Pakistan <7>. During the 1970s the other major change was 
the rise in unemployment. Graph 2:1 shows its growth in 
Tottenham and Wood Green Employment Offices between 1979- 
1981.
6.London Borough of Haringey <1985>: Submission to the 
Secretary of State for the Environment. November, p.10
7. ibid, p.25.
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Alongside this there had been an awareness of a growth 
in poverty in the borough. This is most vividly illustrated 
by the case of Tottenham. 66% of Tottenham council tenants 
claim housing benefit, and between 60% and 65% of private 
tenants are on the official minimum income provided by 
supplementary benefit. The number of claimants at the 
Tottenham office for supplementary benefit increased by 81% 
from November 1979 to July 1985, that is, from 9,323 to 
16,881 <8>.
The epicentre of change was the burgeoning reserve army 
of labour. Unemployment both united and disaggregated class. 
It is the template through which the changing pattern of 
employment, the collapse of the traditional family and the 
rise of the borough's ethnic population took on a social and 
political character. What united the working class was that 
labour power had decisively shifted from being a scarce to 
an over-abundant commodity. The scale of change is 
illustrated by the following example; in 1966 there were 
29,000 people out of work in the Greater London area, 0.7% 
of the working population and 90,000 job vacancies <9>. In
8. ibid, p. 15.
9. Figures from the GLC: Annual Statistical Abstract.
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1986 there were 17,815 unemployed in Haringey alone, 61% of 
the 1966 figure for the whole of London.
The independent development of the three constituent 
parts of Haringey is also reflected in the formation of the 
working class, that is the type of work and stratification 
within the three boroughs, and its political institutions. 
This formation had taken place primarily between 1900 and 
the mid 1930s. For example, a survey carried out in 1931 
noted that for Wood Green 250 out of every 1000 of the 
employed population were clerks <10>, that by 1914 
Tottenham had become 'predominantly a lower middle and 
working class area' <11>, while Hornsey, in a brochure from 
1900 advertised itself as 'healthy Hornsey' in a bid to 
attract the second wave of migration from central London 
which was middle class in character <12>. Each of the old 
boroughs had its own political history of the rise and 
consolidation of labourism, which was to flow into the post­
war settlement.
This snapshot of the alterations to the boroughs' 
working class tends to obscure the fact that the impact of 
change was different on each of the constituent boroughs.
10. London Borough of Haringey Libraries Museum and Art 
Service. <1977>: The Urban Growth of Haringey. Haringey, 
London. p .8.
11. ibid p 5.
12. ibid p 7.
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The commonality is found in that structural change broke 
down the working class formations of each of the boroughs 
that had constituted themselves during the inter-war period. 
It was however a change whose roots can be said to go back 
almost to when the working class was formed. Both Tottenham 
and Wood Green's population began declining in the mid 1930s 
and Hornsey's from 1951. By the 1981 census Haringey had the 
12th largest fall of population in the country <13>. By the 
late 1970s, then, the class formations which had shaped the 
three boroughs comprising Haringey had decisively altered. 
This is seen most strikingly in table 2:5.
Table 2»5_____________________________________ _____________
Decline by numbers and % of Male manual workers 1961 -1981 by major Socio- Economic group.
year----------------------------
Group 1961 1966 1971 1981 Total(decline) 61-8 1
Skilled 30,260 27,210 22,440 12,820(decline) 3,050 10% 4,790 17% 9,620 42% 17,440 57%
Semi-Skilled* 11,480 10,860 9,800 8,420(decline) 620 5% 1,060 10% 1,380 14% 3,060 27%
Unskilled 6,640 6,060 5,130 3,130(decline) 580 9% 930 15% 2,000 39% 3,510 53%
*Agricultural workers have been excluded. Source:1961, 66, 
71, 81 Countv boroughs.Census Economically Active.
13. Central Research Unit <1982>: Analysis of Population 
Change in Haringey. Population Working paper no.6, Haringey, 
London.
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Thus by the end of the 1970s the working class 
formation which had dominated in Tottenham, the 
manufacturing worker, had definitively disappeared. A 
working class which had grown up in the welfare state 
emerged from the consensus, its social economic composition 
substantially altered and with family and community 
diminished. From the middle of the 1970s the impact of these 
changes had affected the local Party and Labour council.
The local Labour Party
The documentation from the local Labour Parties shows 
that they were, at least from the mid-1970s, aware of the 
altering nature of the borough's population. For example, 
the following extract from a resolution to Tottenham General 
Management Committee in 1978: 'if the party is to grow, it 
must turn outwards to embrace women and minorities' <14>.
If their goal was the involvement of wider sections of the 
working class, who were they broadening their appeal from?
By 1977 the membership of the Tottenham Party stood at 404, 
three of the wards having less than 50 members. There were 
17 affiliated trade union branches, of these only the three 
Furniture Trade and Allied Trades (FTAT) branches directly
14. Resolution to Tottenham GMC October 1977.
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represented local manufacturing Industry, and their delegate
was the union full time official. As far as I have been able
to ascertain the social composition of the Party was such
that it could boast just four manual workers, skilled or
otherwise, on its General Management Committee (GMC) <15>.
At one level this reflected the altered structure of the
working class; the rise of the middle class professional and
the decline of the "white'* skilled manual worker. The
change in the social weight of these socio-economic
categories of worker is seen in the decline of the skilled
manual workers within the borough, shown in table 2:5. The
semi-skilled white collar worker on the other hand had risen
to the single biggest economically active group in the
borough and was the socio-economic category which dominated
the GMC. This represents further if limited evidence to that
of Whiteley <1983> who found that Labour was being left with
activists who were:
increasingly more middle class, more, 
ideological in their approach... less concerned 
with pragmatic instrumental questions <16>.
15. The figures for the Tottenham Party are taken from the 
1977 Annual report. I have arrived at the figure of four 
manual workers from a personal knowledge of the GMC of which 
at the time I was a member.
16. Whiteley, P. <1982> The Labour Party in Crisis. Methuen, 
London, p.79
34
The qualification to Whiteley's characterisation of the 
activists is that they wanted to broaden the Labour Party 
beyond themselves. In the late 1970s however, for the 
activists the council was a remote and inert entity. These 
features of the Labour Party will be examined in detail 
below.
A radical tradition?
Haringey returned a Labour council in 1971, (as with
the rest of London, Labour in Haringey had suffered a
'debacle' at the 1968 local government elections). A review
of Haringey council from 1971 to the Conservative Party's
election in 1979 shows that its character was somewhat
removed from the stereotype of a moribund council held by
the new Labour left in the 1980s. The core of the council's
activity was a major programme of municipalisation financed
by a high rate policy <17>. Within a traditional housing
programme it set up in 1976 one of the country's first
Housing Action Areas. The production of an Action Report
documenting the process with an introduction by a government
17. In their comment on the 1978 local election result the 
Hornsey Journal wrote, 'a vigorous housing programme has 
produced much more settled communities in many parts of the 
borough. Slowly some of the slum clearance programme appears 
to be giving Labour an electoral advantage'. This programme 
had been financed through the rates: from 1975 the GLC's 
Yearly Statistical Abstract shows the borough in the top 
five for rate rises within London.
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minister, points to a view of Haringey as a model of 
progress to be emulated by other boroughs <18>. From the 
latter part of the 1970s there was an extension of the 
council's remit into the areas of equal opportunities and 
unemployment.
In 1977 the council produced a statement committing 
itself to an Equal Opportunities policy. By the end of the 
decade a start had been made on disabilities, gender and 
race; the borough was one of the first to employ an Ethnic 
Minorities Officer and to set up an Ethnic Minorities Joint 
Consultative Committee. The major focus of the late '70s 
was, however, unemployment and in particular youth 
unemployment. In 1976 the council with Islington, Hackney 
and Enfield had been party to creating the North East London 
Employment Group. In 1979, in response to a Government 
circular on local government employment strategy, the 
council set up an 'Officers Employment Group' <19>. By 1979- 
80 the council was spending £840,388 on employment projects 
and was directly employing 231 youth on various Manpower 
Service Commission (MSC) schemes and funding another 50 on
18. Comprehensive Housing service. <1977> First Steps 
towards a Housing Action Area LBH. The introduction was by 
Reg Freeson Minister for Housing and Construction.
19. Set up in response to Government circular 
71/77(DoE/Dol).
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the Community Industry Scheme <20>. In 1980 it produced its 
first Employment Profile: Haringey Employment Review which 
discussed among other issues setting up unemployed centres 
and alliances with the voluntary sector <21>.
This expansion of the council's role was generated 
from above; it was directly attributable to the change in 
government strategy towards the inner-city. According to 
Friend and Metcalf <1981>, in spite of major contradictions 
this shift in government policy represented a 'genuine 
break' with the first generation of urban policies; now 
there was an attempt at reversing the 'flight of industry 
and consequent economic decline' <22>. It was the support of 
the government which facilitated this extension of council 
policy, a point borne out, for example, by the council's 
Employment Review: the justification for its wide brief came 
from government which saw the local authority as 'the agent 
for government in economic regeneration' <23>. A similar 
pattern of using a higher authority, whether government or
20. Quoted in Haringey Employment Review 1980. table 7.
21. ibid. p.7.
22. Friend, A. and Metcalf, A. <1981>: Slump City The 
P o l i t i c s  fll M a s s  .U n e m p lo y m e n t ,  Pluto Press, London, p.15.
23. Haringey Employment Review 1980 page 2 Cites, Government 
circular 71/77/ (DoE/Dol).
37
statute, is also found in the council's pronouncements on 
equal opportunities. The early policy statements were 
motivated in terms of the council's moral duty backed up by 
government statute.
The policies pursued by the council from the mid-1970s 
show that the Labour Party through the council expanded its 
mediating role between the working class and state. This 
entailed an altered political role for the council within a 
central-local government consensual framework, a development 
which was to be challenged from two quarters; the 
Conservative government and the left within the Party and 
the unions.
The local labour movement was able to influence the 
actions of the council due to it being the main mediator 
between the Labour controlled council and the population of 
the borough. This mediation resides in the fact that in the 
first instance Labour councillors are a selection of 
individuals from within the Labour Party carrying out a 
specialised function within a state institution. In a 
borough such as Haringey these relations were quite straight 
forward. A standard structure exists between the Labour 
Party and Labour Group (often referred to as the Group). The 
Labour Group has its own internal structure with its own 
officers, appointing the council leader and the chairs and
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vice chairs of committees. The Group's liaison with the 
Party is carried out through the Local Government Committee 
(LGC). The LGC is a delegate body comprising nominees from 
the General Management Committees (GMC's) and the Executive 
Committees (EC) of the borough's constituency parties 
(CLPs). Resolutions concerning council policy pass from 
wards through the GMCs to the LGC? they are then passed to 
the Group to be acted on. LGC decisions are not, within the 
Labour Party, constitutionally binding on the Group, 
accountability being expressed by the possibility of 
deselecting councillors at selection time. As will be seen, 
the local Parties were however able to put considerable 
pressure on councillors to act as direct delegates of the 
Party and forsake their independence <24>.
Just as council-government relations were part of the 
post-war consensus, so too were these Labour Group-Labour 
Party relations (and beyond that relations with the wider 
movement). The divisions between state and labour movement 
institutions were blurred, giving rise to an essentially 
administrative relationship between Labour Group and Labour
24. One of the key difference between the GLC Labour Group 
and the London boroughs was that the GLC's Labour group had 
a considerable level of autonomy as accountablity was 
structured through the 32 constituency parties which 
selected the GLC councillors.
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Party. The Labour government and then on a far wider scale 
the Conservative Government's attempts to alter local 
government opened the way for conflict to arise at two 
levels, the two weakest points, where institutions overlap 
and are subject to political pressure from the next 
institution down within the hierarchy; conflict between 
government and council and between the Labour Group and 
Party. Government policy unleashed the potential for the 
repoliticisation of relations between council and its 
political constituency and began to reassert the division 
between state and labour movement institutions. How a Labour 
council reacted to government policy towards councils was 
then, in the first instance, the product of an internal 
debate within the Labour Party and broader labour 
movement <25>. This debate helped reshape the Labour 
Party-Group and local government union relations and in so 
doing was itself part of the wider reformulation of 1945 
labourism.
25. Central-local relations have been the major 
preoccupation of local government theorists. A critique of 
this one-sided approach is given in chapter six.
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1945 labourism
1945 labourism had its origins in the 1930s and was 
only consolidated in the late 1940s. Its genesis was the 
evolution of a programme around the axis of Keynesianism.
The cohering of the labour movement around an economic 
programme which placed the state at its centre opened the 
way for the formulation of a programme of social reform 
through the state, and for an equation of socialism with 
nationalization and stateisation. It was in this manner that 
the 19th century radical liberalism which had dominated the 
Labour Party (and the working class) was reformulated and 
transposed into the inter-war period. The shift to 
Keynesianism by working class organisations was part of an 
emerging capitalist consensus which stretched through the 
Liberal Party to the Butler and Macmillan wing of the 
Conservative Party.
The war became the forcing house for political change, 
with the 'Keynesian' consensus taking over the running of 
the home front, and the radicalising effect of the war on 
the working class pushing Labour to the centre of the 
consensus. If the 1930s had began to shape the working class 
the experience of the war was to crystalise it. This 
radicalisation arose because the working class had both won 
the war and had been seen to do so which was lost neither on
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the ruling class nor the working class itself, who now 
demanded recompense. That payment was to be the post-war 
consensus. Panitch <1977> has viewed the decision to push 
for full employment and the creation of corporate structures 
as a conscious choice by the ruling class in the face of 
working class power. In the first instance then the 
capitalist side of the bargain allowed for the regulation of 
working class power. The other side of the contract was what 
was ceded to the working class; sanctions were now placed on 
capital and a wide range of political and social 
institutions were created. This expansion of political 
institutions created a sub-system of corporate structures 
grafted onto the existing political structures. As such post 
war corporatism within a liberal democracy was, as 
Panitch <1979> has pointed out 'specific to those groups 
which are class based' <26>. These developments represented 
material and political advances for the working class. The 
concessions achieved allow an analogy to be drawn with 
Marx's characterisation of the inroads British trade unions 
had made in the early 1860s as 'the political economy of 
labour'. In his inaugural address to the International,
26. Panitich, L. <1986>:'Theories of Corporatism', in, 
Working-Class Politics in Crisis Essays on Labour and the 
State. Verso, London, p.176
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speaking on the victory of the ten hour bill he states î
the great contest between the blind rule ofthe 
supply and demand laws which form the political 
economy of the middle class and social production 
controlled by foresight which forms the political 
economy of the working class ...it (the ten hour 
bill) was not only a great practical success; it 
was the victory of a principle; it was the first 
time...the political economy of the middle class 
succumbed to the political economy of the working 
class <27>.
As such I view the various institutions of the post-war 
state as arising out of working class strength. The totality 
of these state institutions and the inter-relations with the 
labour movement represented the functioning of the 
'political economy of the working class', the heart of 1945 
labourism.
In the immediate post-war period these gains had found 
a direct identification between the working class and the 
labour movement. By the late 1940s a separation was already 
underway between the working class and its organisations. 
This separation arose as a consequence of the consolidation 
of the consensus; the Labour Government had carried out its 
reform programme. The Fabian doctrine of society run by an 
elite in the best interests of the population had become a 
reality. Labour could administer this system in a good, bad.
27. Marx, K. <197> The Inaugural Address of the Association' 
in K  M a r x  a n d  F E n g l e s  c o l l e c t e d  w o r K s  v o l  Law.r.nce « 
Wishart, London, pll
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or indifferent manner, but had nothing more to say, or more 
importantly do, once the institutions of the post war state 
had been laid. Just as Labour had nothing to offer, so the 
working class within the political economy of labour had 
little need for governmental representation. The direct 
substitution of state and state agencies for working class 
collectivity began a process of blurring the divisions 
between labour movement, that is independent working class 
organisations, and state/corporatist institutions. This 
fostered a working class identification with these state 
organisations, leading to a growing divergence between the 
working class and its organisations. This divergence took 
the form of the withdrawal of the working class from 
political activity leaving the structures and organisation 
intact. The anatomy of the political relations between 
class, labour movement, and the state were not only set in 
aspic by the consolidation of the consensus, but also hidden 
though the neutrality of administering the system.
As this work will show, the entire political spectrum 
of the labour movement had a common starting point, that of 
the defence of what I have called the political economy of 
labour. The mosaic of political currents, tendencies and 
groups within the labour movement, broadly speaking can be 
divided into two categories. Firstly, those who represented
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the lineage of 1945 labourism. I understand them to be in 
the tradition described by D Coates, when he stated that. 
Keynesianism created, and was perceived as creating, as 
early as the 1930s, by the intellectuals who would lead the 
post-Attlee labour movement - a middle way between private 
capitalism and state socialism' <28>. For those in Haringey, 
who I place in this tradition (and I am mainly concerned 
with labour councillors) their intellectual status is 
unimportant, rather they were the administrators of the 
corporate structures and - as the above has shown - rested 
on a working class stratification which had by the end of 
the 1970s long since ceased to have any substance. Secondly 
there were a wide range of opponents who also based 
themselves on the defence of the political economy of labour 
but who also wished to transcend 1945 labourism. One key 
terrain over which these debates were to occur were Haringey 
council's trade union branches.
28. Coates, D. <1989>: The Crisis of Labour Industrial 
Relations and the State in Contemporary Britain. Philip 
Allan, Oxford, p.13
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Haringey council trade union organisation
There were eight major union branches or groups based 
within the borough which organised an increasing membership.
National Union of Public Employees (NUPE ) Education: This 
union is based on a workplace branch. As with all manual 
unions from 1977. there was 100% union membership through 
Union Membership Agreements (UMAs are a form of closed 
shop). The branch organises manual workers in education, who 
are split into four groups: caretakers, kitchen staff, 
school meals supervisory assistants (women who look after 
the children in the break) and coach escorts (women who 
escort infant children to school).
General and Municipal Workers Union (G@M) : This union is 
restricted to manual workers in education. Its structure and 
membership replicate those of NUPE. Each branch has 
approximately 50% of the workforce.
NUPE Manual: Workplace based, it organises all manual 
workers outside of education. This breaks down into several 
different production groups: cleaning (mainly road sweepers 
and dustmen), parks, council drivers, home helps, porters 
and caretakers (outside of schools).
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Transport and Ganaral Workers Union (T0G): Its structure and 
membership replicate those of NUPE Manual. The membership of 
these two unions has fluctuated wildly over the years; for 
example, in the 1970s the T0G was a peripheral union but now 
it organises nearly half of the available workforce.
National and Local Government Officers Association (NALGO): 
It is the main white collar union with over 2,500 members in 
1978, spread across all council services and organising 
across all the varied white collar grades. Until 1982 it was 
based around a workplace branch (that is borough based) 
which was then replaced by a hybrid shop stewards system, 
which retained elements of the old branch structure with a 
stewards structure superimposed.
Managerial, Administrative, Technical and supervisory. 
Association (MATSA); The clerical section of the G@M. It was 
formed in 1983 as a break away from NALGO.
National Union of Teachers (NUT): By far the largest 
teaching union in the borough. It comprised one branch 
covering most of the schools in the borough.
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Craft Committea: It was the first to have a shop steward, as 
opposed to a branch-based structure. It organises all non- 
supervisory DLO workers and comprises the Electrical, 
Electronic Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EEPTU) and 
the Union of Construction Allied Trades and Technicians 
(UCATT). The overwhelming majority of workers are in UCATT.
In the mid-1970s individuals to whom I give the generic 
title of 'branch reformers' emerged within a majority of 
union branches (the exceptions were the G§M and TGWU and 
NUPE General Manual). These reformers, who were part of a 
much broader left-wing development encompassing the Labour 
Party, wished to develop a more militant trade unionism, as 
one of my respondents from NALGO put it, to transform the 
branch 'from a staff association to a trade union'. In 
attempting this they confronted a number of substantial 
problems, which militated against a simple equation of 
numbers with trade union homogeneity. The workforce more 
than adequately complied with Terry's apt description of 
local government workers as 'the fragmented workforce' <29>.
29. Terry, M. <1982>: 'Organising a fragmented Workforce',
B r i t i s h  J o u r n a l  g £  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s ,  v o i .  x x  no i.
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The fragmented workforce
Haringey's workforce was fragmented in several 
different ways: i) different production groups within 
unions, ii) small workgroup size and geographical 
dispersion, and iii) the size of the part-time workforce.
i) NALGO and the general manual unions organise a wide range 
of disparate production groups; that is, these unions 
organise horizontally across a spectrum of vertically 
separate production processes and council services. This has 
a fragmentary effect on the branches. The union, rather than 
having any internal cohesion, represents an external unity 
which has to mesh together a range of different interests.
ii) The small size of workgroups and the geographical 
dispersion of the workforce are remarkably uniform 
characteristics of all the unions. Haringey covers 11 1/2 
square miles with approximately 500 workplaces; these can 
range from major office complexes which employ upward of 2 0 0  
people, down to small building sites which might have two 
operatives. While the degree of dispersion varies enormously 
depending on the type of work undertaken, a comparison 
between the overall size of the workforce and the 
concentration of workers shows how little concentrated it 
is. For example, in 1980 the DLO had just under 500 
operatives split 50:50 between those on building sites and
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yard-based maintenance workers. The average size of 
workgroups of site workers was ten. While maintenance 
workers are split into three depots of roughly 150 each, in 
reality they are even more fragmented, working either as 
individual jobbing craftsmen or in pairs, only visiting the 
yards once a day to pick up their workload. Of course, some 
groups of workers have an obvious cohesion, such as road 
sweepers and dustmen who not only work from a yard but 
within clearly defined work groups. The biggest single 
production group of 2,000 education manual workers are 
spread over a hundred schools, giving an average of 20  
workers per school. While there are a number of office 
complexes which employ over 2 0 0 people, these are often 
composite places of work, with workers divided by service 
and department.
iii) The problem of fragmentation is compounded by the level 
of part-time work. This takes on a number of different 
connotations. Not only, as might be expected, are the 
majority women (table 2:6), but part-time jobs fall 
disproportionately on the manual unions (table 2:7).
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Tabi» 286
Division between sals and female full and part-timeworkers :__________________________________ ___ _____
Year
Males Females grand
totalfulltime
part
time
total
males
full
time
part
time
total
females
66. 3,538 196 3,734 2,352 2,128 4,480 8,214
67. 3,614 210 3,824 2,376 2,204 4,580 8,404
68 . 3,502 267 3,796 2,273 2,573 4,846 8,615
69. 3,291 241 3,532 2,168 2,516 4,702 8,234
70. 3,239 198 3,437 2,568 2,356 4,924 8,361
71. 3,211 484 3,695 2,675 2,714 5,389 9,048
72. 3,436 539 3,975 3,018 2,859 5,875 9,852
73. 3,448 463 3,911 3,127 3,243 6,370 10,281
75. 3,808 589 4,397 3,167 3,999 7,166 11,563
76. 3,900 403 4,303 3,245 3,722 6,967 11,270
Source: GLC Annual statistical abstract.
The first point to note about table 2:5 is that between 
1966 and 1976 employment rose by 3,056 an increase of 37%; 
of this 81% was amongst women, consolidating their majority 
position within the workforce, which rose from 54.5% in 1966 
to 61.8% in 1976. This is more than offset, however, by the 
growing numbers of part-time women workers. While female 
employment increased by 2,487, only 893 of these jobs - or 
35% - were full time; 1,593 of these women or 64% were part- 
time. This tendency for women workers to be part-time is 
even starker when viewed as a proportion of the total 
workforce: in 1966 it stood at 25.9%, by 1976 it had risen 
to 33%. By contrast, the proportion of part-time male 
workers was 2.3% in 1966 rising to 3.5% in 1976. So 
alongside the consolidation of women as the majority of
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employees was that of their position as part-time workers,
rising from 47.5% of all female workers in 1966 to 53.4% in
1976. The contrasting figures for male workers were 5.2%
rising to 9.2%. The size of the part-time workforce
represents a dilution of the impressive growth in local
authority employment in the borough, rising from 28.4% of
the total workforce in 1966 to 34.4% in 1976. The unions
were confronted with organising approximately a third of the
workforce who were part-time. Table 2:7 shows this was
largely a problem of the manual unions.
Table 2:7__________________________________ __________
Full and part time division between manual and white 
collar______________________________
Manual_________ Non-Manual__________
Year full part full part total
_____time time total time time total all
77 2,216 2,928 5,144 5,144 1,194 6,338 11,482
78 2,209 2,932 5,142 5,258 1,424 6,682 11,823
Source: GLC: Annual statistical Abstract.
Not only were non-manual workers in the majority; in 
addition, only a few were part-time workers, which stood at 
18% split between teachers and white collar. Among manual 
workers, however, from the mid-1970s part-time workers have 
represented a majority: 56% in 1977, split 50-50 between the
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general and education branches. Table 2:8 shows the relation 
between unions and these categories of fragmentation.
Table 2:8---------------------------------------------------
Fragmentation, Concentration and Fart Time Density of local 
authority workers in Haringey.
Union Production* Service** Average work- % of part
groups groups : groups: group size time workers
Same Multi Same Multi 1-10 11-20 21-30 0 10-30 31-70
NUT X X X X
Craft X X X X
White
collar
X X X X
Ed
manual
X X X X
Gen
manual
X X X X
♦The composition of a 'production group' is made up of all 
workers of differing occupations who are required for the 
provision of a particular service. For example in a school 
the ancillary production of an educational service requires 
the combined labours of cleaners, school-meals providers, 
caretakers, etc.
**The composition of 'service groups' is contingent upon the 
council's organisation of services; for example, in Haringey 
the functions of a school are divided between the School 
Meals Department and the Education Department.
Outside a common pattern of relatively small 
workgroups, table 2:8 shows that it is not possible to 
discern any other common pattern between unions around the 
categories of fragmentation discussed above. This 
fragmentation gave rise to a range of what I classify as 
structural problems for the branch reformers in creating and
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maintaining an authority based organisation. Fragmentation 
also created differentials between branches. For example, 
both NALGO and NUPE Education had to contend with a 
fragmented membership, but the problem was augmented for 
NUPE with a part-time membership of 70%. In their attempts 
to develop authority-based organisations the branch 
reformers were confronted by a series of problems which, 
like fragmentation, were specific to local government. It 
was this specificity and the radically different nature of 
authority-based organisation from its manufacturing 
counterpart that has exercised the concern of the main body 
of local government industrial relations literature. What 
follows is an illustration of my understanding of and 
development of the main themes taken up by the literature.
Comprehending local government trade unionism
The growth in the numbers of local government shop 
stewards has been noted by many commentators. For example, 
Somerton put their number at 9,500 in 1971 and by 1977 NUPE 
alone claimed 10,000 <30>. With this phenomenal growth there 
has been a limited number of important case studies into
30. M, Somerton. <1977> 'Trade Union and Industrial 
Relations in Local Government', Studies for Trade Unionists. 
Vol 3, No 11 September.
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local authority based organisation and the role of shop 
stewards: Marchington ê Armstrong <1982>, and primarily the 
work of Terry <1983> and Kessler <1986>. These studies have 
drawn two broad conclusions. Firstly, the way in which shop 
stewards emerged, their role and relations to their members 
has been shown to be very different from their counterparts 
in manufacturing. The difference is so vast that Terry 
commented that:
the emergence of shop stewards in local 
government forces us to revise or expand our 
ideas about their development and behaviour <31>.
One of the central differences between manufacture and local
government is the lack of relevance of the workgroup. Within
the local government context it is superseded by the
occupational group. Kessler has stated that:
the existence of occupational groups in 
relatively independent services suggests that 
such terms as 'fragmentation' and 'unity' have 
very different meanings in the local authority 
context than say in private manufacture, where 
despite undoubted potential for sectionalism 
workers are usually integrated into a single 
production process <32>.
31. Terry, M. <1982>: 'Organising a fragmented Workforce',op.oit.
32. Kessler, I. <1986>: 'Local Government Shop Stewards 
Revisited', B r i t i s h  J o u r n a l  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s ,  v o iXXIV No 3, November.
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The importance of the occupational group is derived from two 
sources. Firstly the point alluded to by Kessler that is 
defining a category of worker through a specific council 
service. This means that categories of council employees, 
for example cleaners, by working in relatively independent 
services are split up into a number of distinct occupational 
groups, such as cleaners working within the schools service.
Secondly, although the Whitley structure allowed little 
scope for localised bargaining, its substantive nature was 
not conducted between the single employer and 
representatives from individual workplaces but 
representatives employed to negotiate on behalf of the 
multi- workplaces within the borough, for example, for the 
school cleaners spread across the borough's 100 schools.(Of 
course issues arose which were of concern to a single - 
workplace or individual such as the need to handle 
grievances.) Rather for an authority-based organisation the 
optimum type of negotiations were on behalf of an entire 
occupational group. For example, if an under-staffing 
agreement was negotiated for school cleaners, it would apply 
to that occupational group rather than any particular 
workplace or the cleaners colleague within the workplace, 
the school caretaker.
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The type of hierarchical production process and the 
nature of localised bargaining expands the basic bargaining 
category beyond the workplace to the occupational group. 
However, the form of localised bargaining and the nature of 
the production process provide a boundary against a 
collectivity wider than the service-based occupational 
group <33>. Consequently, although it would appear from the 
close relations between the different types of work 
undertaken that it would create a relatively homogeneous 
workforce, the organisation of production into services 
creates divisions between workers carrying out similar 
tasks, a division reaffirmed by authority-based 
organisations who bargain for occupational groups defined by 
service rather than by job. Similarly, the question of a
33. For white collar staff the use of the basic Whitley 
bargaining category for pay and conditions related to grades 
which cut across service divisions. This created a tension 
as to where the basic form of collectivity existed, whether 
across services through grades or via the organisation of 
production into services. For a number of reasons which are 
discussed extensively below, the former was how the branch 
originally organised negotiations. From the mid-1970s the 
pattern began to change when negotiations began to take 
place around service-based demands, which largely 
corresponded with occupational groups, such as social 
workers or housing officers. As I shall show, this tension 
was never fully resolved, since service organisation 
highlighted the ambiguity of organising what amounted to two 
hierarchically distinct occupational groups, managers and 
support staff.
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collectivity arising between service - deliverers and 
ancillary staff is not only impeded by the hierarchical 
division of labour but in the majority of cases there is no 
physical link between ancillary functions and service - 
delivery. They either work at different times and therefore 
do not meet each other, or ancillary workers service a range 
of different occupational groups without any common 
linkages. From the viewpoint of both an authority-based 
union organisation and their members the occupational group 
represented the optimum form of collectivity.
The replacement of the workgroup by the much larger 
constituency of the occupational group is the basis for 
comprehending the distinct local government characteristics 
of what I categorise as the sociology of domestic 
organisation: that is the relations between the authority- 
based union organisation (whether this was based on a branch 
or a shop stewards committee) and the members <34>. At the 
centre of this is the ambiguity concerning the role of shop 
stewards. Since the early 1960s it has been considered that 
the only role regarded as being central was that of
34. Kessler who also makes this point adds an important 
caveat that the difference is with manufacturing and that 
many of the characteristics would be applicable to other 
governmental unions.
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negotiator <35>. The emergence of authority-based 
organisations brought into question this key role for the 
steward (A point first noted by Fryer et al. 1974). Within 
the local government context both negotiations, and the 
equally important issue of custom and practice are no longer 
conducted on behalf of a single workplace and definable 
workgroup but ideally on behalf of an occupational group. 
Herein lies the ambiguity around the role of the steward 
within the sociology of the domestic organisation. The 
attempts to theorise this position have been far less 
successful than the more descriptive statements of the 
ambiguity surrounding the role of the local government 
steward. On the basis of this narrative I have attempted to 
provide a slightly different framework for viewing the role 
of the local government shop steward.
The second point the research has shown up is that the 
development of authority- based organisations was very 
different front manufacturing. Both Terry and Kessler have 
addressed the problem of how shop stewards structures 
evolved among the fragmented workforce. Terry's research
35. A less forceful and somewhat broader role was ascribed 
to stewards prior to the emergence of semi-independence from 
the official union structures from the late 1950s. For 
example contrast Goodman, 6 Whittingham, 1973 study Shop 
Stewards with the 1947 study by Barou, 1947 British Trade 
Unions.
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showed that where an effective authority wide organisation 
developed 'one individual was crucial to its success and to 
its continued existence* <36>. He categorised such an 
individual as the 'key steward*. The key steward had three 
attributes; mobility, access to members and 'access to 
decision-taking levels of management*. For the key steward 
to emerge there had to be managerial sponsorship of the 
workplace organisation. When management chose to strengthen 
local organisation for their own ends the 'key steward* was 
given the necessary support <37>. For Kessler managerial 
sponsorship was both expanded and refined to include a 
political dimension of the active participation of 
councillors and the necessity for a centralised personal 
department. Kessler can also be said to have developed his 
own variant of a sponsorship thesis arising from within the 
union structure, that of the 'artificial imposition of a 
representational figure*. For this to arise a catalyst was 
necessary:
for instance some form of industrial action or 
an outside influence, usually a branch officer or 
full-time officer impressing upon the workers the 
need and the value of a collective response <38>.
36. Terry, M. <1982>: 'Organising a fragmented Workforce*, 
op.cit.
37. ibid
38. Kessler, I. <1986>:'Local Government Shop Stewards 
Revisited*, op.cit.
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The centrality of the occupational group, the ambiguous role 
of the steward and the question of what agency could develop 
an authority-based organisation were all issues that the 
reformers confronted. In doing so, they were to 
fundamentally alter the sociology of the domestic 
organisation. In carrying out this change they also had to 
confront another question that the literature has tended to 
subsume into the sociology of the domestic organisation, 
that is, the question of economic leverage <39>.
Within the local government context it is the case that
the very notion of economic leverage is problematic. The use
values created were non-strategic as they lacked relations
with any other sector of the productive process. This placed
the branches in a relatively weak bargaining position as
opposed, for example, to rail workers or miners. The concept
of 'economic leverage' itself is something of a misnomer,
(although I continue to use it for lack of a suitable
alternative) since the union-council bargaining relationship
was removed from the market with council revenue taken from
existing surplus, government grants and rates. By not
39. By viewing the steward from the sociological vantage 
point of the domestic organisation the steward's role is 
cast as a democratic question that is who do stewards 
represent. The other side to this is the type of economic 
leverage open to these workers and the interaction with the 
domestic organisation based on the stewards ability to weild 
economic leverage.
61
creating exchange value, the impact of industrial action, as 
an indication of trade union power, has the reverse effect 
on the employer, saving revenue through the non-payment of 
wages. Within this general framework, the Haringey unions 
will be shown to possess economic leverage, and inside 
individual branches to exhibit highly differentiated levels 
of economic leverage. Linking together the sociology of the 
authority-based organisation with the notion of bargaining 
power provides a starting point to understanding the dynamic 
behind the type of branches that the reformers in Haringey 
confronted and the substance behind many of the issues which 
were to arise within the reformed branches <40>.
The nature of the Haringey branches
Within Haringey workplace branches predated the 
borough's formation: for instance the T§G and NUT date back 
to the turn of the century. Given the importance of national 
bargaining to local government unions this in itself would
40. Consequentially while Kessler's explanation for the lack 
of organisation among female manual workers (like home 
helps) through an argument around gender and fragmentation, 
is valid, I have tried to take the argument one stage 
further. I have sought to comprehend the subordination of 
female manual workers to the dominant occupational groups as 
a relationship which is primarily economic in character. I 
will show, for instance, how this worked itself through in 
the case of the subordination of manual women workers in the 
schools (cleaners and dinner ladies) to the caretakers. One 
important issue this raises is the articulation of 
occupational hierarchy within the unions and gender.
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not have taken on great significance, except for the 
peculiarity of the negotiating structure within the London 
area. From the borough's inception local Whitley Committees 
were created between the branches and the council, known as 
Local Joint Works Committees (or Staff Side in the case of 
NALGO). This meant that from 1965 the branch leaders carried 
out a local bargaining role within the context of tight 
national agreements, creating a considerable amount of 
autonomy for the branches from full time officers 
(FTO) <41>. This bears out the point made by 
Boraston et al. <1977> that 'a relatively narrow scope for 
workplace bargaining may assist workgroup organisation to be 
self-reliant within permitted limits' <42>. With the 
exception of the Craft Committee and the NUT, who organised 
single occupational groups, all of the other branches were 
dominated by clearly definable occupational groups: dustmen 
in the case of the General Manual branches; caretakers among 
the Education manual branches; and senior managers in 
NALGO.
41. Even in the mid-1980s there was still a considerable 
difference in the level of autonomy from FTOs afforded to 
London as opposed to the rest of the county.
42. Boraston, I., Clegg, H. and Rimmer, M. <1975>: Workplace 
and Union: A Study of Local Relations in Fourteen Unions. 
Heinemann London, page 179.
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In spite of the very different sociology of the their 
domestic organisations, the common denominator which exists 
between local government and manufacturing is that the basic 
building block of the branches is the exercise of economic 
leverage. This commonality has enabled the utilisation of a 
manufacturing frame of reference to conceptualise the 
sectionalisms within the Haringey branches and the 
subsequent alterations that they underwent.
Batstone et al. <1977> argued that if the union is important
for determining the workers wages' and conditions, that is
effecting the workers' 'life chances', then a domestic
organisation would have considerable 'institutional
centrality'. They stated:
We may talk of the union having a high degree 
of institutional centrality when it is 
importantly involved in determining the 
wages, conditions, and work of its members.
For such centrality leads to 'mobilization of 
bias' in favour of the union. This term 
refers to a 'set of predominant values, 
beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures 
("rules of the game") that operate 
systematically and consistently to the 
benefit of certain persons and groups at the 
expense of others' <43>.
In this study, what is observed first is a 'sectional 
centrality' which I define as occurring when a definable
43. Batstone, E. Boraston, I. and Frenkel, S. <1977>: Shop 
Stewards In Action: The organisation of W o r k p l a c e  C o n f l i c t  
and Accommodation. Blackwell, Oxford, p 10.
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occupational group is able to shape branch structures to 
maximise its own sectional interests to the detriment of 
other definable occupational groups. Batstone et al. touch 
on the question of sectional centrality, noting that this 
can occur when certain groups of workers occupy strategic 
positions in production. They claim that in this context 
workplace institutions will 'probably change to accommodate 
and recognise power of this kind' <44>. Interestingly 
enough they cite Turner et al's. <1967> study of car workers 
as an example of this type of domestic organisation <45>.
For the car worker, caretaker, and senior manager alike what 
generated the very different types of domestic organisation 
and local bargaining relation was their ability to exercise 
economic leverage. The common denominator between sectional 
centrality in manufacturing and local government unions was 
then the exercise of bargaining power. The major division 
between Haringey and the car workers alluded to by Batstone 
et al. was that within local government that exercise of 
power was not an expression of the interest of the workgroup 
but specific occupational groups. The basic explanatory 
framework I have developed for explaining sectional 
centrality also unifies the two levels on which I have
44 Ibid p.10 
45. Ibid, p 11.
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viewed local government unions; the sociology of the 
domestic organisation and the guestion of economic leverage. 
The unifying factor is found in the nature of the local 
government production process.
Table 2:8 has shown the entire council workforce was 
fragmented, and as such all branches had a fragmented 
membership. This universal character of fragmentation 
obscures however a more precise understanding; behind the 
fragmented workforce was the fragmentation of the 
occupational group. The basic type of production in local 
government consists of the provision of services either to 
individuals or small groups of consumers throughout a 
borough. For the council there is a need to provide a range 
of outlets for any particular service. When this is looked 
at from the viewpoint of the labour process, what is 
observed is not a single production process where an 
occupational group carries out different coordinated tasks, 
as is normally the case in manufacture, but the replication 
of the same task at many workplaces across the borough. Each 
individual or group of service workers works at the point at 
which a part of the service is consumed, the completion of a 
cycle of service delivery, whether it be teaching or school 
meals. A number of services, such as street cleaning, do not
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have this immediate relationship with consumers? however, 
the basic argument remains applicable as the effect of the 
division of labour is also to fragment these occupational 
groups. A similar pattern of fragmentation was followed in 
the case of ancillary and white collar staff, to take an 
example from each; school secretaries and school caretakers. 
Both occupational groups are fragmented by the number of 
schools within the borough. For the council, however, in all 
cases each point of service delivery and its ancillary and 
administrative support represents only part of the whole; 
this division of labour creates the main characteristic of 
local government, the fragmented workforce. Behind this 
stands the main problem for the unions; the production 
process spontaneously fragments the core grouping for the 
union, that of the occupational group.
While all occupational groups were fragmented by the 
production process, sectional centrality arose from among 
those occupational groups who could overcome the spontaneous 
fragmentation imposed on them by the production process. In 
doing so they achieved a collectivity and came to dominate 
their branches. An integral part of sectional centrality was 
that to varying degree the other occupational groups within 
a branch remained fragmented along the lines given by the 
production process. This meant that beneath the surface of
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the formal equality of union organisation, the majority of 
branch members remained fragmented as they were unable to 
achieve a collectivity of their occupational group. The 
criteria for achieving sectional centrality varied between 
the different categories of union branch.
Within the General branches the key differences between 
occupational groups was between those who were depot-based 
and those who were not. It was the depot which provided an 
arena for both formal and informal interaction among 
fragmented occupational groups. This allowed for the 
exercise of economic leverage to be built from the depot 
upwards and the dominance among depot-based occupational 
groups of the more economically powerful dustmen.
Without the depot as a focus for the majority of 
workers there was no other route to forming a cohesion for 
their occupational group. My research shows that the 
exceptions to this occurred where two key variables existed: 
the ability to accrue free time during the working day and 
economic leverage. Both were characteristics of caretakers 
and senior managers; free time allowed them to run their 
branches and both had considerable economic leverage. While 
the prerequisite for the dustmen's power was based on 
forming a collectivity afforded by the depot and expressed 
through the union branch, for the caretakers and senior
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managers their ability to exercise power was ceded to them, 
as individuals, by their location in production. The branch 
was far more an adjunct to that leverage than a precondition 
for the expression of leverage.
Without the combination of the interaction of the two 
variables, economic leverage and free time, occupational 
groups were incapable of overcoming their fragmentation; 
they could neither spontaneously generate an organisation of 
the occupational group as a means of overcoming their lack 
of bargaining rights nor could they generate bargaining as 
an occupational group which would have allowed them to 
develop their organisation. This created a vacuum which 
represented the problem for the branch reformers in moving 
the branches from sectional to institutional centrality.
What agency would generate bargaining for the different 
occupational groups and what interaction would this entail 
in relation to devolving workplace organisation? This work 
will reveal a more complex picture than at present exists 
from the work of Terry and Kessler but will also show 
elements of both Terry's managerial sponsorship and, in 
particular, Kessler's 'artificial imposition of a 
representational figure'. Alongside these branches 
constructed around sectional centrality was the existence of 
an 'informal bargaining system'. Formally the workforce
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confronted an extremely hierarchical management, underneath 
this formality however was a general lack of control over 
the labour process, which gave rise to unofficial 
negotiations.
Unofficial Negotiations
There were two reasons why management lacked control 
over the production process. Firstly, for the majority of 
manual workers the labour process was characterised by 
'formal' rather than 'real' subordination, in the sense that 
neither were workers placed under the direct supervision of 
managers in the immediate process of production (not least 
due to their dispersal and fragmentation) nor, given the 
extremely low level of technology, was there any substantial 
base for the technical subordination of this kind of labour 
<46>. Second, for all workers the organisation of work was 
removed from the discipline of market mechanisms, leaving
46. Eiger <1979> in his critique of Braverman has commented 
on the complexities surrounding Marx's use and development 
of the terms formal and real subordination. I do not 
attempt to put forward a view on this complex question 
except to note that the present day usage of these terms 
takes place at least a century after Marx's usage of them to 
describe the transition from manufacture to modern industry. 
As such, the use of this terminology can only be an 
analogous one and suffers the limitations of all analogies. 
My main concern throughout this work is with the interaction 
between control and resistance surrounding the labour 
process.
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the managerial functions as defined by Edwards of 
'coordination and the exercise of authority' <47> to be met 
by other means. The replacement of market relations by the 
regulations of public bodies and internal council auditing 
created a range of problems for management's enforcement of 
work discipline. Work was carried out on a cost plus basis, 
with any increase in costs being met by the council. If 
tasks only have notional costs which can overrun without any 
implications for the workers or the service management, this 
removes a major imperative from management and with it a 
discipline on the labour process. Another form of external 
constraint was removed due to the use values created by 
local government workers lacking any relation with other 
sectors of the productive process. Lastly, the market which 
the council faced was comprised generally of atomised 
consumers who had little power to impose their will over the 
work performed. When the council was the monopoly supplier 
of these services it could neither lose its market share nor 
incur losses. Without the market, the linkage between 
technical coordination and the exercise of managerial 
authority was essentially through a set of political 
determinants. These determinants had a liberal ethos.
47. Edwards, R. <1979>: Contested Terrain: The 
Transformation of the Workplace In the Twentieth C e n t u r y .  
Heinemann London.
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expressed in the form of good working practices and benign 
disciplinary codes, which derived from the more general 
conditions of the post-war consensus. The interaction 
between the political dimension and relations of production 
formed a system of control which was extremely hierarchical 
and bureaucratic, as a mechanism to overcome the limitations 
of formal subordination and the lack of market mechanism 
governing the productive process. Against this was workers' 
spontaneous struggles within the labour process.
The interaction between the forms of control open to 
management and the workers' spontaneous struggle created the 
preconditions for a struggle over time to take place. For 
the workers the main element of informal bargaining was the 
winning of free time from the working day, summed up by one 
of my respondents as a 'time bonus', a term which I shall 
also employ. For the worker, the importance of time bonuses 
arose negatively out of the fact that bargaining over money 
was largely ruled out, and positively because time could 
substitute for money. On the side of management, there was 
an attempt to integrate workers' struggles over time into a 
form of control by bargaining free time in exchange for work 
and discipline. Time, apart from being an area of 
contention, also represented an area of convergence between 
worker and management which allowed the time bonus to
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represent the unofficial bargaining counter between workers 
and management. In so far as the time bonus was an element 
in the workers' lives, it was an individualistic and sub­
trade union relation with management The branches were 
incidental, the bargain was struck between workers and 
foremen, generating a division between workers and branch.
The problem stated
Those within NUPE Education and NALGO who wished to 
reform the branches were confronted by; a fragmented 
workforce, an extremely bureaucratic and hierarchical 
management structure, a complex and extensive informal 
bargaining system, and most importantly an existing 
workplace organisation based on sectional centrality. The 
problem for the branch reformers in NUPE Education and NAIX30 
can be summarized as to how they were to shift the branches 
from a sectional to an institutional centrality. The journey 
from sectional to institutional centrality was one largely 
initiated and carried out by workers whose conceptions of 
trade unionism were based on the manufacturing model of shop 
floor organisation, the core of which, particularly within 
NALGO, was the building of a shop stewards system which was 
equated with class and power. In attempting, and failing, to 
replicate the manufacturing model the branch reformers were
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however to create a form of workplace trade unionism 
specific to local government, one where the far more 
ambiguous role of workplace organisation was to become 
apparent, and the interaction between politics and trade 
unionism was to take on increasing significance. For the 
change within these branches not only signified an 
alteration in their domestic arrangements, it also 
represented an illustration of how a fragment of the labour 
movement and the working class altered and attempted to come 
to terms with the ending of the post-war consensus. Such 
"weighty'• matters were not considered, as the branches 
entered what was uncharted territory.
Chapter three 74 Part one
The Evolution of MALOQt 19CS-198Q
An overview of the Branch
Haringey NALGO was formed in 1965 by the amalgamation 
of the Hornsey, Tottenham and Wood Green branches and part 
of the Metropolitan District branch which covered 
education. While no figures are available for the old 
branches (almost certainly Tottenham and Wood Green Labour- 
run authorities would have had the majority of members) 
their combined membership totalled 1,273 <1>. Elections 
were held at the Annual General Meeting for branch 
officers, the most important being the chair, secretary, 
and treasurer. Annual elections also occurred for 
departmental representatives which took place on a 
department-wide basis; for example all members of the 
housing department were eligible to vote for their 
representatives. These two groups - the branch officers and 
departmental representatives - formed the Executive 
Committee which met bi-monthly to run and administer the 
branch. On a daily basis these functions were carried out 
by the key branch officers primarily the secretary. The
1. The figures for branch membership have been complied from 
branch subscriptions returns at NALGO HQ.
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executive also formed a number of sub-committees which were 
accountable to it. The most important of these comprised 
the NALGO members sitting on 'staff-side'. From its 
formation until 1980 the branch secretary was Norman Child; 
as with all the other leading branch officers. Child was a 
senior council officer. I will use the generic title of 
'the old leadership' to refer to this grouping. It was not 
until 1980 that the first branch officer, the secretary, 
obtained job release to carry out full time union duties.
The formation of Haringey created a large branch, the 
membership of which was divided into two major occupational 
groups; support staff, and core managerial grades. The 
managerial grades were those of Serving Officer (SO) and the 
grade above that. Principal Officer (PO). The position of a 
worker within these grades, for example being a P02 as 
opposed to P03, corresponded to a definition of 
responsibility which equated with either direct supervisory 
or administrative responsibility. (From the mid-70s an 
important sub-division among the professional staff emerged 
which is taken up below). The overwhelming majority of 
workers were concentrated in the three town halls of the 
boroughs which had formed Haringey. This allowed the branch 
secretary to cover workplace problems. At the time of
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writing, Roger Roles, the council's senior insurance officer
and for many years a member of NALGO's National Executive,
was the last of the old leadership still working for the
borough. He described the secretary's role in the 1960s and
1970s as being 'much more involved in the day to day
operation because the branch was so much smaller'. He saw
this in marked contrast to the 1980s:
I get the impression that because of the 
various procedures they have these days the 
lot of the branch secretary is now on a much 
more corporate basis. He hasn't got the time 
to be involved in departmental issues unless 
they have an across-the-board effect <2>.
The branch minutes, in comparison with those of any other of
the borough's branches are a model of clarity, betraying the
occupations of their writers. According to Roles:
The minutes were precise because people in 
negotiations knew that words meant things, 
should and shall, shall and will have two 
different connotations, one is mandatory and 
the other isn't. When you are negotiating it 
is essential that you get those right, 
because at some stage, some bugger's going to 
challenge you <3>.
These minutes provide a window into a well ordered and 
regulated branch, the pace of which was relaxed and whose 
tenor was one of intimacy. A sense of its character may be
2. Roger Roles side 'a' [hereafter RR].
3. RR. side 'a'.
77
gained from the minutes of one of the first discussions of 
the newly formed branch, which took place between the 
treasurer and other executive members about centralising 
branch records:
The treasurer considered the keeping by him 
of a central record of members and 
subscriptions paid, would be essential to the 
efficient carrying out of his duties as 
treasurer <4>.
The branch was both hierarchical and paternalistic, 
though this is a view which Roles strongly contested. 'It 
certainly wasn't paternalistic', he said, 'some of the 
debates at the executive were very vitriolic and of a very 
high standard. The quality of argument and debate in those 
days was very high' <5>. Yet in his defence a picture 
emerges of a hierarchical structure with a clear line of 
command:
The officers were doing the leg work. They were 
coming back with positive recommendations... It 
may sound critical, but I went to this years 
AGM [1987]... You had motions which were being 
put, with no positive recommendation either 
way. I think within the branch the branch 
officers have got to lead; if you stay silent 
it can be taken you are acquiescing. It 
certainly didn't happen in those days <6>.
4. Executive Committee minute [here after EC minute] October 
1965.
6. RR. side 'a
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Within this framework it is possible to point to 
certain bureaucratic excesses within the branch. This is 
revealed in the following account of how the leading branch 
officers amplified their authority over the executive. The 
branch leadership and other senior council officers 
dominated Staff-Side. They used this negotiating body as an 
'inner cabinet', where its deliberations remained 
confidential from other executive members <7>.
The length of tenure of the branch leaders, their 
position as senior council officers, the branches' 
paternalism and hierarchy were manifestations of a branch 
which functions on the basis of a sectional centrality in 
the interests of the core managerial grades <8>.
Sectional Centrality
At the centre of the characterisation of the branch as 
being dominated by the sectional centrality of the managers 
was the economic domination by the core managerial grades.
7. This point was made by Jeff Rudin, who was the first 
member of the new branch leadership to be elected to the 
Executive committee (see below).
8. A similar length of tenure in the leadership is 
observable in the borough's other branches, including my 
other case study NUPE Education.
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Roger Roles did not dispute this point. In defending it he 
emphasised that:
Whilst some would argue that initially the 
top echelons of your grades benefited, in 
actual fact if you can, what I would call lift 
the lid of a pot and create a vacuum, you've 
got room to bring other grades up and that 
certainly happened <9>.
His claim that the raising of the top echelons benefited
other grades would be strongly contested by my other
respondents. For example Ray Gillard, a senior personnel
manager who worked for the borough since 1970 pointed out
that the type of negotiations the branch entered into
created a tendency where:
Agreements were aimed towards the middle group 
of employees, and a lot of the lower grades 
were left out, because they didn't have much 
clout. Secondly most of the agreements were 
unrelated to equal opportunities or anything 
like that. They were all based on improving the 
lot of core officers, white males. A typical 
staff association <10> .
The sectional centrality of the branch can be said to 
have been institutionalised in 1974 with the establishment
9. RR. side 'a'.
10. Ray Gillard side'a' [hereafter RG]. It was only in the 
latter part of the 1970s that the emphasis in negotiations 
began to shift towards lower paid workers. That was the 
support staff and the lowest end of the SO grade. Opposition 
to this shift was to underlie the break away (which Gillard 
was part of) from NALGO and the formation of the MATSA 
branch in 1983.
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of the 'Haringey Job Evaluation Scheme'. This scheme arose 
from the London Whitley Job Evaluation Scheme, and 
represented the growth of local bargaining based on criteria 
for an individual's incremental advancement between and 
within SO and PO grades. The scheme provided a mechanism for 
the advancement of individual workers generating a form of 
wage drift between services. Inbuilt into this system and 
therefore the life chances of the managerial grades was the 
NALGO branch (who according to Gillard virtually designed 
the entire scheme) which not only compiled the claim for 
upgrading but also jointly heard any appeal <11>.
It was not that the core managerial grades were endowed
with this strong bargaining position but the manner they
used it which provides the basis for my characterisation of
sectional centrality. The impact of bargaining across
service for the managers epitomised by the 1974 agreement
effectively split the branch into two between the core
managerial group and the support staff. For the managerial
grades the cross-service bargaining mechanism was the means
by which they asserted their economic leverage which
11. Although the advancement made by Haringey's core 
managers may have been unusual, it was not exceptional.
Other NALGO branches benefited from the internal labour 
market. The best localised package I have been able to 
identify was not negotiated by a union branch but by the 
GLC's staff association
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excluded the support staff (and certain professionals who 
were excluded, a point taken up below) . This was the basis 
on which the relations between dominant and subordinate 
occupational groups functioned within the branch structures. 
It was this cross-service bargaining structure which 
obstructed the emergence of service-based bargaining. For 
the support staff these existing bargaining relations 
represented the mechanism by which the union structure 
fragmented them. This did not take the form of a 
bureaucratic exclusion from the branch structures, but was 
in some ways more insidious. While they were able to take 
part in the formal trappings of the branch they were 
excluded from the "real branch" by the bargaining relation 
and in their fragmented state had no means by which to 
reorientate the branches' negotiating priorities. It was 
this which generated the branch's characteristics and the 
way in which it was constructed. Not least among these 
characteristics was the role of the departmental 
representatives.
Departmental representatives 1965-1975
The issue of workplace representatives became an important 
and controversial one from the middle of the 1970s, but in 
the preceding decade they were a quiescent and uncontentious
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part of the branch structure. Departmental representatives
differed from stewards in that they were elected to cover a
whole department and accountable to the branch executive
rather than the workplace. Their main role and indeed origin
was that of collecting union dues. Roles saw them as central
to the fabric of the branch:
it was the departmental representatives' duty 
to collect the subscriptions each month; that 
meant they had to go and see the members each 
month; that's when complaints were made. You 
were very close to your members <12>.
In many unions from a similar starting point, the
collector had evolved into the more authoritative and
independent figure of the shop steward. Clegg <1954> was
able to make this point:
In many industries there is no official 
provision for a shop steward... The need for a 
spokesman to deal with management on the many 
trivial issues which arise is not thereby 
removed. It is easy to see that matters of 
this sort are likely to be brought to the 
attention of the collecting steward who is 
probably the only officer of the union on hand. 
Unless he refuses the task with determination 
he is likely to become the regular spokesman of 
his fellows <13>.
12. RR side 'b'.
13. Clegg, H, A. <1954>: General Union A Study of the 
National Union of General and Municipal Workers. Basil 
Blackwell, Oxford, p.lll.
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I could find no evidence of departmental representatives 
blurring into a shop steward's role, or any substantial 
tension between them and the leadership. Rather it was their 
weakness which is observable.
Departmental representatives did, however, begin to 
expand from their original function as collectors. This 
embraced such minor things as distributing Public Service 
(NALGO's national magazine) and the branch magazine to the 
most important task which they acquired, that of calling 
departmental meetings. It is not possible to date the start 
of these or their frequency. Roles was undoubtedly right 
when he stated that 'I think these things develop, don't 
they, as issues come up' <14>. Their ad hoc nature is borne 
out by the minutes which mention them only at times of 
disruption, for example, a meeting of the housing department 
in 1970 over the major issue of ending Saturday 
working <15>. Their absence from the executive committee or 
sub-committee minutes, shows them to be a weak counterpoint 
to the executive.
This lack of contention surrounding the role of 
departmental representatives was partly due to the branch's
14. RR. side 'a'.
15. EC. minute June 1970.
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negotiating structure which excluded any relation between 
negotiations and the departmental representatives. The 
formal role of the departmental representatives can then be 
seen to obscure the power relations within the branch by 
providing representation disconnected from economic power.
It may well have been that members felt dissatisfied with 
their branch but understood that their representatives had 
no power to alter their situation.
The impact of industrial unrest on the Branch 1970-1974
A characteristic of this period was the extension of 
industrial unrest from those unions based within the 
manufacturing sector to unions representing workers in a far 
wider spectrum of employment, including local government 
workers. Walsh <1981> has seen this as a period of militancy 
within local government and Terry <1982> has gone so far as 
to view local government as ' a new strike prone industry'. 
From the late 1960s strike action began amongst local 
government workers, much of it unofficial (for example the 
1969 London dustmen's strike). Its depth can be gauged by 
the embrace of industrial action by the white collar unions, 
for example, in 1971 NALGO and NUT members took strike 
action over their London weighting claims. It is against 
this backdrop of the rise of industrial militancy among
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local government unions that the maintenance of branch 
homogeneity has to be judged. Industrial action did affect 
the branch, gradually altering its routines, but this was 
largely a result of external forces, primarily the official 
union structures above branch level rather than any 
groundswell from the membership for a more militant course 
of action. While dissent among the branch membership 
existed, it was notable by its weakness.
Between 1970 and 1973 the branch was confronted on a 
number of occasions by the issue of industrial action. In 
January 1970 a special meeting of the executive took place 
to discuss a forthcoming special conference on the pay 
claim. NALGO nationally was recommending acceptance. The 
minutes start with a precis of the representatives' reports 
on the mood of the membership, which was one of general 
dissatisfaction, with opinions divided on the course of 
action to take. Some called for rejection coupled with 
demands for immediate action, others for acceptance, linked 
to the demand 'to go all out on negotiations for the second 
stage making it quite clear that militant action should be 
considered, if the negotiations did not come up to 
expectations' <16>. The minutes continued with voices from
16. EC minute May 1970.
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the Executive urging caution and calling for a vote against
action which was supported <17>.
The branch took its first tentative steps in
industrial action in October 1972, when the executive 'fully
supported' the social workers' work to rule' <18>. Rather
then emanating from branch members, it came from a
resolution by the Metropolitan District Council calling on
branches to support the work to rule <19>. In May 1974
industrial action occurred over London weighting, when for
the first time the Executive came into conflict with the
membership. As with the social workers, it originated in
Roles view 'very much from national and district' <20>. The
action they took was to boycott local election duties which:
was quite a penalty because the pay wasn't bad 
and it was extra pay because you got paid for 
your day's work as well. So to get members to 
do that was quite significant and it had an 
impact as I recall... but my memory fades <21>.
This action represented a boycott of voluntary overtime 
outside of the workers' normal duties, affecting only a few
17. ibid.
18. EC minute's October 1973.
19. ibid.
20. RR. side 'a'.
21. RR. side 'a'.
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core officers. In spite of this the branch was faced with 
members who worked normally. Given the conservatism of the 
branch, it was surprising to find that the minutes show that 
these members were disciplined. From this evidence, the 
picture is one where the leadership, far from lagging behind 
the members, were if anything ahead of them! Roles rightly 
pointed out that 'obviously you had a large section of 
people who didn't believe in strike action in those days; it 
was something which hadn't happened in local government and 
in Haringey in particular' <22>.
An aspect of this conservatism of the Executive 
Committee is found in their narrow definition of what 
constituted trade union issues. Throughout this period it 
was expressed in the insulation of the branch from the wider 
labour movement. For example, in 1974 a resolution to 
affiliate to Haringey's trades council was lost <23>. I 
could find only one example of major dissent over the 
Executive's narrow view of trade unionism. In February 1973 
a motion from a Mr Hughes calling on the NALGO branch to 
express 'its opposition to the government's counter­
inflation policy on the grounds that it is a serious erosion
22. RR. side 'a'
23. EC minute January 1974.
of traditional trade union rights' was lost. The minute 
commented that:
Mr Hughes was disappointed at the decision 
and was of the opinion that the executive 
spent the majority of its time carping on what 
he considered incidental matters, whilst 
letting a thing like this go unheeded <24>.
Mr Hughes represented the "left wing" of the branch 
leadership; Roles remembered him as a 'traditional Labour 
Party member', holding 'quite strong political views' <25>. 
This episode, as with the debates on industrial action, 
provides a point of reference against which to assess the 
radical changes which were, in a very short space of time, 
to overtake the branch.
From the mid-1970s a younger, more radical element 
began to be elected to the executive committee. Jeff Rudin, 
the first of such people, is first mentioned in an Executive 
Committee minute of May 1974. People like Rudin brought to 
the branch a militant conception of trade unionism, moulded 
by post-68 student radicalism and reflecting the direct 
action ethos of industrial militancy of the early 1970s. In 
the timescale of that militancy, it was only after the more
24. EC minute February 1973.
25. RR. side 'a'.
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general wave of industrial militancy had declined, that 
these militants began to have an impact on the branch.
The rise of a Professional Sub-Group
From the middle 1970s it is possible to identify the 
rise of a sub-group among the professional workers, 
initially within social services and housing. From a 
relatively small professional establishment in these 
services, a qualitative and quantitative growth took place. 
This involved an expansion of existing posts and more 
importantly the creation of new ones, as the scope and 
nature of the workload of these services expanded. The 
importance for the branch of this professional sub-group was 
that the new branch leadership was to be drawn exclusively 
from their ranks.
My categorisation of these professionals as a sub-group 
is derived from the nature of the work they undertook. For 
professionals, like social workers, community workers and 
housing advice officers, their work put them outside of what 
were the two main categories which characterised the core 
managerial grades; supervision and administration 
responsibility. Instead, this sub-group was primarily 
concerned with the regulation, both statutory and voluntary, 
of the social aspects of council services, dealing directly
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or closely with the public. This created an anomaly over 
grading; with SO and PO grades corresponding to a definition 
of responsibility which equated either with direct 
supervisory or administrative responsibility. For the sub­
group neither area was central, placing it partially outside 
of the managerial grades. I have established the existence 
of this anomaly through graph 3:1. This shows a comparative 
employment profile for Social Services and a selection of 
other council services in 1979. The disproportion of workers 
at the top of the administrative grades among social 
services employees equates in part to both support staff and 
elements of the sub-group within that service. This is in 
marked contrast with the employment profile in these other 
services and denotes the lack of a sub-group.
Within this broad outline, the rise of the sub-group in each 
service has its own particular starting point, such as the 
Seebohm Report in relation to Social Services and in housing 
the 1974 Housing Act. The Housing Act can be identified as 
the major turning point from the demolition of housing stock 
and the building of high rise accommodation towards housing 
renewal. Linked to this was a move from an administrative 
approach towards housing stock, to the involvement of 
tenants, epitomised by the growth of housing action centres 
and housing aid. This 'humanising' of relations between
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council officers and clients created the demand for a
different type of worker. Mary Corbishley, a housing officer
and a leading NALGO activist during the late 1970s and early
1980s, perceived these workers as having less of the
traditional 'management executive perception, a controlling
perception, towards housing clients', instead a more caring
attitude and 'concerned with the tenants' control of their
community' <26>. These jobs engendered their own liberal
ethos and provided a cohesion for these workers who, albeit
very loosely, were bound together by a caring ideology. The
expansion of this type of council service created its own
demand for those who were interested in 'helping others'.
Corbishley, in contrasting them to the core managerial
grades more than adequately catches the social
characteristic of this sub-group:
The radicals were in housing and social services, 
increasingly libraries. These were the posts taken 
by the 60's generation of university graduates. 
Prior to that local government had been an area of 
employment for the upwardly mobile working class, 
moving into lower middle class. Their attitudes 
would be in keeping with that upward mobility; get 
more money, a comfortable job, and not worry too 
much wabout what you're doing. Then you got all 
these boring people who said: I want a satisfying 
job, I want to achieve something, what can I do? 
Become a social worker. This must have had an 
effect on the perception of the union <27>.
26. Mary Corbishley tape 1 side 'a'[hereafter MC].
27. MCI. side 'a'.
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I will adopt the term used by Corbishley - that is, 
'radicals' - to describe the professional sub-group's 
social political and trade union views, distinguishing them 
from those of the core managers. It was from among the ranks 
of the radicals that a self selection process occurred 
whereby a number of them become directly involved in 
transforming the branch. I will use the label 'branch 
reformers' to distinguish them from the 'old leadership'. 
Corbishley's description of the radicals as the '60s 
generation' of university graduates was certainly a correct 
characterisation of the nucleus of the branch reformers. All 
these initial activists, (with the exception of Corbishley, 
who had attended teacher training college,) had a university 
degree. In many cases they had no formal professional 
qualifications for their career in local government. For 
example Jeff Rudin had gained an MA in Anthropology from 
London University and got a job with Haringey council as a 
social worker. Rudin recalled that he was appointed despite 
the fact that the application asked for:
A professionally qualified social worker. I 
wasn't professionally qualified as a social 
worker or community worker. I should say so- 
called professional <2 8>.
28. Jeff Rudin [hereafter JR ] 1 side 'a'.
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Similar accounts were related by Bob Hatherway and Joan
Monroe. Hatherway, who was to became branch secretary in
1980, had trained as an engineer at Cambridge, looking
forward to a career as a naval architect. After finishing
his degree, he was offered a job designing war ships which
he declined. He ended up :
as a temporary handyman at a children's home to 
provide an income; that was June 1973. By 
December *73 it was clear the permanent 
handyman was coming back and it was clear that 
I enjoyed the child-care, social work side of 
that business. I applied and got a job as a 
residential social worker <29>.
Joan Munroe, the second identifiable 'radical' to become
active within the branch, after Rudin, commented that she
had gone to university getting a degree in computer science,
but had become:
more interested in politics than computing, and 
went straight on to do a certificate in 
community work, being a useful way of 
organising. I went through a lot of political 
changes at university, an anarchist one year, 
a socialist the next, that sort of thing. When 
I came to work in Haringey, it was my first 
permanent job <30>.
29. BH1. side 'a'.
30. JM. side 'a'. These limited accounts would seem to more 
than adequately bear out the education thesis put forward by 
Niclsion, N., Ursell, G. and Blyton, P. <1981>: The Dynamics 
of White Collar Unionism. Academic Press, London.
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A wider perspective on the division between the old 
branch leadership and the radicals is gained by contrasting 
the quotations from the radicals with the following 
testimony offered by Roles on growing up in the Tottenham of 
the 1930s:
I had led a very tough existence as a child, 
we were a very poor family. My father had been 
unemployed for a number of years in the 
recession and when he died he had never earned 
more than £3 ten shillings a week, that was his 
maximum earnings. He was a waterman... <31>.
There was a generational division which was extreme; 
one group was coming to the end of their working lives, the 
other just beginning. In addition, the old branch leadership 
had a lived experience which spanned the 1930s, the war and 
the emergence of the post-war consensus. The radicals, by 
contrast, were part of the generation who grew up within the 
welfare state; this formed the basis of their very different 
world view. It is illustrated through their perspective on 
work. The jobs they acquired were incidental to their lives 
and were then 'intellectualised', or given a meaning, not as 
meeting their own material needs but as helping others. 
Outside of sections of the middle class such an attitude 
would have been an unthinkable luxury to Roger Roles's 
generation.
31. RR. side 'b
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The perspective of the branch reformers
Two strands of thought can be discerned from their 
practice which have their origins in the student radicalism 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Firstly, from their own 
student experience they brought to the branch an eclectic 
mix of anti-authoritarian ideas, ranging from the anti­
professionalism found, for instance, in Rudin's comment 
about 'so-called professionals', to what was to become its 
most definable aspect, an opposition to the exclusion of 
different oppressed groups from the branch. Secondly, the 
fact that the reformers had been in higher education during 
the height of the post-war industrial struggles, allowed for 
a ready identification with the working class. It was the 
reformer's imagery of a working class which was to inform 
their desire to transpose a shop stewards system to the 
NALGO branch. For the radicals, the connotation of the shop 
steward was one of class and power; the personification of 
the working class. For the political conceptions of the 
radicals to be translated into trade union practice, they 
had to engage with the day-to-day problems of the branch and 
evolve a more cogent view of what they wanted and how they 
might achieve it. Their starting point was the formation of 
their own caucus within the branch, the Duke House Group.
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The concern of the 'Duke House group' (so called 
because it net in a council building named Duke House) was 
to change the way the branch functioned. As Rudin put it 
'the focus was the branch and the attempt was to try and 
transform it into a trade union branch' <32>.
While no documentation survives, Joan Munroe, the
convener of the Duke House group from its formation until
she left the borough in 1978, dates its origins sometime
around the beginning of 1975. She commented 'Jeff (Rudin)
was already the education officer; he now decided we needed
to set up some kind of education school for representatives,
to inform ourselves of what was going on, and from that we
picked out, I suppose, the younger radicals in that group
and talked to them' <33>. Commenting on the politics of the
participants at its formation Munroe did not perceive any
overt political allegiance:
I don't remember anyone being in an 
organisation or politically active, except for 
Harry Lister [a future branch secretary and 
Labour councillor] who was in the Communist 
Party, and he only got involved latter <34>.
32. JR1. side 'a'.
33. JM. side 'a'.
34. JM. side 'a'.
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She characterised the participants as:
A lot of people who were fairly liberal in 
their politics, they weren't at all akin to 
the SWP, probably Labour voters... We weren't 
the party left, we were the non-aligned left.
We were probably the people who would be in 
the Labour Party now <35>.
While it has been impossible to establish the exact 
membership of the Duke House group, my respondents believe 
it was around twenty five, in other words a substantial 
group. They were able to recall fourteen names, these 
included two future branch secretaries (all subsequent ones 
started work in the borough after 1979) , two future Labour 
councillors, and with the exception of Rudin and Munroe, the 
others have all become senior managers. Munroe's 
retrospective view of their motives for involvement was that 
'they probably were the young people who were in the council 
at that point on lowly grades and wanted to throw their 
weight around' <36>. How far this was a conscious motive for 
individuals at the time remains speculative, but their 
subsequent evolution into management does show up the 
general fate of their radicalism.
35. JM. side 'a'.
36. JM. side 'a'.
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Duke House was an informal body. Disagreements took 
place, but apart from the force of argument or moral 
pressure there was no other means of imposing a collective 
view on the individual. There were two factors which allowed 
it to function. Firstly, its members were confined to the 
radicals and as such the caucus represented the 
formalisation of a ready-made consensus. Secondly, it was 
possible to maintain this inbuilt consensus because of the 
nature of their practical task of turning the branch into a 
trade union <37>.
The following account of the activities of the Duke 
House group gives a picture of a loose organisation which 
evolved out of the need to meet two main functions; mutual
37. The Duke House Group represented a parallel to the 
Batstone et al. Quasi-Elite, or rather, in this case a 
Quasi-Elite in formation. There is of course no correlation 
at the empirical level between the Duke House group and 
Batstone et al. Rather behind the different sociologies of 
the domestic organisations is Batstone et al. statement that 
'The Q-E and the conveners form a key group within the 
organisation, and, in particular, they play a major role on 
the shop-floor in terms of the general reaffirmation of 
values and their application to major issues'. What they are 
alluding to are the activities of the core trade union 
activists within the domestic organisation, as was the case 
with the Duke House Group. Of corse there is no necessary 
correlation between a Q-E within a domestic organisation and 
the wider trade union movement. The old branch leadership in 
NALGO were equally a Q-E. The interest centres on how 
different Q-Es are formed and interact with the wider 
membership.
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support within the branch Executive and socialisation within
the group itself. Munroe commented:
We had fairly regular get togethers? we often 
had drinks after meetings which was part of 
talking things over and providing a support 
network for people raising issues. Also it was 
self-education; part of the game was to 
understand the system, what was going on and 
what the issues were, so that you could 
participate more in debates... <38>.
Their perspective meant they began to take responsibility
within the branch. Munroe continued:
We also got on the running of the branch. I 
remember being on the rules working party and 
organising socials; there were also people 
standing for positions such as chair <39>.
From my reading of the minutes, these accounts understate
the intensity of some of the issues they were involved in.
They were also partly defined by the nature of the old
leadership, who through retirement and death were rapidly
losing their cohesion. According to Rudin:
it happened very rapidly, very, very rapidly.
After being totally on my own for a year I 
was joined by Joan Munroe. Within another 
year or two that there had been this complete 
change over... Certainly in the last year or 
two of Norman Child's tenure [he resigned in 
1980], with him still very capable as an 
administrator, the policy making was being 
made on the Executive by the Duke house 
people <40>.
38. JM. side 'a'.
39. ibid.
40. JR1. side 'a'.
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The comments by Rudln on the rapidity of change were echoed 
by Munroe, who saw the importance of the Duke House group in 
the following terms:
It represented different forces... it also 
galvanised those forces; change might have 
happened anyway but it facilitated it <41>.
While Munroe's characterisation of the reformers as
facilitators is a good one, it obscures the fact that to
take on that role there were two prerequisites. Firstly, an
organisation had to come into existence to give body to
these ideas; secondly it was possible for them to act as
facilitators due to the growing inertia of the old
leadership, who proved incapable of replicating themselves.
A vacuum began to emerge within the branch which the
reformers started to fill. This inability of the old
leadership to replicate themselves situates the ascendancy
of the reformers as something more fundamental than a
struggle between two competing elites. It indicates that the
decline of the old and the rise of the new, seen for example
in the emergence of the professional sub-group, was part of
a more deeply seated change within the working class, (as
has been discussed in chapter two). Along with the rise of
the Duke house group was a process among the reformers of
political clarification.
41. JM side 'b'.
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The polities of ths Duke House Group
Munroe's characterisation of the Duke House Group as 
the non-aligned left in reality only captured a very brief 
period in their existence, their transition from the world 
of the student to the labour movement. The label 'non- 
aligned', however, is appropriate as it provides a 
definition of the majority views within Duke House and a 
strand of political activism which in the late 1970s found a 
resonance among large numbers of socialists. For instance 
the term 'non-aligned left' is encountered again in this 
work as a self- definition among Labour Party activists. One 
of the important facets of the non-aligned left was that it 
denoted being to the left of the left-wing of traditional 
labourism including the Communist Party (CP). In terms of 
the Duke house group, and the branch reformers in general 
this meant that there were two competing views amongst the 
left, those of the non-aligned left and the more traditional 
views of the CP which inside the trade unions were usually 
organised under the rubric of a broad left. Thus an implicit 
political division existed between the non-aligned left and 
a CP broad left axis. Rudin was emphatic that such political 
divisions never affected the running of Duke House, and 
there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. However implicit 
within Duke House there were two perspectives on altering
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the branch; the CP's and the one which emerged from the non- 
aligned left.
A large part of the explanation for the lack of 
Communist influence given by my respondents - although 
Communists were in the Duke House group - centred on 
personal animosity towards the leading CP member, Harry 
Lister <42>. The personality question tends to obscure a 
more fundamental division between the CP and the majority of 
the reformers which helped form the non-aligned left. Their 
areas of difference can be identified. Firstly, the norms 
and practices of the CP were founded within the labour 
movement, creating a conservatism which clashed with the 
very different tempo and anti-authoritarianism of the 
radicals' student background. Secondly of greater importance 
was the consolidation amongst the reformers of political 
views which were to the left of the CP as the following 
example illustrates. In 1976 the Working Women's Charter 
Campaign was formed. Munroe and Corbishley (the latter of 
whom at that time was teaching) were members of the Haringey 
branch. The campaign was taken into NALGO by women in NALGO 
Action who met on a London-wide basis who put forward 
resolutions to NALGO branches to adopt the Charter and to 
establish Women's Committees within the branches (which were
42. BH1. side 'A'.
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endorsed by the union in 1978). While the CP played a 
supportive role within the union's bureaucracy, the 
initiative and the activists on the ground came from forces 
to its left. They, rather than the CP, set the agenda in 
relation to such questions. The inability of the CP in this 
period to formulate a "shop floor" strategy towards such 
questions played no small part in making the 'people on the 
other side' more attractive. Finally, the implicit division 
between the labourism of the CP and the more 
"revolutionary" approach of the non-aligned left 
manifested itself around the question of how to deal with 
expenditure cuts. This issue simmered from 1977 onwards, 
coming into sharp relief in 1979. Hatherway captured the 
basic line of demarcation between the radicals and the CP 
members thus:
I think at the time I thought it was a 
personality issue; it came to a head in 
relation to Thatcher's election in '79, I think 
looking back on it now, it was a fairly 
straightforward split: hard left Labour Party/
SWP versus the CP... lines that would look 
exactly the same today <43>.
For the period under discussion it was the non-aligned left 
which dominated among the branch reformers, and who in their
43. BH1. side 'a'.
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turn were part of a broader political development <44>.
From around 1978 there developed a coherence to the 
reformers' views. By then, the project for turning the 
branch into a trade union had come to mean the following: 
democratising the branch, ending the exclusion of the 
support staff, opening up the branch to women and minorities 
and shifting the emphasis of local negotiations to the lower 
paid staff. These goals were encapsulated in the desire to 
create a shop steward-based structure. It was around these 
issues that they were to transform the branch.
The Ascendency of the Reformers 1976-1979
The latter part of the 1970s was a period of 
confrontation between the old leadership and the reformers. 
It occurred at a time when the homogeneity of the branch was 
beginning to fragment under the impact of two sets of 
external factors. The first of these can be characterised as 
coming from above and represents the impact on the branch of 
the devolution and extension of corporatism, such as the 
early legislative programme of the 1974 Labour government 
for example the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act and the
44. The development of those socialists who can be grouped 
under this generic title of the non-aligned left is central 
to this work and a rounded view of them is provided in 
chapter five.
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Employment Protection Act. The second set of factors arose
from the changing economic circumstances of the membership,
and may be seen in the impact of the social contract and
government expenditure cuts generating a pressure on the
branch from below. Local government pay decreased in real
terms by 2.5% in 1976-7 and by 8.0% in 1977-78 <45>. This
fall correlated with a notable shift within the branch
around industrial action. This shift made the earlier
debates over the legitimacy of industrial action appear
somewhat "twee", they already belonged to a bygone age.
Hatherway first noted the change at a 1977 branch meeting:
called to discuss our response to the first 
effort of NUPE and the T@G to organise 
against the pay policy. It was attended by 
large numbers of NALGO members from the 
building works division. What happened was 
about twenty donkey-jacketed supervisors 
arrived at this meeting. The reaction to it was 
quite extraordinary the right had an apoplectic 
fit because they thought the meeting had been 
invaded by manual workers. A few really well 
known right-wingers were almost hysterical at 
the concept of the meeting being invaded by 
these roughnecks <46>.
45. Cited in: Public Finance Foundation <1986>: 'Public 
Service Pay Over Two Decades Under Attack?', Discussion 
Paper 25. London. The importance of this fall in real wages 
fits into a cycle around local government wages and economic 
militancy. Its full importance for the branch reformers is 
discussed in chapter 8.
46. BH1. side 'b'.
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Within the branch these external factors interacted 
with the struggle for control between the reformers and the 
old leadership, culminating in the coming to power of the 
reformers. This was to be a fragmented process taking place 
along three lines of development: political struggles within 
the branch structures, the growth of departmental 
organisation and the receptiveness of the membership to 
militant policies in defence of their jobs and conditions. 
The interaction of these issues were to determine the 
character of the branch at the end of the 1970s.
Departmental Representatives 1975-1979
The various constraints which had blocked the 
development of workplace organisation began to break down 
from the mid-1970s. There was no guiding hand pushing a 
coherent policy across the union, but rather a fragmented 
development amongst the departments. If any pattern can be 
imposed on the growth of workplace organisation it would 
seem to correlate with the disruption caused by wage freeze 
and the threat of cuts, that is, out of a direct material 
need.
The minutes of the executive committee start to reflect 
this development by showing far more frequent departmental 
meetings, for example, an initial meeting of NAI£Q school
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workers occurred in September 1977 to discuss the effects of 
a Green Paper on education <47>. A meeting of the borough 
engineers put forward a resolution to the executive on car 
allowances and London weighting. While each service has its 
own history of how its departmental organisation was built 
up, I can find no evidence of the emergence of any stable 
structure outside of the two areas in which the radicals 
were prominent; Social Services and Housing. Social Services 
was to become the first service to overcome the 
institutional blockages of the branch and create a service 
organisation, that is one based on the occupational group of 
social workers.
In Social Services a clearly defined project existed to 
build up workplace organisation, which the reformers were 
able to fuse with a wide range of grievances felt by their 
fellow professionals. In 1974 departmental representatives 
existed but their line of command was into the branch 
structure with no service-level organisation. Rudin 
explained just how lacking ''shop floor'' organisation was
47. EC minute October 1977
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and how a few people began to change the situation:
We didn't function; there was no organisation, 
there was no accountability, no collective 
decision making. Because such ideas were 
totally new, it was very difficult to start 
changing things. Development was very much on 
an ad hoc basis, it was at least a year after I 
had joined the department before there was any 
getting together with other departmental 
representatives <48>.
To overcome these difficulties the reformers organised
outside the branch structures, Rudin recalled:
I was able to agree with Bob (Hatherway) and a 
few other departmental representatives that we 
should meet regularly and that's what Bob 
undertook to do; meetings took place at his 
house <49>.
It was through this activity of the reformers that the 
fragmentation within the service began to be broken down and 
a start was made in the construction of a service-based 
organisation. From Rudin's account, this occurred sometime 
in 1974; by 1975 the reformers had set up a departmental 
social services committee which Hatherway attended.
This represented a major development. By creating a 
structure for formal collective decision making they 
brought into sharp relief the inability of the branch 
leadership to deal with social service problems. Hatherway
49. JRl. side 'a'.
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commented that the Executive:
found a lot of difficulty coping with the 
conditions of employment of people who didn't 
work in conventional offices, whether these 
people were social workers or residential 
social workers <50>.
It allowed the departmental committee to gradually become 
the de facto leadership within the service. For example, in 
September 1977 a call for a day of action in support of 
Tower Hamlets social workers was organised by 'Area 1* - 
that is, members of a cluster of Social Service offices - 
whose representatives included Rudin and Hatherway.
These developments, however, came to fruition in 1978 
not over a local dispute but over the national pay claim, 
which was devolved to local negotiations. Because of the 
departmental committee within the Social Services, it was 
able to gain control of the pay negotiations from the 
Executive. The claim was formulated by social workers and 
presented to departmental meetings for endorsement; it was 
only then passed to the Executive who were left to endorse 
it <51>. The rapidity of the shift in negotiations from the 
branch to the service was facilitated by a more open 
Executive, well under way to being in the hands of the
50. BH1. side 'b'.
51. EC Minute May 1978.
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reformers. This was however, secondary to the inability of 
the Executive itself to play a constructive role in the 
social workers' pay negotiations. This derived from a lack 
of understanding on their part of the needs of workers 'who 
did not work in a nine-to-five job'. It was the embryonic 
service organisation rather then the branch leaders who had 
a monopoly of knowledge about the concerns of the social 
workers. The formation of the service committee had 
effectively created a power base outside the central branch 
leadership. It was not, however, having departmental 
representatives which was central but forming a collectivity 
of the occupational group which had control over the 
negotiations. Organisation was linked to the exercise of 
bargaining power. If the reformers had not engaged in the 
activity of building workplace organisation, it is highly 
unlikely that these developments would have taken place. The 
workforce would have confronted the Executive in a 
fragmented state. Instead the reformers were able to 
articulate the grievances of the workforce, allowing this 
process to be justly characterised as a movement from below.
The breaking down of the old branch structures had by 
the end of the 1970s shown up a pattern based on the 
development of service organisation. This was characterised 
by the branch Executive ceding its negotiating role to the
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service level organisation. This transfer of power had only 
taken on any real substance in those areas where the 
professional sub-group were in the ascendancy. This points 
to a linkage between a substantial discontent among the 
professional sub-group over their position within the 
council's hierarchy, and their marginalised position within 
the branch's bargaining structure. It was these issues that 
the reformers were articulating through their different 
perspective on trade unionism. While departmental 
organisation evolved in other services, it did not 
spontaneously break out of the confines imposed by the 
branch structure. This meant that the attempted transition 
from a sectional to institutional centrality of the branch 
could not be concluded from below. This was to lead in the 
1980s to a second pattern of development; the extension of 
bargaining by the new branch leadership and the imposition 
by them of a shop stewards system. In the mid-1970s however, 
a different perspective had opened up - that of a more 
militant transformation which was not based on the altering 
of services but of transforming the branch in toto.
The limits of militancy
In 1977 the gradual process by which the branch was 
undergoing change seemed to be superseded by the possibility
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of a rapid fusion between the radicals and the broader
membership; the core managers and the support staff. This
was indicated by the formation of the NALGO Emergency
Committee in a response to the 1976 Labour Government
expenditure cuts. Hatherway recalled:
It was part of our AGM resolution to fight the 
Labour Government cuts. It was set up on a 
quasi shop steward basis, of one representative 
from each council department <52>.
The reformers had won at a branch meeting what was then a
militant and implicitly political resolution; as Hatherway
stated 'it was against the Labour Government and its
substance was concerned with defending jobs and
conditions' <53>. This represented a substantial
achievement, taking place at the 1977 AGM, a year prior to
the left coming to dominate the Executive. This response of
the branch was important, as the issue of expenditure cuts
had entered the branch as a question of how it should defend
its members' jobs and conditions. The political dimension
stood behind the 'narrow' trade union question, allowing the
reformers to achieve a wider area of support. It was through
the narrow trade union issue that the political questions
raised by expenditure cuts began to permeate the branch.
52. BH2 side 'b'.
53 BH2. side 'b
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This represented the start of the relocation of the branch's 
political centre.
In 1977 and again in 1979-1980 expenditure cuts were 
addressed through what can be characterised as a militant 
defence of the branch members' jobs and conditions. This 
defence held within it three propositions. Firstly, it 
opened the way for the branch to carry out a basic trade 
union function, that of defending members jobs. Secondly, it 
overcame the division between trade unionism and politics 
insofar as the branch, to defend its members jobs, were 
confronting government (and council) policy. Thirdly, it 
represented a possible mechanism for the reformers to fuse 
the radicals with the broader membership. At the centre of 
this was the potential it held out for overcoming the 
division between the trade union and the political. This 
was, however, fraught with ambiguities; as a defensive 
structure the NALGO Emergency Committee could only respond 
to the actions of government and council, that is, to 
political institutions. The Emergency Committee turned out 
to have little practical relevance as the council was able 
to offset expenditure cuts through a combination of a high 
rate increases and negotiations with government. This 
primacy of the political which arose first in relation to 
the Emergency Committee was to be continually exemplified
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throughout the anti-cuts struggle. The reliance on this 
reactive mode of operation within the branch (and among the 
wider labour movement of the borough) became a continual and 
important thread in the branches development, (and as will 
be seen in the wider Labour movement of the borough).
In terms of the branch it was the third issue which was 
of immediate significance; the syndicalist model (involving 
reliance on an outside agency) had opened up a different 
route to the members. At the time, however, the mid 1970s, 
far from being counterposed to the reformers evolving 
service based organisation, these two issues were interwoven 
and were to remain so for a number of years around the 
proposition of forming a shop stewards system. In practice, 
they were to provide two separate routes for the reformers 
to win the membership, the rapid perspective of the 
syndicalist model always remaining at the level of 
potential. In 1977 the effect of the councils political 
action was to close off the potential route along which the 
reformers could hope to reach a wider membership. It meant 
that the reformers' influence was limited by the existing 
parameters of the branch and the existing quantities within 
it; the radicals and the core professionals.
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The limits on ths power of the Reformers.
Within the existing parameters the reformers were 
still able to advance. Hatherway was quite clear on the 
fundamental element which confined them 'there was never a 
natural majority for the left by any stretch of the 
imagination' <54>. This is illustrated by their attempts to 
set up a shop stewards system. At NALGOs 1977 conference, 
the union endorsed a National Executive working party report 
to support branches wishing to set up a shop stewards 
system. Without this endorsement it is inconceivable that 
this centre-piece of the reformers' programme would have 
ever been considered by the branch. The branch set up a 
working party from the general purposes sub-committee which 
consisted of Norman Child, Rudin, Hatherway, and Harry 
Lister. Hatherway's retrospective view of the working party 
was that 'It was not a successful exercise' <55>.
The report of the Working Party resulted in the 
Executive calling a special general meeting, (without 
putting forward a recommendation), which decided on a 
membership ballot. As far as it has been possible to 
ascertain both sides in the debate campaigned vigorously as 
both had an identification of stewards with class and power. 
54. BH2. side 'b'.
55. BH1. side 'b'.
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The shop steward was a talisman for the left and a bogeyman 
for the right. The latter was expressed in points three and 
four of the 'Nine Reasons Against the Stewards System' found 
in the Executive document Communications and Membership 
w i t h i n  t h e  B r a n c h ?
There are many members of the branch who will 
feel that adoption of the steward system is too 
reactionary and may well produce results that 
have been seen all too frequently in other 
unions where shop stewards are very powerful.
The possibility of this insofar as local 
government officers are concerned will 
therefore be distasteful.
Even if it can be demonstrated that the 
steward system might lead to streamlining 
branch procedures, it will also make it that 
much easier for a minority group to achieve 
rapid control of branch affairs <56>.
For the first and last time the Executive was publicly split
along left-right lines with the members supporting the old
leadership and rejecting a shop stewards system.
A second example of the limits placed on the advance of 
the reformers was expressed through their refusal to stand 
against Norman Child for branch secretary. While this was 
partly an effect of personal prestige, since 'no-one would 
say a hard word against Norman' (neither did any of my 
respondents), of greater importance was that for a
56. NALGO branch Executive document. 'Communications and 
Membership within the Branch'. Points three and four form 
Nine Reasons Against the Stewards System.
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substantial section of the membership Child represented 
their perception of how a NALGO branch should function. Both 
their defeat over the shop steward question and the 
unassailable position of Child represented parameters to the 
advance of the reformers. It meant that through the latter 
part of the 1970s the branch was increasingly shaped by a 
range of compromises between the reformers and the old 
leadership, compromises which arose out of debates carried 
out by few people within the branch structures.
Marrow and broad trade unionism
The election of Jeff Rudin to staff-side in 1975 had 
marked the start of the process of change within the branch 
structures. Rudin recalled from his first staff-side 
meeting:
A fairly acrimonious discussion between myself 
and the rest of staff-side. They wanted me to 
agree that whatever was said at that meeting 
would be confidential to that meeting. I said 
nonsense, we are all elected members of the 
Executive Committee, it would be confidential 
to that body. It had elected me and I was 
accountable to it. <57>.
In this manner the decisions and discussions of staff-side 
became the property of the Executive. If Rudin was able to 
start the process of change by attacking bureaucratic
57. JR1. side 'a
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excesses, the substance of the division between the two 
groups began to take on an increasing political character. 
This political division was primarily expressed through 
different interpretations of what constituted trade 
unionism, the narrow interpretation of the old leadership 
and the broader definition of the reformers. For example, at 
the Executive Committee of September 1977 a resolution from 
Harry Lister calling for the affiliation of the branch to 
the Trades Council was lost; a resolution from the Publicity 
Sub-Committee to affiliate to Chile Solidarity was referred 
by the old leadership to the AGM (where it was passed) . 
Resolutions to affiliate to the newly formed Haringey anti­
racist committee were lost on the grounds that it was a 
political issue, <58> and a resolution to give a £10 
donation to the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants 
was passed only on the casting vote of the chair <59>. These 
suggest that the old leadership's division between political 
and trade union issues was contested but generally 
maintained. This was however to be a temporary 'stemming of 
the tide'.
58. EC minute October 1977.
59. EC minute June 1977.
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In pursuit of their broader trade union aims the 
reformers were able to circumvent the old leadership by 
utilizing branch committees other than the Executive. Most 
importantly the Press and Publicity Sub-Committee. This 
became the driving force for both branch affiliations to the 
broader labour movement and an arena for discussions around 
branch based issues, such as; the training of 
representatives, greater membership involvement, and the 
planning of day schools <60>. The reformers were also 
positively aided in a broader interpretation of trade 
unionism by the impact of the national union on the branch. 
For example, during this period the minutes record that a 
circular from the National Executive called for co-operation 
in any inquiry into racial discrimination <61>. The union 
sponsored women's committees <62>. It supported the setting 
up of a stewards system <63> and it asked the branch to
60. This point was made by Joan Munroe.
61 EC minute December 1976. Correspondence from National 
Executive Committee [hereafter NEC] to branch.
62. EC minute January 1978. Correspondence from NEC to 
branch.
63. EC minute November 1977. Correspondence from NEC to 
branch. This was followed in 1978 with a circular from the 
NEC urging departmental representatives 'to be responsible 
to and for a particular group of members and negotiate on 
behalf of its group and individuals within this group'.
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pursue industrial democracy and worker participation <64>. 
Once the door had been opened, these issues began to take on 
an autonomy and their own timescale. For example, the 
setting up a shop stewards system was contingent on the 
balance of local forces who either supported or opposed it. 
There can be no doubt that these initiatives combined with 
the movement from below provided major bridgeheads for the 
reformers into the branch structures.
The minutes show that the turning point for the
radicals came in 1978. This was marked by their ability to
begin turning the branch outwards to the broader labour
movement, as might be seen through its affiliation at this
time to Chile solidarity, the National Council for Civil
Liberties, the South-East Region of the TUC and other such
bodies. The tide was running in favour of developments which
were associated with the reformers. Part of this was the
collapse of the old leadership. Monroe commented that:
I think all the issues were argued, it was just 
that the complexion of the Executive changed, 
and the votes began to go our way. Some of 
their arguments were stupid. I raised the 
question of a banner, and they said that it was 
too expensive, so I said I'll make one for a 
fiver. So they were forced to have a banner and 
we could take it on marches <65>.
64. EC minute June 1976. Correspondence from NEC to branch.
65. JM. side *b'.
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The ascent of the reformers to a position of running the 
branch had then taken place in all but name by the latter 
part of 1978. It had, however, taken place in the form of a 
compromise, since the "syndicalist model'' had failed to 
develop and the three constituencies within the branch, core 
managers, support staff, and radicals remained very much 
separate entities. The consequence of this was that in spite 
of their advances the reformers were confronted with a 
leadership which was still powerful both among the members 
and within the branch structures, leading to change being 
achieved through compromise and flowing through the existing 
branch structures, a point made by Hatherway 'We could get 
things through, if they were packaged as service conditions 
issues' <66>. The major problem for the reformers was that 
without an external agency they had no hope of becoming a 
'natural majority'. Once in power the reformers were to 
address this question with a considerable amount of 
confidence arising from their political convictions, their 
belief in the effects structural change would have on the 
branch, and most importantly the resurrection of the 
syndicalist model with the advent of the Conservative 
government. Prior to that they had to decide who among their
66. BH2. side 'a'.
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number would stand; on this issue the consensus within the 
radical camp broke down.
The Struggle between Harry and Bob
The announcement by Norman Child in August 1979 that he 
would not stand for reelection marked the end of an era in 
the branch. The transfer of power to the new leadership was 
completed in 1980 with the election of Hatherway, who beat 
Lister, to become branch secretary. The contest marked the 
surfacing of splits within the left, of which Hatherway 
commented that 'Norman announced in August 1979 that he was 
going to retire as branch secretary. There was then 
basically a fight for succession from that moment onwards 
and there were only ever two candidates' <67>.
In 1979 Harry Lister had been the left's successful 
candidate for the position of assistant secretary which 
provided a strong platform to mount a challenge for 
succession. According to Hatherway, however, the experience 
of Lister as assistant secretary was one 'where he was seen 
to be completely ineffective' <68>. Whether this failure, 
was real or imagined by Hatherway and his supporters, it
67. BH2. side 'a'.
68. BH1. side 'a'.
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allowed the left vote to be split. Those supporting 
Hatherway would have been the non-aligned left, exemplified 
by him being nominated by Diane Desmuli, at that time a 
member of the International Marxist Group. Hatherway 
perceived another factor which allowed him to stand, the 
question of not alienating the right-wing by standing as a 
service conditions candidate rather than an overtly 
political candidate:
I was staff-side secretary and perceived as 
such, I had also been very successful 
in terms of deals I'd done for low paid 
people. There was a whole range of natural 
support there on the traditional service 
conditions <69>.
His effectiveness as a staff side secretary allowed him to 
draw support from two distinct groupings within the branch. 
As he commented:
I got the votes of the hard left and the 
moderate right; the hard right boycotted 
the meeting and there was a whole band in 
the middle who voted for Lister - a broad left 
you could describe it <70>.
Hatherway's account obscures what I consider to be the 
anti-Comrounist consciousness of the support he won from the 
right. This was the real substance between an overtly 
political and service conditions candidate. The alliance 
69. BH1. side 'a'.
70. BH1. side 'a
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between him and the right is born out by the fact he was 
seconded by Norman Child (surely the seal of approval from 
the old leadership). Hatherway's election address verges on 
being a witch-hunt against Lister, as the following extract 
indicates:
In contrast to the labels that have been stuck 
on me, I believe in the fundamentals of 
representative democracy. I am an inactive 
member of the Labour Party, inactive because I 
do not want to become politically involved with 
the councillors with whom I negotiate. I am and 
never have been a member of any other political 
organisation <71>.
Lister in his election address is well aware of the hidden
agenda. In a section headed 'How far will personally held
views influence the job', he states:
In a democratic structure conflict real and 
imagined exists between those holding different 
political views. I have never tried to hide my 
own views; at the same time I have never tried 
to impose them on the branch. My concern is about the issues and the problems that confront us as a union and I am concerned as anyone with 
the time that I'd spent on secondary issues 
which divert us from the priority which is to develop a stronger, better organised, more effective and more caring branch <72>.
71. BH1. side 'a'.
72. From H Lister Election address to the 1979 Haringey 
NALGO AGM February 1980. (emphasis in the original).
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Hatherway recalled that it was not a well attended 
meeting: 'I won by something like 50 votes to 100' <73>. The 
branch membership stood at 2,796. His election marked the 
end of the period of opposition for the reformers; they were 
now in charge of the branch, just six months after the 1979 
general election.
73. Quoted from the Ordinary Quarterly General meeting June 
1980.
Chapter four 127 part on*
Tha Evolution Of NOPE 1965-1979
An overview of a Caretakers branch
The Haringey NUPE branch originated as a break-away 
among caretakers in the 1950s from the Wood Green General 
and Municipal branch. By the time of Haringey's formation in 
1965, the branch existed in the other constituent boroughs 
organising all of the ancillary grades in education. In 1977 
with the introduction of the Union Management Agreement 
(UMA), membership increased by approximately 500, placing 
the caretakers in a minority of approximately 1:10 in 
relation to the other ancillary grades.
The manner of the UMA's implementation typically left 
little choice to the individual to decide what union to 
join. Peter Spencer, who became branch secretary in 1978, 
recalled that:
everybody had to join. I would imagine at that 
time John Bruce (NUPE's branch secretary) and 
the secretary of the G@M had to sit down and 
work out procedures how they were going to cope 
with it. I know they did, you have that kitchen. 
I'll have that one. I inherited that <1>.
While caretakers always had a 100% unionisation, and
numbered around 80-100 members, prior to the UMA there are
1. Peter Spencer tape 1 side 'a'[hereafter PS].
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no available membership figures for the other groups; the 
only indication is a branch minute from 1967 stating that 
its membership stood at 700 (probably an exaggeration). In 
1977 there was an influx of 500 new members. Even if the 
1967 figure was inaccurate by 50%, the other ancillary 
grades, all of whom were women, were in a clear majority in 
relation to the caretakers, all of whom were men.
Before 1977 there is no indication of any drive by the
branch to recruit new members. Spencer assumed that the
cleaners had the greatest level of organisation;
I would think the cleaners were already well 
organised because the caretakers were all in 
the union. The SMSAs (the School Meals 
Supervisory Assistants) were not well 
organised <2>.
My understanding of the nature of the branch supports 
Spencer's perception and provides a logic for a seemingly 
ad-hoc form of recruitment. As I shall argue, the branch 
functioned in the interests of the caretakers who carried 
out recruitment to the branch on the basis of their working 
relations with the other occupational groups. The most 
direct was with the cleaners, the caretakers being their 
supervisors; slightly more tenuous was their link with the 
kitchen staff; relations with the SMSAs and coach escorts
2. PS1 side 'a'.
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were completely peripheral. This meant that prior to 1977 
the greatest density of membership was among cleaners, 
followed by the kitchen staff, with a minimal level amongst 
the other two groups.
From 1965 until 1978 the branch met monthly on a
Sunday morning, with a continuity of leadership through the
secretary John Bruce, who held that position from its origin
in the 1950s until 1978. Looking back on how the branch was
run, Spencer saw it in the following terms:
The branch was run by John Bruce, he did all the 
negotiations, he dealt with all problems. His 
attitude was that if you wanted a job done 
properly, do it yourself, because his experience 
was that on many occasions when he sent a shop 
steward to deal with something, he had to clear 
it up himself. Rightly or wrongly I can only 
tell you the way it operated <3>.
He also recollected the following anecdote concerning the
hierarchy within the branch.:
I tell you this, Alan ( Alan Carey, a caretaker 
who became branch chair when Spencer became 
secretary) told me he was at a meeting, before 
my time, and he was there with his assistant 
Tony, who was very outspoken. Tony jumps up, and 
he was going on, and John Bruce says: 'sit 
down, you speak through your caretaker'. How 
can anyone come to terms with that? <4>.
3. PS1 side 'a'.
4. PS1 side 'a'.
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As with NALGO, the structures of this branch represented an 
institutional expression of the dominant economic group, in 
this instance, the caretakers. The nature of their 
ascendancy was, however, different from that of the managers 
in NALGO. This was due to the form in which the caretakers 
exercised their economic power, and the manner in which the 
labour process fragmented the other occupational groups that 
comprised the branch.
Within this branch relations between dominant and 
subordinate occupational groups are clearer than those in 
NALGO; for example, there is no evidence of any attempt to 
involve the majority of the members in the branch. This is 
graphically illustrated by the attendance at branch 
meetings. Until 1978 these were only attended by the 
caretakers and their assistants. For workers from the other 
occupational groups an array of informal sanctions, for 
example, the fact that these meetings were held on Sunday 
mornings, existed which effectively excluded them from the 
branch. Until there was a change of leadership in 1978 the 
branch meeting was the only available means for collective 
decision making; as such, the exclusion of the non-caretaker 
membership from its deliberations was crucial. The complete 
absence of the non- caretaking membership from this 
collective forum allowed the branch to function solely in
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the Interests of the caretakers. From the perspective of the 
branch everything was viewed through the prism of the 
caretaker; how issues were addressed for the other 
occupational groups was contingent on their relations to the 
caretakers. This begins to explain Fryer et al. <1978> 
statement that 'it is remarkable that males in education 
should dominate branch offices given that only 1 0 % of manual 
workers in education are males' <5>. To elaborate further it 
is now necessary to look at how the formal organisation of 
the branch related to the different occupational groups. I 
start with an exposition of the position of cleaners and 
kitchen staff <6>.
5. Fryer, R, H., Fairclough, A, J., and Manson, T, B.
<1978>: 'Facilities for Female Shop Stewards: The 
Employment: Protection Act and Collective Agreements', 
British Journal of Industrial Relations Vol XVI No2 p. 160- 
174, July.
6. Due to the limited number of occupational groups 
involved, it has been possible to carry out a more detailed 
study than with NALGO of how the branch functioned in both 
this and my concluding chapter on the branch. Even so I have 
excluded the two 'minor' occupational groups, of coach 
escorts and SMSA's.
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Cleaners, Kitchen Staff and the Branch <7>.
For the cleaners and kitchen staff their formal 
relations with the branch fell into three categories; 
indirect contact with branch meetings, direct contact with 
branch officials arising out of workplace problems, and 
local negotiations with the employers. Arising from their 
lack of direct participation in the branch, all of these 
forms of contact represented an affirmation of the dominance 
of the caretakers over their fellow branch members. This was 
seen overtly in relation to branch meetings where different 
forms of mediation between members and the branch replaced 
participatory relations.
The relations of the cleaners to the caretakers 
explains the greater frequency and wider scope of cleaners' 
issues found within the minutes. These were brought directly 
to the branch by the caretakers, who in effect played the 
role of shop stewards. For example, at the November 1965 
meeting a report of the works committee mentioned that they
7. Unlike NALGO the NUPE Education documentation is both 
somewhat sparse and incomplete. The following represents the 
highlights of seven years minutes, (these cannot tell the 
entire story) taken from a single hardback A4 book. 'This 
book is the first record of minutes for Haringey school 
staff branch effective from 1st April 1965'. [Hereafter 
Branch minute book 1]. The second set of branch minutes is 
Branch minute book 2. Along side these minute books there 
was one file with a miscellany of letters from 1965 until 
1979, [hereafter correspondence file].
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had called on the employers to provide 'overalls for 
cleaners'. Similarly, in the following year 'the need for 
water-proof protection for cleaners was discussed and 
members agreed that an application for some should be 
forwarded to the office' <8>. Whether these requests 
originated from a caretaker seeing a need for cleaners to be 
provided with something basic like overalls, or the cleaners 
in a particular school making demands on the caretaker, I do 
not know. It was, however, the caretakers, rather than the 
cleaners, who brought issues to the branch, and it was this 
which opened up the possibility of their being generalised 
to all the cleaners.
Even this level of representation was not open to the 
kitchen staff. This is seen in their different modus 
operandi with the branch, which was through correspondence 
with the secretary. The kitchen staff approached the branch 
as individuals, so that the leadership is not told of 
problems with the kitchens in general but of individual 
kitchen staff with problems. Typical of this type of 
individualised 'intrusion' of the kitchen staff into branch 
life is the following minute: 'a letter was read to the
8 . Branch minute book 1, November 1965.
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branch concerning a Mrs Purdy who works at Risley Avenue 
school kitchen, regarding an accident at the kitchen' <9>.
In respect of the cleaners, the minutes provide just 
one example of the branch's intervention into a workplace 
problem: 'St Anne's school relief school keeper, Mr 
Greenwood, spoke about two cleaners who refused to be told 
of their duty. Secretary also spoke about the case' <10>.
The tone of that minute and the lack of any other minute are 
indicative of the caretakers' supervisory function over the 
cleaners.
The issue of branch intervention into the workplace was 
confined to the kitchens. This took two forms: 
correspondence between the secretary and someone in 
'authority' and a branch officer going into a kitchen to 
discuss a specific problem. Typical of the former is the 
following: 'St Ignatius school. The secretary informed the 
members about the bad state of the meals department but was 
pleased to say that a great improvement had been made since 
he saw Mr Carter in the education office' <11>.
9. Branch minute book 1, October 1968.
10. Branch minute book 1, April 1970.
11. Branch minute book 1, January 1970.
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As for the direct intervention by branch officers into 
the workplace, it has been possible to establish that these 
visits were more frequent than appears from the minutes. It 
has been possible to throw light onto what they entailed 
through my respondent, Carol Adeniz. She started work in the 
kitchens in 1970 and since 1983 has been branch chair. She 
recalled that:
When John Bruce used to visit our kitchen, he 
would come in and go into the supervisor's office; 
we would take a cup tea into them. They would 
sit there, discuss and then he would leave 
although we were his members. The supervisor 
wasn't even a member of his branch but he never 
came round and spoke to us. The supervisor would 
then come round and say 'well, I've spoken to your 
branch secretary about certain items, now bloody 
well get on with it <12>.
It is difficult to convey the anger with which this was 
related. Her view provides an important area of agreement 
with Marie Williams, (my third respondent). Williams started 
work in 1979, just after the period presently under 
discussion. It is significant that her account of her 
treatment by a shop steward was similar to that related by 
Adeniz, even though they had radically different perceptions 
of the role of women in trade unions. It is possible to 
point to a number of issues which generated this agreement; 
the premise was that the union would not have treated them
12. Coral Adeniz © Peter Spencer [hereafter CA/PS] side 'b'.
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with such contempt had the union official been dealing with 
a man. While I do not disagree with this, the roots of this 
chauvinism should not be divorced from the nature of the 
caretakers' power, which was in part based on a dependence 
on management. This helped to generate a conservative and 
deferential leadership, and served as the basis for the 
interaction between union officials, members and kitchen 
supervisor. The supervisor was a higher authority who knew 
what was 'best' for the kitchens and understood the rules 
and regulations governing the staff.
The union's lack of independence may be illustrated 
through what was the main area of dispute between workers 
and management; the arbitrary manner in which management 
moved workers between kitchens as a form of punishment 
against workers they disliked. The ability of management to 
do this was written into the workers' contract of 
employment; where an employee worked was at the discretion 
of management. There was no attempt by the branch to alter 
this by negotiating a procedural agreement that would have 
created some form of mutuality, that is, a trade union 
sanction which stipulated the conditions under which a 
worker could be moved. Consequently, whenever the issue 
arose the union was always in a position of weakness quite 
independently of the officials' attitude to women.
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The local negotiations concerning the cleaners were 
reasonably straightforward; these took place, as I have 
shown above, through the caretakers at branch meetings 
generating negotiating issues. On the other hand, local 
negotiations for the kitchen staff remain obscure; my 
understanding is that there was no connection between these 
workers and negotiations which the branch entered into on 
their behalf. The branch secretary simply took up issues he 
thought relevant, two of which are noteworthy. The first 
occurred in 1967 with the introduction of a retainer fee for 
kitchen staff in the holidays. The second was an 
understaffing agreement which dates from 1971. The former 
was a national initiative with some marginal local 
negotiations over the amount of service needed prior to 
eligibility. The understaffing agreement was only 
implemented after four days of absence; this meant, for 
example, that in a kitchen with ten workers and with one 
absent, the remaining nine would have to cover the 
absentee's work for four days prior to their receiving any 
financial benefit. In spite of this scheme being in 
Spencer's word 'diabolical', and Adeniz never recalling its 
implementation, it was an important initiative in the 
context of the late 1960s. Its importance was shown in a
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1970 article written in the Trade Union Register by a NUPE
official by the name of Mike Taylor:
When there are staff shortages, the ladies 
instead of leaving the work will catch up on 
it, and so educational management has been able 
to impose a tight staffing schedule <13>.
There is one important event which took place at the 
end of the 1960s, of which unfortunately I have little 
knowledge. The branch began to be pressed by management over 
the question of a bonus scheme for the kitchen staff, as a 
consequence of report No 29 of the Prices and Incomes Board. 
What is clear was that the branch was not equipped to deal 
with the issue and on a number of occasions turned to the 
union for advice. In the minutes there are a number of 
letters from the Area Officer and the Executive Committee of 
the union on this matter <14>. This led to the only recorded 
section meeting for kitchen staff, and some time later the 
scheme was abandoned. There is no further information on 
either of these issues <15>.
13. Taylor, M. <1970> 'The Revolt of the Low Paid', in K 
Coates, and T Topham (ed.s) The Trade Union Register. Merlin 
Press, London.
14. Between June 1969 and January 1970 this issue is 
recorded in the minute book with continual reference to 
'discussion between secretary and regional officer'. Also 
two letters survive in the branch's correspondence file 
between the secretary and national officers on this subject.
15. The failure to implement a productivity scheme within 
the kitchens shows up the lack of impact of government 
pressure for reform within the borough.
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The Caretakers and the Branch
The above shows what little relevance the branch had 
for the non-caretaker members, but what is more surprising 
is that a similar conclusion can be drawn concerning the 
caretakers' own formal relations to the branch. The very 
tediousness of the minutes speaks volumes about the lack of 
branch character. Nonetheless the minutes identify four 
areas where the branch concerned itself somewhat with issues 
relating to the caretakers. These were the defense of their 
'craft status', regulation of the labour process, informal 
agreements and the advancement of pay and conditions through 
local negotiations.
The minutes reveal little attention to the defence of 
any of the branch members' interests, including those of the 
caretakers, but the major, albeit thin, seam of continuity 
is to be found in the defence of the caretakers' 'craft' 
status. For example, on the issue of appointments, the 
caretakers never attempted to control entry, but they sought 
a voice in deciding who should be appointed. This partly 
arose from pressure by assistants who wanted caretaker jobs, 
but it also derived from the caretakers' self-perception as 
a craft with a legitimate right to an opinion on who was the 
right man for the job. A branch minute of October 1965
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illustrates this concern: 'The method of selecting school 
keepers was not approved and will be looked into' <16>. In 
the following month, a minute revealed the branch's concern 
at 'the appointment of an outside man at Highgate primary 
school when the short list was only two. The other applicant 
was an assistant for three years at Tollington' <17>. This 
issue is one of the few which consistently appeared over the 
years, through correspondence from the branch to the 
Education Department and in reports from the local Joint 
Works Committee. In a similar vein there is a minute which 
records that 'the status of school keepers was defended in 
regards to the new method of form filling required by the 
office' <18>, and another which expresses the branch's 
disapproval of a caretaker moonlighting, 'the case of Bro 
Houghton doing a second job does not find approval by the 
branch' <19>. At the following meeting the minute records 
that 'The branch remains adamant in the case of Bro 
Houghton' <20>.
16. minute book 1, October 1965.
17. minute book 1, November 1965.
18. minute book 1, April 1970.
19. minute book 1, March 1971
20. minute book 1, April 1971
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On a number of occasions the minutes reveal that the 
caretakers fused their concern over the regulation of their 
own working conditions with an equally strong concern over 
protecting their status: 'The position of staff on the 
school after hours without permission was to be looked 
into' <21>. Or again, 'Bro Dean spoke about a teacher who 
was very late in leaving the school at night' <22>. There 
are also entries which directly relate to the regulation of 
work, such as: 'A letter to be sent to the office on the 
deplorable work of the window cleaners' <23> or 'School 
keepers were warned of a drop in their fuel requirements, a 
new type was being tried out' <24>.
The third category of minute shows up some of the 
informal practices that were open to the caretakers: 'it 
was decided that owing to some difference of opinion with 
contractors, this branch would work to the book for school 
keeping hours during week-end working, except in 
emergencies' <25>. This, however, did not preclude the 
caretaker making an agreement with the contractor, something 
which was considered 'entirely between themselves'. This
21. minute book 1, October 1968.
22. minute book 1, January 1970.
23. minute book 1, December 1967.
24. minute book 1, February 1971.
25. minute book 1, June 1971
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strongly suggests that any agreement with contractors would 
have involved a financial transaction. In relation to the 
cleaners the branch was notified that 'assistant school 
keepers would be able to claim 3/4 of a cleaner's work in 
her absence. This is for information only' <26>. Presumably 
this meant 'do not tell the cleaners'!
In the category of negotiations and plus payments, I
have included the upgrading of caretakers' houses.
Understandably this was and remains a major concern? for
example, the minutes record that the officers were asked 'to
see about telephones at school keepers' residences' <27> or
'to further a request for piped hot water in caretakers'
homes from the school' <28>. From the surviving
correspondence file, I was surprised to find as late as 1978
that the housing conditions of some of the caretakers were
bad, as the following indicates:
It has been acknowledged that certain deficiencies 
have been remedied - such as urine seepage 
through the walls - but it is still maintained 
that the property is most inadequate for the 
needs of an average family in the late 1970s <29>.
26. minute book 1, September 1970.
27. minute book 1, June 1971
28. minute book 1, March 1969
29. Letter from Education department to the branch secretary 
dated 19.1.7
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When looking at the question of local negotiations, the 
issues I was able to uncover were very limited. For example, 
in 1967 there is a minute recording members seeking 
clarification over overtime rates and payments for weekend 
lets. They were told at the following meeting that payment 
was 'per the green book', that is, the nationally agreed 
rate. The most substantive agreement minuted dates from 
1968; it states that 'when a person is sick or on leave the 
letting fees will be taken into consideration for the 
purpose of paying out wages' <30>. This was important as it 
represented the consolidation of their payment for lets onto 
the basic wage calculation for sick and holiday pay. This 
was, however, a Joint Whitley Council rather than a branch 
agreement, although the branch would have had a role in its 
implementation.
On a more mundane matter the branch asked management 
'if gas maintenance can in future be carried out by the gas 
board' <31>. The reply it received at the following meeting 
was that 'the office has rejected the proposal that all gas 
maintenance be done by the gas board' <32>. The lack of
30. minute book 1, September 1968.
31. minute book 1, September 1970
32. minute book 1, October 1970
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negotiating issues for the caretakers is the most notable 
feature of the minutes; a large amount must be lost, but the 
substantive agreements would have been minuted, as with the 
1968 agreement over lettings. Local negotiations seemed to 
have been non-existent in strong contrast with the period 
after Spencer took over as secretary <33>.
Rather than addressing any issues of negotiation, the 
minutes are saturated with the branch's concern over 
protecting the caretakers' craft status and an ethos of 
deference. For example, in the 'Bro Houghton' case, he was 
seen as ''sullying" the branch's name and degrading the 
caretakers' status by having a second job. As for their 
attempts to formalise plus payments or regulative issues, I 
am left with the strong impression that they were carried 
out on the basis of deference. For example, the small 
incident of gas maintenance was not important in itself, but 
the impression given by the minutes is that they had made a 
request, were turned down and then resigned themselves to 
that answer. What was absent was any form of bargaining.
This reveals a paradox: logically the branch should 
have shown a range of benefits for caretakers over the other 
occupational groups, particularly around local negotiations;
33. see chapter 10
145
instead, the documentation confronts the reader with the 
impression that there was little substantive difference in 
the way in which the branch treated the different 
occupational groups within it. My understanding of this is 
that the caretakers' economic leverage, rather than being 
expressed through the branch's bargaining relation, was 
realised primarily at the workplace. This understanding 
shifts the focus of power out of the formal structures of 
the branch into the workplace. To comprehend how this 
worked, I now look at the labour processes of the three 
occupational groups starting with the caretakers.
The Caretakers' Labour Process
The caretaker's life is structured around his work. His 
house is situated on the school site, which can be in use up 
to sixteen hours a day. Outside of very limited set duties, 
Spencer was unable to put forward a routine to the day, 
which is indicative of the caretakers' control over their 
work. This was not always the case; they were the direct 
benefactors of the technological change during the late 
1950s from coal to oil and gas fired central heating.
A separable issue is that of their potential economic 
leverage. This was considerable, due to their pivotal role 
within schools; the caretaker is in charge of the day to day
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running of a school's non-teaching, non-administrative side, 
as such he is essential to the smooth running of the entire 
school. The caretaker can, without going outside of any 
formal procedures, damage that routine by the withdrawal of 
his good will. This of course was not one sided; Spencer saw 
it as a quid pro quo:
By the same token the head teacher can make 
life difficult for the caretakers, so what you 
do is study one another, don't you, and keep one 
another happy. It would be a foolish caretaker 
who didn't keep his head teacher happy and a head 
who didn't do the same with the caretakers <34>.
This has allowed for the growth of custom and practice,
where the structuring of the working week was determined
through semi- formal negotiations:
How you work that 39 hours is usually agreed 
between the caretaker and the head, taking into 
account the needs of the school <35>.
The ascendancy of the caretaker was based on these two 
strands; their potential to disrupt and the control of their 
working day ceded to them by the organisation of the labour 
process. The potential to disrupt the workings of a school 
was subordinated to the control they exercised over their 
time. This allowed for the emergence of a 'time bonus', 
which Spencer saw as 'the ability to pull flankers'.
34. PS2. side 'b'
35. PS2. side 'a
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Not surprisingly Spencer was reluctant to speak about 
the time bonus; he would only go as far as saying that 'if 
the school itself is happy with the caretakers, then he can 
take certain liberties in terms of the day'. On the issue of 
the time bonus and evening lettings, while the caretakers 
are supposed to be on duty, he commented that 'if you have 
half a brain, you will let the hirers know where you are 
because they might need to use the phone in an 
emergency' <36>.
The nearest I got to finding out exactly what the time 
bonus meant for the caretaker was the following comment from 
Spencer who stated that the previous branch secretary, John 
Bruce, had 'never worked more than six hours a day'. This 
meant that on an eight hour day he secured a minimum of ten 
hours a week time bonus. It was probably, however, a good 
deal more.
The dynamic behind the time bonus was a reciprocity 
between worker and management, with the need for formal 
supervision by management removed in return for not auditing 
the caretakers' time. It was this system which explains both 
the lack of use of the branch by the caretakers and their 
deference encountered above. This can now be seen as not
36. PS3. side 'a
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simply oriented towards management as such but to a system 
which worked in the caretakers' favour. This was exemplified 
by an account provided by Spencer of a scandal caused by one 
caretaker who had been drunk one evening and shouted at the 
hirers. This was seen as letting the side down by breaking 
the unwritten agreement. The caretakers, then, exercised 
their ascendancy through the workplace; this had not evolved 
from trade union militancy challenging the organisation of 
the labour process, but organically through individuals 
accepting the levers of power ceded to them by management. 
Representing the benefits of a spontaneous struggle over the 
labour process, the time bonus system stopped the evolution 
of a more formal trade unionism based on a potential to 
disrupt the schools through a more vigorous use of branch 
structures.
This dichotomy between the formal and the informal 
arose initially from the caretakers' inability at the 
workplace to transcend an individualistic framework. The 
nature of their work excluded collective workplace 
bargaining, which would have undoubtedly created a very 
different set of relations between management and the union. 
Instead negotiations were necessarily individualised around 
largely private agreements, the 'craftsman' bargaining with
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his master in antithesis to the norms of formal trade 
unionism.
As with the NALGO branch, sectional centrality involved 
a similar division between the branch structures and the 
manner in which the real bargaining relationship took place. 
As such the branch was subordinated to and shaped by the way 
the caretakers exercised their power. As this bargaining 
relation largely took place outside the branch, the branch's 
content was filled with the formal trappings of that power: 
craft consciousness and deference. The branch represented 
the caretakers' guild, a viewpoint inadvertently put forward 
by Spencer:
Given the way the branch was organised it was 
the caretakers who were always getting together, 
anyway they were like a fraternity. When you 
joined the union, you joined the fraternity of 
caretakers. We see ourselves almost as a 
profession; we are the school caretakers, we meet 
every month and discuss all our problems, a great 
sense of identity, it's still there now <37>.
The exercise of sectional centrality by the caretakers 
denied the prime function of the branch, that was to develop 
service level bargaining for all the occupational groups. 
This was a position that was made possible by the lack of 
economic leverage given to the cleaning and kitchen staff by
37. PS3 side 'b'.
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the labour process. It is to an examination of their labour 
processes that I now turn.
The Cleaners' labour process
All the cleaners were part-time workers. Their work 
placed them at the periphery of the school's labour 
process, taking place before the school opened and after it 
closed, but prior to school lettings. This created an 
enclosed set of parameters to the cleaners' working world. 
During term-time they worked split shifts: starting between 
6-6.30 a.m. through to 8-8.30 a.m., recompensing between 
3.30-3.45 in the afternoon, possibly working until 6 p.m. 
depending on their hours. Work was done on an individual 
basis, with their own designated areas and a rigid time 
scale for completion. In term time their job was to maintain 
a high standard of cleanliness. All the heavy work - 
mopping, sweeping out the school, emptying of the bins - was 
done in the afternoon. The morning was mainly spent damp­
dusting. School closure created a different work pattern: 
the split shift was abandoned, work was concluded in the 
morning and its nature changed. Each closure amounted to a 
spring clean, with the summer break known as the "the big 
clean". This involved the scrubbing of ceilings, walls and 
all furniture being moved to clean behind them.
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The caretaker was the cleaners' manager. His duties
included administrative work, such as filling in the
cleaners' time sheets, booking in holidays and marking down
sickness, and the supervisory duty of ensuring that a
standard of work was maintained. In the holidays this
included taking a direct foreman's role by pre-planning the
cleaners' work, that is, deciding in what order the school
should be cleaned and making sure that the relevant areas
were ready for the cleaners' attention. It was through the
caretakers' supervisory role that the cleaners were able to
gain a time bonus. Its most common expression was around
their starting and finishing times. This had been explained
to Spencer by John Bruce:
I remember him saying to me; I worked out they 
came in half an hour late in the morning and went 
half an hour early in the evening and they got 
their work done. That's an hour a day, five hours 
a week at say £3 an hour, that's a £15 bonus <38>.
The second type of time bonus was developed around overtime,
(a practice superseded by an understaffing scheme in 1981,)
and was achieved when a worker was absent; her hours were
divided amongst the remaining cleaners and booked down as
38. PS3 side 'a'. It should be noted that cleaners have 
never earned £3 an hour.
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overtime. This overtime was never worked. Spencer recalled:
In the past if a cleaner was absent, they did 
the work in their own time no one ever did extra 
time and all the hours for that absentee were 
claimed as overtime <39>.
The cleaners' time bonus paralleled that of the 
caretakers, in so far as it represented the same type of 
reciprocity between management and worker; in this instance 
the caretakers' supervisory duties were traded for free time 
on behalf of the cleaners. The dynamic of this relationship 
was, however, different when viewed from the position of the 
cleaner in relation to the union. The critical difference 
between the cleaners' and caretakers' time bonus was that 
for the cleaner there was no potential economic leverage 
backing up their time bonus. This created a type of 
patronage by the caretaker over the cleaners in which the 
caretaker was not only her supervisor but informally the 
cleaners relied on his goodwill to provide their time bonus. 
The reality of this period in the branch's history was that 
the cleaners were stuck at the margins of the schools' 
labour process without any collective occupational identity. 
Their time bonus gave them a modicum of freedom within their 
working day. Even this highly circumscribed form of 
independence was absent for the school meals staff.
39. PS3 side 'a
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The labour process of the School Meals Staff
Adeniz started work in 1971 at one of the biggest
kitchens in the borough, serving over 700 meals a day; she
explained the division of labour in her kitchen:
I use to be a server which meant you only dealt 
with the dinning room and washed up the plates 
and cups. When I transferred full time into the 
kitchen, I became a general kitchen assistant.
The way we worked it the pastry, meat, custard 
and the gravy were done by the cooks and the 
assistant cooks, the potatoes and vegetables 
were cooked by the general kitchen assistants who 
also washed most of the floors and did the washing 
up. I was in with the assistant cooks who were 
also responsible for the ovens so we did guite a 
lot of non-cooking work in that kitchen <40>.
A large element of the work was hard manual labour:
All the veg and potatoes, everything was fresh 
at that time, so your potatoes came in sacks, 
and you had to stand and peel them in cold water. 
The fish you had came in boxes, frozen fresh fish 
and you had to stand and cut it into portions, 
it was hard work <41>.
The cooking itself paralleled a production line:
When I started it was all cooked freshly but we 
were very much into what was called slap cooking. 
If you made sponge for 24 you would make one in 
a large tin and cut it into 24—  syrups sponges, 
spotted dick and all that are all gone now <42>.
40. Carol Adeniz tape 1 side 'a'[hereafter CA].
41. CA1 side 'a'
42. CA1 side 'a'
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What is striking about this work was the workers' lack of
any control over its organisation. Adeniz spent several
minutes thinking about this, and could only recount the
following general point :
Well there are laid down rules and laid down 
menus, it's a bit difficult to cut corners because 
we have recipes and we have to follow them 
recipes. There are small things which let you 
cut corners but you never think of them because 
you do them automatically <43>.
This lack of control, and it is the most rigid example 
encountered, arose because these workers were engaged in a 
continuous production process which created an internal 
regulation to their labour process. The workers ability to 
impose sanctions on the labour process could only have 
arisen through formal trade union mechanisms. This was not 
only absent but the union functioned in a negative manner, 
regulating the existing system largely against the interests 
of these workers.
From the basis provided by the production process a 
system of control was created which rested exclusively in 
the hands of the Supervisors. The attitude that this control 
generated among the supervisors is shown in the following 
comment from Spencer, concerning the head of the school 
meals service, Mrs Buckingham, and one of her supervisors
43. CA1 side *b'
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over the branch's struggle to provide rubber gloves for the 
workers:
Mrs Buckingham thought she won the argument, as 
far as she was concerned, because she saw a 
woman working in the sink with no gloves on:
'Look, they don't use them'. I know they don't 
all wear them but some want to and they should 
have them. It's like the supervisor who said to 
me: 'the women like scrubbing the floor on their 
hands and knees, it's like a social event. Look' 
she said, 'see how they stop every now and again 
and straighten up and have a little natter and 
then get down again and start scrubbing'. It was 
like being on the plantation talking to the 
overseer <44>.
Adeniz explained this type of discipline as the result of 
the fragmented nature of the School Meals Service, and the 
autonomy of its management from the control of the council. 
Adeniz believed that 'Mrs Buckingham ran her service apart 
from anything the council did. It worked in the way she 
wished it to' <45>. The fragmented council bureaucracy, 
which allowed Mrs Buckingham to run things how she wished, 
was the norm among all the council services. What 
differentiated the kitchen staff was their inability to 
spontaneously impose sanctions on the labour process. This 
revealed, in a sharper manner than in the case of the 
cleaners, the lack of and the need for some form of official
44. CA and PS2 side 'b'.
45. CA1 side 'a'.
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trade union role to place sanctions on management. This 
absence created an enclosed world of work which stretched no 
further than the kitchen. It consisted, in Adeniz's view, of 
the 'ten or twelve people in a kitchen who tend to become a 
little unit as long as you get on with people' <46>. This 
narrow world set the boundaries of their consciousness as 
workers, which Adeniz rightly saw as an important difference 
from the caretakers who saw themselves as being employees of 
the borough:
You very rarely met people from other kitchens.
The supervisors recruited and even threatened 
you with sackings from that little workforce.
There were lots of little workforces, you weren't 
part of the whole workforce in Haringey <47>.
This lack of any trade union mediation into the 
kitchens is one reason why it was such a static world; this 
description of the labour process could equally well have 
applied to the 1950s or 1940s. For kitchen and cleaning 
staff, the failure of the labour process to cede any 
economic leverage to them interacted with the power given to 
the caretakers to provide the preconditions for sectional 
centrality. The cleaners' and kitchen staff's exclusion from 
any formal participation in branch decision making meant
46. CA1 side 'a'.
47. CA1 side 'b'.
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that they were excluded from the only possible mechanism by 
which economic leverage could have been generated; through 
the actions of the collective organisation of the 
occupational group. Without collectivity these workers 
remained fragmented in their 'own little workplace'.
Gender, occupational group and the caretakers branch.
The caretakers branch lasted for just over a decade and 
raises the question of women within the branch. There is no 
indication that at any time during this period women members 
attempted to get involved with the branch. It is certainly 
possible to point to a range of institutional barriers- for 
instance branch meetings that were held on Sunday mornings. 
Another problem was that the majority of women tended to 
view their work as an extension of domestic labour, which 
generated a level of passivity on their part <48>.
Cunnison <1983> in her study of school meals staff comments 
on the interaction between home and work and the importance
48. Adeniz commented on this point in relation to the impact 
of the School Meals Project on the school meals staff. This 
project was set up in 1985 by the London Food Commission, to 
look into a range of issues associated with school meals 
(see below chapter ten). Adeniz stated that it had given the 
women a sense of their own worth where they no longer saw 
their job as an extension of the home.
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for women of the idea of a woman's place and her:
primary identification with home and family and 
how this is supported by workplace culture, low 
wages, by the broken work career and the 
particular way women's earnings are interacted 
into the family. This means that family 
responsibilities tend to be given priority over 
responsibilities attached to work and hence union 
involvement <49>.
Such a framework fails to fully explain the position of 
the women in the Education branch, as the interaction 
between family life and work is taken up as the dominant 
problematic almost to the exclusion of the question of 
bargaining power. As the above has shown it was not because 
they were women that they were unable to spontaneously 
exercise economic leverage (the key to the caretakers' 
power) but because of the role of occupational groups within 
the labour process, which led within the branch to the 
subordination to the caretakers <50>. The powerlessness of 
the women workers within the NUPE branch was in the first 
instance related to this inability to spontaneously exercise 
economic leverage. The following example illustrates this
49. Cunnison, S. <1983>: 'Participation in local union 
organisation, school meals staff: A case study', in 
Gamarnikow (ed) Gender Class and Work, p 92.
50. I am not attempting to say this was the only reason: 
there was of course a range of issues which reinforced this 
subordinate position not least of these being the home/work 
division.
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point. It concerns the effect of a labour shortage of 
cleaners in the late 1960s. A branch minute from 1969 states 
'owing to a lack of cleaners a large number of hours were 
not being used up' <51>. This represented a potentially 
powerful bargaining lever. Knowledge of this shortfall 
required an overview of all the borough's schools; whilst 
the branch had this, the cleaners, excluded from the branch, 
were excluded from this knowledge. Even under these 
relatively favourable circumstances they were unable to 
generate service-level bargaining. The idea that the branch 
would have acted on this information in the interests of the 
cleaners is of course fanciful. Here the potential economic 
leverage is directly blocked by the institution which should 
have expressed it, the union branch.
By excluding the question of economic leverage a 
rounded understanding of the position of women workers 
within the branch is not possible. Rather the question of 
home and work becomes central, as in the above quote from 
Cunnison. The problem with Cunnison's thesis lies not in 
what she describes; for sure the home-work division is 
central for most working class women. The difficulty lies in 
the logical conclusion of her argument; for the reality of
51. minute book 1, March 1969.
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women's lives to change and for trade union involvement to 
be possible, the social reality of the home-work division 
has to change. An over emphasis of the home-work division 
ends up situating social change prior to collective activity 
and involvement, and leaves begging the question as to how 
change in favour of women comes about without the active 
involvement of women. This perspective shifts the locus for 
change from the workplace and trade union organisation to 
the realm of personal relationships and social policy.
That there was no challenge by the women workers to their 
surbordination within the caretakers' branch is a sad 
testimony to their awareness of their relative powerlessness 
within the labour process. This does not mean that they were 
not angry or did not wish to alter the situation, the 
crucial factor missing for the NUPE women was not their 
experiential understanding (of either their situation in 
relation to the union or the home work division) but a means 
of altering their work situation. The question they faced 
was how could change be achieved. In NALGO an ambivalent 
attitude towards shop stewards by the national union was 
used as a stepping stone by the reformers to create a shop 
stewards structure. The project to alter the branch had been 
carried out by both men and women. Gender had been a 
contentious issue but this contention was based around the
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active participation of women. NUPE nationally was actively
sponsoring stewards and woman's involvement within the
union, but in Haringey there is no indication of any
response from the women workers. Individuals may well have
considered involvement but decided against it because the
problems seemed insurmountable <52>. A comparison of the
development of the two branches shows that gender was not
the prime determinant, rather the comparison shows that the
very different material conditions of groups of women led
them to play different roles. The women radicals in NALGO
had jobs with a certain degree of economic leverage, were
childless and had a higher education. The radical NALGO
women were also able to carry out their very high profile
public role within the branch because their education had
given them access to both the women's and the labour
movement <53>. This undoubtedly helped them to enter the
public world and to question the dominant conceptions
concerning women and the working class which went beyond
their immediate experience. For the women in NUPE the
52. NUPE changed its rules at a special National Conference 
in 1975 the object of which was increasing membership 
participation and in particular women's involvement.
53 This is not to imply that the women involved in 
organising in the NALGO branch did not have to pay a 'price' 
for what amounted to their pioneering activity of taking up 
'women's issues' within the trade union branch.
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conception of the labour movement as a vehicle for change in 
their lives cut across their life experience generally, and 
their personal experience of the union which was known to 
them through the branch.
This points away from the division between home and 
work to a division between their working lives and the 
culture of the wider labour movement <54>. This is not to 
suggest that the possession of a conception of the labour 
movement ameliorates let alone overcomes the problems 
associated with the division between home and work. Rather 
the labour movement allows the issue to be shifted from a 
private to a public one where the difficulties associated 
with the home work division become an issue of concern of 
the public world of the trade union movement which it has to 
address and attempt to resolve on a collective basis <55>.
54. This point is alluded to by Cunnison <1983> when one of 
the women from the kitchen was elected as a shop steward 
through her contact with the union 'she began to ask 
questions... 'about woman's pay and conditions, the ideology 
of the family.. . *
55. It is important to note here that in taking up the issue 
of women workers the nature of the discourse alters from 
that centred on the wider aspects of the home work division 
to the more concrete questions of the problems that entails 
for the domestic organisation. It is in my view a false 
dichotomy between the ideal type of the wider discourse and 
the pragmatism of the narrower question of the domestic 
organisation.
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Without this relation to the labour movement everything
about the experience of their working lives engendered a
passivity and pulled them back towards the home. The
following comments from Coral Adeniz place the women workers
in the wider context of their 'lived experience':
At that time recruitment was done by the 
Supervisor in the kitchen and it was very much 
local women. If you wanted a job which fitted 
in with your children's hours, you went along 
to the local kitchen and asked your supervisor; 
she would arrange it, if there was vacancies 
for you to get a job. Most of the women at 
that time were married women with children in 
school and that's the reason they did the 
job <56>.
Adeniz put forward the following argument which makes 
sense of her situation. She offered what can be described as 
a generational argument. Instead of looking back from the 
1980s through a filter formed by subsequent alterations in 
the place of women in the union, she saw her own work 
situation in the post-war context as a positive gain for 
women. It should be recalled that for most of this period 
(1965 to 1979) women workers were married, working in a 
period of full employment. In reality they were earning a
56. CA1 side 'a
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second family wage but one which was their own. Adeniz 
stated:
I worked like the other women for the money, why 
else? It gave us that little extra so we could 
buy the kids another pair of shoes and it gave 
me a bit of independence <57>.
It was this limited financial independence which Adeniz saw
as important, (focussing on the independence rather than its
limitations). Her comparison was with her mother who had
been in service during the 1930s. The reason that Adeniz
adopted this generational comparison was based on a defeat
of an aspiration; she had perceived a certain independence
for women through war-work and the receding of that
independence in the post-war settlement. This was not what
she had wanted but there was nothing she as an individual
could do about it. Coral Adeniz had been schooled in the
circumstances of her time into viewing her work in this
generational light. This is important because Adeniz
combined an understanding of her own position, which held
within it the potential for change once the half light that
the post war world had cast women into had altered. In this
small instance, this was to mean two things; the altering
circumstances within the workplace and the bringing of the
57. CA1 side 'b
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wider labour movement to the women workers through the new 
branch leadership.
Branch changes 1976-1978
The beginning of alterations to the branch can be dated 
from the mid-1970s when the initial fracturing of the post­
war consensus began to alter the world around the branch.
The changing world began to impinge on and challenge the 
branch's norms and routines. The second minute book, which 
starts in 1975, shows up a sharp contrast with the period 
1965-1972 <58>. There were three areas in which branch 
relations underwent change: with the wider labour movement, 
the national union and the council. The minutes show that a 
number of labour movement campaigns and bodies start to 
canvass the branch for support. This is a new departure from 
the preceding period. These overtures met with a stock 
reply, typical of which is the following: 'Tottenham 
Constituency Labour Party anti-racist march on November 6th, 
letter read; branch to follow normal policy' <59>. Normal 
policy was to ignore it.
58. These change occurred sometime between 1972 and 1975, a 
period for which the branch documentation has been lost.
59. minute book 2. September 1976.
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The second, more substantial challenge came from the 
national union. The union had kept in contact with the 
branch through the regular attendance of the regional 
officer, correspondence, and union circulars; on occasions 
the branch had even asked for information. My impression of 
union-branch relations in this period is that they were 
formal and extremely parochial. By 1975 this had radically 
altered; the majority of items in the second minute book 
were circulars from the union. These circulars highlighted 
the concerns of the national union, which showed a higher 
profile in relation to women members and a more militant 
position against government cuts in public spending. It was, 
however, the sheer volume of material now being produced 
which made a qualitative difference from the preceding 
period. This coincides with Fryer's Warwick Report <60> and 
shows the union had already undergone a substantial 
alteration. It is doubtful that the Ron Keating of the mid- 
70s would have made the comment attributed to him at a 1967 
branch meeting, when he was regional officer: %A speech by 
Bro Ron Keating ended this meeting in which he told of the 
satisfactory running of this branch' <61>.
60. Fryer, R., Fairclough, A., Manson, T. 1974 Organisation 
and Change in the National Union of Public Employees. NUPE.
61. minute book 1, March 1967.
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In subsequent years, after 1978, the national union was 
to play an important role in the branch. Prior to 1978 the 
attitude of the branch to union intervention was one of 
hostility, as this minute illustrates: 'cuts in public 
spending; Alan Fisher general secretary circular. Branch 
decided that it will make its own stand against them, and to 
tackle the problems when they arise' <62>. Union 
intervention was treated as a type of disruption to the 
branch's order and way of life, which the branch leadership 
neither wanted nor understood. The national union and the 
wider labour movement were not just intruding on eleven 
years of routine but were beginning to challenge a routine 
which had remained unaltered since the war.
External interventions could be blocked by the branch. 
In 1976 an internal disruption began that the branch had to 
come to terms with; the first effects of government cut­
backs in public expenditure. The manner the branch resolved 
to deal with the proposed cuts is shown in the following 
pronouncement:
The secretary gave the meeting a full report of 
the details that he had to hand. Members were 
in agreement; no cuts in school-keeping or 
alterations to time sheets whatever <63>.
62. minute book 2, January 1976
63. minute book 2, March 1976.
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Spencer recalled what lay behind the phase 'no cuts in 
school keeping':
I don't think it struck me at the time, but 
looking back on it, the branch officers were 
actually prepared to concede carpet cleaning time, 
which was the cleaners. Sell that, but don't touch 
the caretakers <64>.
This is a clear example of one group of workers selling off 
another section's practices to defend their own position. 
This arose directly from the cleaners' lack of a voice 
within the branch.
These changing relations between the branch and the 
"outside world" present a sharp contrast with the 
preceding period. The reality, however, was that as with the 
shifts within the NALGO branch, they did not lead to 
traumatic alterations, rather disruption was molecular in 
character. It was this altering world which provided the 
backdrop to Spencer becoming branch secretary.
Transforming the Branch 1978-1979
In a matter of eight months, from June 1978 to the 
ending of the low pay strike in February 1979, the basis was 
laid within the branch to move from a sectional centrality 
to the inclusiveness of institutional centrality. The motor
64. CA\PS side 'b
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force for this was to be the new branch secretary, Peter 
Spencer. His ability to transform the branch did not arise 
from any internal dissent, but from his own radically 
different conception of trade unionism interacting with the 
changing world around the branch.
In June 1978 John Bruce resigned as branch secretary 
and with one exception, that of Ray Rowley, the other branch 
officials went with him and his coterie withdrew from branch 
life. Spencer was voted in as the new secretary 'on a Sunday 
morning by half a dozen caretakers' <65>.
Spencer had the support of a number of caretakers who 
became stewards, one of whom, Alan Cary, became branch 
chair. The core of caretakers Spencer had around him did not 
support him simply because there had been no one else to do 
the job; rather Spencer won their support on the basis of 
his reputation as a "militantH. This was hinted at when he 
remarked about a London-wide meeting for caretakers in 1977 
that 'a few of us militants went up'. This implies the 
formation of a quasi-elite which, although much looser 
paralleled Duke House Group in NALGO.
65. PS1 side 'b'.
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Spencer's election took place eighteen months prior to the
coming to power of the new leadership in NALGO. Formally it
bears no comparison with NALGO in respect of the forces
involved, the political debates generated and the schisms
which racked that branch. Here all that was involved was a
decision by half a dozen caretakers that Spencer should be
branch secretary. The substance of the change was
nonetheless similar within both branches. If the reformers
in NALGO had taken up the imagery of militant trade
unionism, Spencer brought to the NUPE job a conception of
trade unionism steeped in that militant tradition. This went
far beyond the boundaries of the caretakers' craft
consciousness. In trade union terms Spencer introduced the
branch to an alternative world view, formed out of his
experience in the car industry:
I ended up with the Ford motor company, I was 
there for 14 years heavily involved in the trade 
union movement. I went there at the beginning 
of 1960 and I left at the end of 1973. For all 
of that time I was a member of a union, first of 
the G@M, and because of my disgust of the way 
they handled some issue, I transferred to the 
T@G and was in that for most of the time... I 
then decided to go into school caretaking. I 
got a school in Buckinghamshire and became a 
shop steward in North Bucks for about ten 
schools, representing everyone. We had cuts there 
in 1975 which we fought. <66>.
66. PS1 side 'b'.
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Spencer was a labour movement activist schooled at one of 
the sharpest points of industrial conflict in post-war 
Britain. He was different from those militant workers who 
were to migrate into local government from manufacturing in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. By leaving manufacturing at 
the height of those workers' power, he had not gone through 
their subsequent defeats and was already established as 
secretary prior to the major disruptions to local government 
unions. His experience and knowledge from manufacturing 
unionism were brought to bear on altering the branch . As 
with the radicals in NALGO, his concept of trade unionism 
was itself subsequently to be redefined by his experience of 
local government. Spencers' own development provides an 
important understanding of what this transposition of 
militancy from manufacturing to local government originally 
meant and what it was to become <67>.
For Spencer to act on his conception of trade unionism
meant dramatically reorientating the branch. The axis of
change involved developing the branch in two directions:
firstly overcoming the problem of membership atomisation and
secondly extending the bargaining agenda to include
67. This was not solely one of militancy during his time at 
Fords. He had also been involved in serious set-backs to the 
union organisation, particularly the defeat associated with 
the 1963 ''bell ringers dispute".
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substantive issues from the excluded occupational groups.
The starting point for this was solely Spencer's desire that 
the branch should be run differently and that all members 
should be informed of branch meetings. This led him to take 
an elementary step: 'I made up my mind at that time, branch 
notices would go out widely circulated to all groups of 
workers' <68>. Mailing members for branch meetings was an 
obvious first step to overcome the problem of lack of 
attendance, and address the more general problem of a lack 
of information from the branch to the members.
This was a considerable innovation in the late 1970s, 
as it took the union to the members and developed the 
union's profile; it did not overcome, however, the 
substantive problem that the members were still excluded 
from the decision making process, that is, the problem of 
non-attendance at branch meetings was not resolved. In spite 
of the council's more liberal attitude to time off for 
industrial relations, for this branch there was not an 
option of holding branch meetings in work time. This was due 
to members' working patterns; there was no common time when 
the whole branch was working and the production process of 
the kitchen staff precluded any latitude for them to leave
68 PS2 side 'b'.
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work. These factors represented a boundary which helped 
shape the branch, focusing on the problems involved in 
evening meetings, and in particular the problems associated 
with women. Spencer related that the women membership had 
told him 'quite clearly they were not very happy at coming 
out in the evening' <69>. This problem was to be resolved 
through the development of sectional meetings for the 
occupational groups taking place in work time.
The second question that Spencer tacked was that of 
negotiations. His basic approach was systematic: 'When I 
became branch secretary, I looked at all the agreements we 
had negotiated, then I sat down and tried to improve them'. 
In line with this general approach, issues relating to the 
kitchen staff and cleaners began to be brought into the 
orbit of negotiations. In just over a year the branch was to 
throw off a decade and a half of inertia; these changes were 
fundamentally about extending the areas of bargaining 
carried out by the branch and about democratising its 
structures. In was just after the period presently under 
discussion that a stable pattern around both of these issues 
was firmly established.
69. PS2 side 'b'.
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The ease with which the branch secretary was able to 
carry out change was in marked contrast to NALGO. The 
central difference being Spencer's ability to build up the 
branch structures without coming into conflict with the 
caretakers. The lack of any resistance from the caretakers 
to this development was fundamentally due to the location of 
their economic power. That power existed at the workplace 
and largely independently of the other occupational groups. 
In NALGO the reformers' programme of democratising the 
branch and opening up the bargaining relation to the lower 
paid had encroached on the dominant economic group's mode of 
bargaining. Change in the NUPE branch did not.
It was the nature of the caretakers' economic power 
which provided the basis for Spencer to act as an individual 
independently of the different occupational groups. In spite 
of the demarcation afforded by the workplace based power of 
the caretakers, at some stage the division between the 
burgeoning branch structures and this workplace-based power 
would break down. This demarcation was to collapse and it 
would be difficult to conceive of it doing so on more 
favourable terms for the branch. It occurred through a major 
shift in the consciousness of the caretakers, arising out of 
the 1979 low pay strike. The impact of this strike 
represented the second thread in determining the branch's
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evolution and was to be seminal in the formation of
Haringey's union-council relations.
Taking the decision to strike
The strike arose out of the rejection by the unions of
a pay offer made under the restrictions of the government's
pay policy - the concordat. For education ancillary workers
this offer amounted to £2 for caretakers, 30 pence for
assistants and between 10 pence and 15 pence a week for
cleaners. The strike, which became known as the 'dirty job
strike', lasted for six weeks and to date represents the
high point of militancy among the national leaderships of
the local government unions and in particular NUPE <70>.
The strike began with a call from the national unions for a
one day strike on January 21st 1979, with future action to
be determined by the individual branches. Three factors were
essential to persuading a large number of low paid workers
to take strike action; a determined leadership, an issue
that the members felt strongly about and a will on the part
of the unions' lay officials, branch secretaries and
70. In the Autumn of 1978, and beginning of 1979 NUPE 
nationally stood out among the unions involved in 
negotiations for local government manual workers, as the 
most aggressive in support of industrial action, playing the 
leading role in developing a climate of opinion amongst the 
membership to strike. This militancy was to recede rapidly 
after the strike. The reasons for this are not my concern, 
though its impact on the branch, as I show in chapter 8 was 
to be considerable.
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stewards to argue the case for a strike with the members.
That on this occasion the national leadership was seen to be
serious in organising for industrial action was central.
Spencer recalled that 'you could not criticise the national
union, they were pushing it, recommending it. The last time
they have ever done it.' He also recognised that this strong
leadership was not in itself sufficient:
Its all right for the branch secretaries to go 
to national or divisional conference and being 
told; 'we want everybody out on January 21st', 
you have then got to go back and ensure your 
members want to come out... I can remember at 
one of our divisional meetings, a divisional 
executive member saying; "you got to go back and 
try, I've got to go back and try". So that's 
what we did <71>.
Spencer's quotation highlights the pivotal role of the 
branch officers. The branch officers had to take the call 
for strike action back to the members. If they had been 
unconvinced or hostile it would have been relatively simple 
to block the strike call. Spencer, along with the other 
branch officials had attended a divisional conference at 
which 'they were banging the drum and we firmly believed 
that this was the way forward' <72>. They came back to the 
borough firmly committed not only to a strike on the 2 1 st, 
but to indefinite strike action.
71. PS3 side 'a'.
72. PS3 side 'a'.
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Once back in Haringey the first step in convincing the 
members to take indefinite strike action was for the NUPE 
leadership to convince the G@M branch leaders of the need to 
pursue such a policy. Spencer won 'the argument in the joint 
shop stewards committee, and being the sort of people they 
were they acknowledged this' <73>. That the leaders of both 
branches were united around indefinite strike action sent a 
strong signal to the members of their leaders' seriousness. 
The branch leaders were however only able to convince the 
caretakers to take such a course of action. This was due to 
the existing division within the branch, the division 
between the caretakers, who had a trade union tradition and 
a somewhat ambiguous craft consciousness, and the other 
occupational groups, who were on the threshold of developing 
a collective identity. This issue of collectivity intersects 
with that of structure. At this stage the non-caretaking 
membership were only formally union members; no structures 
existed which could provide any substantial link between 
workplace and union branch. This inhibited the ability of 
the branch leadership to organise and argue for the strike.
Spencer, subconsciously or otherwise, was aware of 
these divisions. Rather than having a mass meeting of the 
entire membership, sectional meetings of the constituent
73. PS3 side 'a'.
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occupational groups were organised. This approach arose from 
an uncertainty on Spencer's part about the members' 
willingness to take action, and where the cleaning and 
kitchen staff were unknown quantities. In Spencer's account 
of the decision making process surrounding the caretakers' 
support of the branch leadership he recalled that this had 
involved 'two or three meetings talking about it before we 
took the decision' <74>. The leadership was able to 
participate in these meetings with a considerable amount of 
confidence due to the agreement with the G§M. The caretakers 
were confronted with the full weight of the local union 
branches encouraging strike action. There could be no 
question of a reluctant membership using, "the get out 
clause'' of equivocation on the part of their local leaders 
as a reason for not supporting the strike call. This was not 
simply a case of the leadership imposing their views,
Spencer remembered that 'we could get the caretakers out, 
who knows why, something clicked they were all aroused about 
the bleedin thing' <75>. However a unified leadership and 
strong feelings amongst the membership on the issue, did not 
guarantee an immediate positive response as explained by 
Spencer's comment that only after two or three meetings was
74. PS3 side 'a'.
75. PS3 side 'a'.
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the final vote taken. Spencer had no recollection, and 
therefore I have no knowledge of the details of their 
discussions. For sure he would have played a leading role, 
but at some stage rank and file members must have spoken. 
They would have been an important element in the final 
outcome, providing an indication to the more passive members 
that support for strike action went beyond just the 
leadership.
It is far easier to understand why the cleaners and 
kitchen staff did not strike than why the caretakers did.
The national strike pattern was for the general manual 
workers, in particular the dustmen to lead the strike. 
Spencer found it very difficult to articulate why the 
caretakers struck:
because they were incensed by the fact the 
assistant caretakers, for example, were being 
offered something like 3Op a week, and school 
cleaners, according to their hours, were being 
offered lOp to 15p a week. They weren't very 
happy with what they were being offered either.
I felt at the time they were more incensed at 
what was being offered to assistants and the 
cleaners. The caretakers came out in support of 
them (the other workers) that's the way it 
worked out, and the caretakers were prepared to 
accept that <76>.
Here we have a group of workers who were not militants, but 
who not only embarked on indefinite strike action but did
76. PS3 side 'b'.
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so, according to their secretary in the interests of other
workers. The caretakers' action can best be understood in
the context of their status and position in the labour
process. Part of their own status lay in their ability to
defend those workers who they directly supervised,
paternalism helped generate their decision to strike. This
however was only an element. It should be recalled that the
strike came after five years of wage restraint, and the call
by the national leadership to take industrial action
provided a way forward out of an impasse on the economic
front <77>. What enabled both of these feelings to be
transformed into action arose from Spencer's second reason:
We organised. Let me tell you something, I was 
ringing up branch secretaries in other boroughs 
and I couldn't believe some of the things, the 
wishy washy way they were talking to me. I 
couldn't believe it. We organised, we saw the 
need to strike. If you want it from an egotistical 
point of view it was because I was here and not 
say in Waltham Forest <78>.
This was undoubtedly the primary factor which allowed the 
strike to take place, and behind the 'we organised' was the 
driving force of Spencer. His leadership position enabled
77. The 'wage cycle' for local government workers is 
discused in chapter 8.
78. PS3 side 'b'.
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him to put forward his wider trade union view to act on the 
existing trade union consciousness of the caretakers.
For the other occupational groups, the interaction
between branch leaders and members whilst formally the same,
was in reality very different. The non-caretaking membership
were still an undifferentiated mass, and herein lay the
crucial difference from the caretakers. Every aspect of the
caretakers-branch leadership relations was missing, creating
a totally different set of relations between leaders and
members. Spencer recalled that:
My memory of the caretakers and the cleaners 
meeting is vague. I can well remember, a school 
meals meeting up at the civic centre, which was 
unbelievable. I ended up having to stand on a 
chair and shouting. While there was a large 
minority of support, quite clearly the majority 
did not wish to strike, we lost the vote. It was 
a very emotional meeting, because we were asking 
them to strike. Our full time officer was there; 
it scared the life out of him <79>.
This meeting to decide on indefinite strike action was held
at the beginning of 1979, fourteen years after the branch
was formed. For the kitchen staff it was either their first,
as with the parallel meeting held with the cleaners, or
second meeting. It was the first time cleaning staff or
kitchen staff from one part of the borough would have come
into contact with their colleagues from another part of the
79. PS3 side 'b'.
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borough. They would not have perceived themselves as a 
collective body of workers outside of their own 'little 
workplace'.
The corollary to the lack of collectivity of these 
workers was that they could not have any recognised leaders. 
Three types of leadership can arise from a collective body. 
Firstly that of the formal branch leadership: Spencer had 
become branch secretary six months prior to the strike call, 
and the impact he was to make was only just beginning to 
effect these workers. In January 1979 there could not be any 
substance to his relationship with these members. The second 
form of leadership, stewards from among these groups, did 
not exist. Nor could the third form of leaders have arisen; 
the informal non-elected representatives - workers 
acknowledged by their peers as spokeswomen. Such a 
leadership was to emerge (and is discussed in chapter ten) 
through an informal self-selection process taking place over 
a period of time. The prerequisite for this was meetings of 
the collective body, for example sectional meetings among 
cleaners where unofficial spokeswomen would emerge and 
become the "opinion formers'' among the occupational group.
The prerequisite, then, for a leadership to function 
was some form of collective identity. Its absence ruled out 
any authoritative link between the branch and members. Due
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to this Spencer was addressing workers who were only 
formally branch members, and it was this which represented 
the major difference with the caretakers. If the strike had 
taken place perhaps a year later both the cleaning and 
kitchen staff may well have made the same decision but it 
would have been made on a different basis, the far more 
informed one of a functioning collective body.
The consequences of the strike
The strike had little immediate impact on unifying the 
branch. Adeniz recalled that 'the strike had not concerned 
the women' <80>. It had been a 'caretakers strike'. The 
effect of the strike was to alter caretakers' view of trade 
unionism, shifting it from the narrow confines discussed 
above to a more militant view achieved through this 
"narrow" economic struggle. What the caretakers found in 
their six week strike action was that their craft 
consciousness, their power and status outside of the school 
counted for very little. In the course of the strike, which 
at times become quite bitter, they had encountered their 
true worth and the different experiences of a collectivity 
of the trade union and the support of the wider movement
80. CA\PS1 side 'b
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which had helped them to win some not insignificant 
advances.
The strike had represented the transition of the 
caretakers' power. It had shifted it from the discreet sub- 
trade union time bonus to the exercise of their ability to 
disrupt schools. This had not been an automatic development 
derived from going on strike. While the events surrounding 
the strike allowed them to transcend their craft 
consciousness this could have proved to be transient had the 
strike been lost. The caretakers could have become 
embittered with the cleaners and kitchen staff, and could 
have retreated from their new found collectivity back into 
the individualised world of the school keeper. The 
caretakers neither withdrew into splendid isolation nor 
recriminations. Victory allowed for the consolidation of 
Spencer's power base among the caretakers, which not only 
fused the democratic element of the changes to the branch, 
it resolved the duality of their school based power and the 
burgeoning branch structures. The strike provided the basis 
for a largely smooth conclusion of shifting from sectional 
to institutional centrality. The strike also represented the 
'jumping off' point for the branch's identification 
(primarily, through not exclusively through Spencer) with 
the non-aligned left and the subsequent conflict with
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government and council over the cuts. This was to be seen in 
the adoption by the branch of a militant programme for the 
defence of members' living standards, which emerged towards 
the end of 1979 as a reaction to the threat of expenditure 
cuts.
The identification which the Haringey branches of both 
NUPE and NALGO had with the non-aligned left differed in one 
fundamental way. In the case of NALGO the relationship was 
based on resolutions and as I show, while never without 
substance were always ambiguous. In the case of NUPE there 
was a solid foundation to the relationship, the 1979 strike, 
where industrial militancy had provided a way forward 
because it had been seen to work.
Chapter five 186 part one
T h «  B a i r g e n c e  o f  i  C o l l e c t i v i t y
The borough's unions in 1979
The changes observed in my two case studies had close 
parallels in the evolution of the NUT and the Craft 
Committee, where similar reforming leaderships came to power 
in 1979 and 1980 respectively. In the NUT there arose a 
group sharing many of the characteristics of the radicals in 
NALGO; it was exemplified by the route the NUT leaders took 
into teaching, entering the profession through university 
rather than teacher training college <1>. In the case of the 
Craft Committee, a new convener, Dennis MaCracken, was 
elected in 1979, bringing to the Committee a wider 
conception of trade unionism. His militancy was shaped by 
his Northern Irish Protestant background and a rejection of 
sectarian politics; and by his experience of working on 
London building sites during the early 1970s, the height of 
the building unions' economic power. MaCracken's role within 
the Craft Committee paralleled that of Spencer's in NUPE.
1. For example Val Graham one of the key NUT activists had a 
degree in Russian, she became a infant school teacher. Tony 
Brockman who became the NUT secretary in 1980 had a degree 
in computer science and had only entered teaching in 1973 
'as a stop-gap measure'.
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At the other extreme were the general manual branches, 
the T§G and NUPE General. As late as 1979 these branches 
were still firmly based on the sectional centrality of the 
dustmen. This is illustrated by the following anecdote from 
Ray Gillard, (my respondent from Personnel management) 
recalling how NUPE General functioned:
We were in the middle of negotiations with the 
street sweepers about their bonus rates and the 
door opened and in walked Mullins (NUPE General's 
branch secretary and dustman) and three or four 
of his group and they said 'never mind about 
this rubbish, we're here to negotiate our clear-up 
money' and the council members turned to them 
and ignored the street sweepers and started to 
negotiate with Mullins. It was a very large 
meeting jammed solid with officers from street 
cleansing and members from Civic Amenities.
There must have been thirty to forty people in 
that room <2>.
In neither of the general branches was there a university - 
educated grouping or a leader like Spencer. Kessler's agency 
for the artificial imposition of a representative figure was 
absent.
Apart from the static general branches all of the major 
unions were undergoing substantial internal alteration. This 
process was most thoroughgoing in NUPE Education and NAIXSO, 
as it involved the breakup of the old bargaining relation 
and with it a shift from sectional to institutional
2. RG side 'b'.
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centrality. Concretely change meant that by the end of the 
1970s four of the major unions, with the majority of 
borough's employees, either had or were on the verge of 
gaining a left wing leadership, the majority of whom were 
from the non-aligned left.
Change from above or below
The pivotal role within NUPE Education and NALGO was 
played either by individuals or by a clearly definable 
category of worker. My ability to draw on similar processes 
in other branches begs the question; how was it possible for 
these militants to become leaders?
I have already shown that both Kessler's and, 
especially, Terry's theses about sponsorship have been shown 
to have considerable limitations. Of even less validity is a 
view of change "from below'' derived from a traditional 
manufacturing model of workplace organisation (Lane 1971, 
Beynon 1973, Croucher 1982). In Haringey there was a general 
lack of movement from below, though I will qualify this 
assessment in subsequent chapters, particularly in relation 
to NUPE.
The inadequacy of both 'sponsorship' and 'membership 
involvement' theories would seem to leave these militant
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leaders emerging from thin air and the changes which 
occurred as their ''property". That this is inadequate may 
be illustrated by thinking through the hypothetical 
consequences of Rudin and his colleagues joining the NALCO 
branch in 1965. Undoubtedly they would have played a very 
different role; the narrative, instead of charting their 
ascendancy, would have discussed them as an interesting 
footnote. Rudin and his friends were clearly a post-1968 
phenomenon; more importantly they would have had less weight 
in the branch of the mid-'60s. The key difference lay in the 
molecular changes which slowly and imperceptibly had altered 
the culture of the branch, previously founded on the post­
war consensus. It was this which opened the way for the 
radicals' tenuous but nevertheless fruitful interaction with 
the membership.
The literature which has taken up the broader question 
of how change came about <3>, found a consensus around the
3. It is found in the debate around the rise of local 
government militancy Walsh, K. <1982>; 'Local government 
Militancy in Britain and the United States', Local 
Government Studies. Vol 8, No.6, November/December. 
Dunleavy, P. 1980 Urban Political Analysis. Macmillan, 
London. Fryer, B., Fairclough, A. and Manson, T. <1978>: 
'Notes: Employment and Trade Unionism in the Public 
Services', in Capital and Class, no 4, Spring p. 70-77. 
Clegg, H, A. <1976>: Trade Unionism under Collective 
Bargaining. Blackwell, Oxford.
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notion of the 'rise of local government militancy' but 
polarized around the question of whether that militancy was 
generated from 'above' or 'below'. My research has revealed 
an interaction of change from above, the presence of 
reforming branch leaderships and from below, a shift in the 
position of local government workers. This interaction 
between human agencies occurred within the context of a 
third variable, the institutional framework. The structures 
of workplace organisation had two determinants: one derived 
from the centrality of the occupational group internally and 
the other from the impact of local government reform 
externally. The former has been discussed above; it is to 
the impact of reform that I now turn.
Change from above - the reform of the bargaining relation
The reforms which affected the unions had begun in the 
late '6 0s and can be characterised as attempts at corporate 
reforms, that is to reform the institutions of the post-war 
consensus from above through the expansion of local 
government and the separate question of productivity, that 
is, how in a period of tight labour markets it was possible 
to ''get workers to work". The unions became the 
beneficiaries of the growth of corporate management and of a 
perceived need to professionalise industrial relations, most
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Importantly expressed in the Bain report <1973>. For the
unions, however, the real generator of change arose out of
the Prices and Incomes report No. 29 <1967>. Although the
chosen method of the report for reforming pay was through
the introduction of productivity schemes it opened the way
to borough based bargaining and with it the potential for
the development of institutional centrality.
Sheldrake <1988> has pointed out that the type of scheme
introduced came from manufacturing, the benefits of which in
local government were to prove illusory. Sheldrake comments:
work studies freely adapted from engineering 
industry... were of little use in the caring 
occupations. Further, whilst the erosion of 
demarcation agreements in capital intensive 
situations could readily generate substantial 
savings ... such saving were not easily found 
in the labour intensive activities of local 
government <4>.
As Walsh <1982> commented 'bonus schemes... were as much 
methods of paying extra to low paid workers as a means of 
implementing tight managerial control' <5>. In spite of such
4. Sheldrake, J. <1988>: 'The changing pattern of collective 
bargaining in local government, in R Saran and J Sheldrake 
(ed.s) p u b l i c  S e c t o r  B a r g a i n i n g  i n  t h e  ! 9 8 Q s ,  Avebury,
London.
5. Walsh, K. <1982>: 'Local government Militancy in Britain 
and the United States', Local Government Studies. Vol 8,
No.6, November/December.
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shortcomings bonus schemes covering all full-time male 
workers increased from 16% in 1968 to 72% in 1978 <6>.
From the stand-point of the corporate reformers 
devolution can only be judged a failure, for while they 
succeeded in generating a "workplace based'' trade 
unionism, they were unable to replicate at a local level the 
bureaucratic relations which characterised the national 
Whitley system. The main reason was the lack of a reliable 
agency to regulate the devolved structures. The failure of 
productivity payments as a mechanism for increasing output 
has an important corollary? it failed as a method of 
imposing self-regulation on the worker through tying wages 
to output <7>. The devolution of the bargaining relation, 
far from turning it into a 'disciplinary' mechanism, opened 
it up to a wide diversity of pressures and influences.
For the bargaining relation to become operative at a local 
level it had to pass through two filters. The first was the 
council. According to Terry, while governmental pressure on 
management for reform was intense, 'this was neither uniform 
nor irresistible' <8> and Walsh, commenting on the trends
6. LACSAB Evidence to the standing commission of pay 
compatibility, LACSAB 1979.
7. A point alluded to by both Walsh <1982> and Sheldrake 
<1988>.
8. Terry, M. <1982>: 'Organising a Fragmented Workforce', 
B r i t i s h  J o u r n a l  o f  I n d u s t r i a l  R e l a t i o n s ,  v o i .  x x  no i .
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towards corporate management, pointed out that 'the extent 
to which they were ideological movements as opposed to real 
operational and organisational changes is a matter of 
debate' <9>. What both Walsh and Terry have alluded to was 
that underneath the highly centralised Whitley system, the 
councils' residual local bargaining autonomy was amplified 
by their removal from market mechanisms and the political 
autonomy open to them. This allowed for fragmentary, even 
parochial, responses by councils to pressures for reform 
from above.
The second filter was of greater importance; the 
question of who from the workers' side was to carry out the 
devolved bargaining relation. The crux of the problem has 
been articulated by Boraston et al. <1975>. After they had 
noted the general growth of productivity bargaining and its 
extension into local authorities, they commented that 'these 
developments have not been matched by trade union action
9.Walsh, K. <1982>: 'Local Government Militancy in Britain 
and the United States' Local Government Studies. Vol 8,
No.6, November/December. The failure to make this important 
distinction between the bureaucratic imagery of change and 
real change has dogged the neo-Marxist literature, for 
example, Cockburn <1977>, the Community Development Projects 
<1974> and certainly within the British context O'Connor 
<(1971>; they have continually mistaken conception for the 
child.
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along the lines recommended by the (Donovan) report' <10>; 
that is, an increase in full time officials (FTO's) to carry 
out this bargaining role. Instead it was left to the 
stewards.
The qualification Boraston et al. made in relation to 
local government, where they saw an increased role for FTO's 
to set up productivity deals, was proved to be misplaced. As 
I have noted in chapter two, more specific local government 
studies have all pointed to the phenomenal increase in the 
numbers of shop stewards. The national unions were either 
unwilling or unable to provide FTO's to carry out the 
bargainers' role, and therefore they lost a controlling 
influence over the emerging workplace organisation. The 
basic consequence of devolution was that potentially 
powerful localised bargaining structures were created and 
then ceded to an array of lay branch officials and shop 
stewards. In the hands of the stewards the bargaining agenda 
was opened up to direct influences from below and the way 
was opened for the workers to be influenced by the wider 
labour movement.
10 Boraston, I., Clegg, H. and Rimmer, M. <1975>: Workplace 
and Union: A Study of Local Relations in Fourteen Unions. 
Heinemann London.
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Th* Particularities of Haringey
Within this general framework of the devolution of the 
bargaining relation the specifics of Haringey were of major 
importance in the rise of the branch reformers. As I have 
commented in chapter two, Haringey's localised bargaining 
relation, along with other London boroughs, dated back to at 
least 1965, predating the impetus from government to devolve 
the bargaining structures. In Haringey the 'corporate 
reforms' rather than generating entirely new workplace 
structures were impinging on an existing structure of 
management union relations based around the sectional 
centrality of the branches. The expansion of local 
bargaining came into conflict with these existing relations, 
based on sectional centrality. For both management and the 
elites who ran the unions there was no imperative to change, 
the corporate reforms having little impact - for example, no 
productivity scheme was evolved within the kitchens, and Ray 
Gillard could point out that it was some years after the 
council had adopted a corporate management structure that 
'we set up a joint consultative committee with the 
unions' <11>. Those who wished to build up workplace 
organisation were confronted by entrenched interests within 
the branch and council bureaucracy. The branch reformers
11. RG side 'b'.
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however, were assisted at every juncture by the consequences 
of Institutional devolution; for example, the reformers in 
NALGO used both national union policy and legislation to 
their advantage against the narrow interpretation of 
management and the old branch leaders. This early 
establishment of a bargaining relation explains the 
discrepancy between this work and Terry's sponsorship 
thesis. The branch reformers had to carry out change against 
the inertia of the existing bargaining structures and the 
sectional interests which lay behind them.
There were then two aspects of the institutional
framework which sustained the branch reformers; firstly the
structural determinants of workplace organisation provided
for an autonomy of leaders from members; secondly, by the
leaders ability to draw on support and an independence from
higher authorities. The structural seems to hold the key, as
Ingham <1974> has pointed out:
.... unless the institutional and normative 
structures of the system are taken into account it 
becomes difficult to explain the specific form 
of action to which the discontent may lead <12>.
It is the case that by the end of the 1970s the militant
leaders were using their institutional power base to
12. Ingham, G, K. <1974>: *Strikes and Industrial Conflict- 
B r i t a i n  a n d  S c a n d i n a v i a ' ,  Macmillan, London.
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articulate demands from below rather than act as regulators 
from above, and to "invade'' higher level decision making 
bodies without substantial support amongst their members. 
Taken by itself, however, the fact that the institutional 
framework was used and the fact it helped maintain the 
branch reformers misses the substantive development of 
collectivity within the workforce.
The importance of collectivity
Earlier research, for example that of Terry, dated the 
emergence of workplace organisation at the beginning of the 
1970s. Although there is not enough empirical data to draw 
any general conclusions, this and other work, such as 
Nicholson et al. <1981> Smith et al <1987>, has shown that 
these changes within the workforce only began from the mid- 
'70s. Comparing the Haringey branches at the beginning and 
the end of the decade, this work has pointed to an 
alteration in the position of workers. This change was not 
sudden, rather it consisted of a series of small shifts 
which began to alter the workers' working lives. Change 
arose from the inability of the employers, both locally and 
nationally, to meet the aspirations of the workers, the core 
of which was generated by a fall in real wages. (The local 
government 'wages cycle' is looked at in more detail in 
chapter eight.) An important caveat was that for the worker
198
change resided at the level of external rather than internal 
intrusions; there was no substantial alteration to the 
workers' labour process <13>. These alterations in the 
workers' lives drew a number of responses; for example, it 
will be recalled that the caretakers sold off the cleaners' 
carpet cleaning time. This guild-like reaction was, however, 
the exception. In general this work has shown that change 
generated a trade union response; thus the tenor in which 
industrial action was discussed had substantially altered by 
the middle of the 1970s and this shift was not confined to 
the reformed unions. The dustmen played a major role in the 
'Low Pay Strike' of 1979 and when the NUPE General branch 
found the branch secretary incapable of running the strike, 
younger workers previously quiescent came to the fore and 
took it over, pursuing the strike in an assertive fashion.
It was then from the mid-70s that workers began to act
in a collective manner, engaging in collective decision
making and trade union activity. It was the emergence of
this collectivity which represented the pivotal shift among
the workforce. I have used the term collectivity to denote
what I consider to be the basic change shown up by this
research; that workers, by acting in a collective manner,
13. It was this lack of internal change than invalidates 
notions of a process of 'proletarianisation' taking place.
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had taken a first step in evolving a class-conditioned
response to their changing circumstances. While the
collective activity of the workers took the form of trade
unionism, what was crucial was not the form of trade
unionism as such but the act of collectivity. The shift to
collectivity was a moment of class formation which was prior
to any characterisation of trade union practice <14>. It
represented the emergence of what Draper <1978> has called
the 'process of maturation' <15>. This concept does not
denote a continuum where 'A' automatically leads to 'B',
rather it is concerned with workers becoming a class
'becoming fit to rule' that is a revolutionary class. For
Draper of central importance is the level of independence
achieved by working class organisations, it is in terms of
maturation as a measure of class formation, that this
concept is useful for this work. This can be viewed at two
levels; firstly the changes seen in these union branches
were not confined to Haringey but were part of a wider
response to the ending of the post-war consensus. How these
14. This is not to disagree with the point made by 
Fairbrother <1990>: Union Democracy and Socialism, that it 
is because unions are 'rooted in the production process, 
which distinguishes them from other forms of organisation, 
such as pressure groups or social movements'.
15. Draper, H. <1978>: Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, 
vol. 2, Monthly Review Press, New York. Chapter 3.
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workers in Haringey altered can be taken as a measure of 
wider alterations to class. Secondly a very direct measure 
of maturation was how the branches evolved an independence; 
for example the attempts to alter the paternalism which 
dominated the relations between members and management. 
Similarly within the branches the relations that represented 
the relations between 'leaders', including stewards and 
members was also indicative of the development of class 
formation.
If trade unionism could not have emerged without the 
shift to collectivity, it could not be spontaneously 
sustained from below,. This is exemplified by the evolution 
of NUPE General. The lack of a broader trade union 
consciousness among the leaders found the branch entering a 
decline once the spontaneous class consciousness developed 
during the strike had receded; the 'lessons' from the strike 
were soon dissipated. This was in marked contrast to the 
role that NUPE Education was to play, the difference between 
the two branches residing within their respective 
leaderships. Once collectivity had emerged it was the 
interaction between the reforming leaders and members which 
was to develop the branches. In concrete terms this was a 
two way process; it opened the way for the reforming leaders 
to provide a labour movement perspective for the members and
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for members to effect how the branch leaders reacted to 
events. For workers this represented a potential shift from 
their fragmented state to collective participation in the 
labour movement.
Within this interaction also lay the basis of two 
potential gaps between leaders and members. Firstly the 
process of developing 'workplace organisation' began to 
generate the specific characteristics of local government 
organisation, in particular the primacy of the occupational 
group. Secondly the reforming leaders were acting with a 
predetermined formula of class which lay behind their 
manufacturing model of trade unionism. The class content 
within these local government unions however, that is how 
the membership acted as a collective entity, did not conform 
to any predetermined formula. Through moving toward a form 
of collectivity, the membership displayed a more inchoate 
mass of concerns and prejudices then the model allowed for. 
In 1979 the question of how the process of maturation was to 
evolve could have been formulated in the following way; how 
would the relations between leaders and members evolve that 
is how would the domestic organisation develop, which was 
largely contingent on whether the workers gravitated towards 
the political and trade union conceptions of the leaders or 
the leaders be bent and shaped by the members?
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The perception of change as either coming from above or 
from below can now be seen at the very least to be 
problematic. What this work has been able to point to has 
been how, in the context of the fragmenting post-war 
consensus, forces from above and below interacted with one 
another, creating an ambiguity which did not fit into any 
easily definable pattern. On the one hand, the rise of 
collectivity marked a clear departure from the way the 
branches had previously operated; on the other hand this 
shift was not strong enough by itself to sustain the 
reformers. The existence of the reforming leaders, the 
emergence of collectivity among members, and the 
institutional factors, in Haringey at least, had opened the 
potential to become part of the labour movement <16>.
By the end of the 1970s, although the unions were 
distinguished in terms of their internal regimes, a common 
denominator of assertiveness and independence was 
discernible. The unions had an ability and willingness to
16. Implicit within the literature is the diversity of 
'workplace based organisation' which opened up once the 
devolution of the bargaining relation was under way. It was 
the different permutations of this institutional change 
interacting with human agency which generated different 
forms of 'workplace organisation'; for example see Terry, M. 
<1982> 'Organising a fragmented Workforce', in British 
Journal of Industrial Relations. Vol. XX No 1. and 
Marchington, M. and Armstrong, R. <1982> 'A comparison 
between Steward Activity in Local Government and the Private 
sector', L o g a l  G o v e r n m e n t  s t u d i e s ,  vol. 8 ,  no 6 .
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act independently of the council, an independence which 
predated both the Conservative Government and the 
radicalisation of the council. These changes had begun to 
cohere around the core functions of trade unions; the 
economic and defensive .
The dual agenda
The major element in this agenda was economic. From the 
mid-70s the decline in local government workers' living 
standards had generated wage militancy across the union 
branches. The second prong was political, politics entering 
the branches as part of the trade unions' defence of jobs 
against government cutbacks. I characterise the articulation 
of these issues by the branches as a 'the dual agenda'. The 
importance of the dual agenda was twofold; firstly, these 
issues were the form in which collectivity was articulated 
and the form in which the shift in NUPE and NAIXSO from 
sectional to institutional centrality was carried out. 
Secondly the "playing out" of these issues set certain 
parameters to the development of collectivity and with it 
the core of institutional centrality in the bargaining 
relation.
By 1979 the unions had reached a plateau. Confronted with 
the rapidly changing situation generated by the election of 
the Conservative government, however, the potential arose
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for them to play the central role in the defence of local 
government. This assessment derives from a number of 
factors. The local government unions represented by far the 
largest and indeed only serious organised working class 
force in the borough. In this sense they had a substantial 
social weight. The unions had built up an independence from 
the employer and for many of the manual unions their 
organisations had been tested and alterations had, where 
necessary, been made in the local leadership. Though the 
unions would have taken primarily a defensive role in the 
context of any large scale strike action, questions of 
workers' control would have been raised in a range of 
services, as the trade union replaced the council 
bureaucracy in deciding on their delivery <17>. If the 
branches had performed this leading role they would have 
opened the way to unifying other sections of the working
17. This view is based on a direct observation of events in 
the London Borough of Hackney during the rate capping 
campaign. The council leader was taken to court at the 
height of the campaign and the possibility arose that she 
would be jailed or surcharged; the response of the unions 
was to prepare for indefinite strike action; they were faced 
with the problem of who would run and what would be deemed 
to be essential services. They began to organise workers to 
run these under the control of the Joint Shop stewards 
committee. The point was that the union was being forced 
into the position of acting as the collective organisation 
for the producers of services rather than as wage 
bargainers.
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class behind them. To explain why this potential was never 
realized a key determinant lay in the conceptions of the 
leaders of the reformed unions.
The politics of ths new leaders: branch based militancy
In my characterisation of the Duke House Group I used 
the term non-aligned left; by the turn of the decade it was 
applicable to the majority of leaders within the reformed 
unions. By then the practice developed by the non-aligned 
left was derived from syndicalism. It had three discernible 
traits; socialism, a militant trade unionism and a 
commitment to democracy. First and foremost, these leaders 
were socialists rather than militant trade unionists <18>. 
Their identification of a militant trade union practice with 
a socialist ethos was not in itself unique, but what had 
been revealed is an inversion of the normal relationship: 
the militant manufacturing model they adopted was 
transmogrified from a form of trade unionism to a political 
practice.
18. For example Peter Spencer's socialism had arisen from 
working at Fords, from being a 'spiv' and a racist growing 
up in Hackney in the late 1940s. At the plant he had not 
only been involved in the union, but according to his 
testimony he had been deeply effected by the civil rights 
movement in the USA and had applied it to his own values and 
practice.
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This inversion was based on a view of working class 
spontaneity as latent within the membership ready to be 
aroused by the objective circumstances- the attack on jobs 
and conditions, and facilitated by their programme for 
democracy. The non-aligned left's desire to integrate 
democracy into their practice was then not an optional extra 
but a necessary plank for their conceptions. Democracy 
provided a leaven for their actions; there could be no 
militant practice without democracy and no democracy without 
militancy. In the final analysis the spontaneity of the 
workers was to substitute for organised political activity. 
It allowed them to be "untainted" by party politics creating 
an organisational and a semi-ideological independence from 
labourism. Concretely the transposition of the militant 
tradition was freed from a 'party dogma' which would not 
have been the case if this process had been dominated by the 
Communist Party.
The basis on which these views had emerged was their 
experience of the early 1970s in manufacturing, and the ease 
with which they had been able to transpose this militant 
tradition. In each union the transfer of power from the old 
to the new was relatively unproblematic, with the old 
leadership reaching the end of their working lives and 
unable to replicate their views. In each branch limited
207
resources and a loose network of activists had been 
sufficient to carry through change. When discussing the 
trade union practice of the non-aligned left I will use the 
term "branch based militancy" because they looked to carry 
out a militant industrial struggle and viewed the trade 
union branch as sufficient to that task.
It was a syndicalist viewpoint which the socialist 
leaders took to the unions into the 1980s and which very 
rapidly was to be shattered. How the unions were to interact 
with the changing political terrain during the early 1980s 
in Haringey and London is the subject of the next section of 
this work.
Chapter Six 208 Part Two
Th« R l» «  C t  R « a lc « l l» »
Defending local government
By unanimous consent the relations between central and 
local government underwent a major alteration after the 
election of the Conservative Government in 1979.
Government's attitude to councils became, as Rhodes 
commented, one where the 'description control seems a mild 
appellation for these changes' <1>. The sharpness of the 
struggle between central and local government, where the 
meekest defiance by councils led to an extreme reaction by 
government, arose, at least in part from the government's 
desire to reduce the ability of the working class to use the 
council as an institutional expression of class interest. In 
1979 the success or otherwise of this project was contingent 
on a range of issues, not least the labour movement's 
defence of the political economy of labour. It was around 
this question that the political forms of central-local 
government relations were to evolve.
It is far from the case that the government 
(particularly during its first two administrations) achieved 
all it desired in relation to local government. For example,
1. Rhodes, R. <1985>: 'Intergovernmental Relations in the 
Post-war Period A squalid and Politically Corrupt Process', 
L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t  S t u d i e s  voi n. No.6, p n.
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in spite of Government policy local government's current 
expenditure in 1986-87 was in real terms between 5-6% higher 
than in 1979-80. Similarly, the declared aim of government 
to reduce local government employment did not materialise; a 
5% fall did take place in full-time employment between 1979 
and 1982 but then stabilised, and while part-time employment 
also fell, by 1985 it had returned to just below its 1979 
level as table 6:1 shows.
Table 6:1:___________________________
Local Authority Employment 1979-1985
year full-time part-time
thousands thousands
1979 1626 886
1980 1609 865
1981 1578 843
1982 1552 840
1983 1558 852
1984 1551 858
1985 1545 873
Quoted in Stoker, G. <1988>: The politics of Local 
Government. Macmillan, Basingstoke
However, while there has been a decline in numbers employed 
as Table 6:2 shows, Haringey went against this trend insofar 
as the overall increase in employment, noted in chapter two 
continued unabated during this period.
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Tabi« 6:2:
Haringey Staffing Levels
year full-time part-time total
1979 7,775 4,172 11,947
1980 7,916 4,110 12,026
1981 8,064 4.085 12,149
1982 8,374 3,773 12,147
1983 8,484 3,821 12,305
1984 8,574 4,443 13.017
1985 8,646 4,446 13,192
1986 9,202 4,829 14,031
1987 9,550 5,019 14,596
Source : figures from the GLC yearly statistical abstract.
Since 1979 there can be no doubt that a defence was
mounted by councils against governmental encroachments. 
Until rate-capping the main mechanism in the councils' 
armory against government expenditure cuts was the 
substitution of the rates for decreasing government grants; 
'the rate rise defence'. This defence was not solely the 
province of the left Labour councils, it represented a far 
wider response by councils to central government cutbacks. 
Table 6:3 shows the increasing share of local authority 
income being made up from the rates.
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Local Authority Income Sources, 1976-85
Percentage of income Central government
made up by: rates grants miscellaneous
1975-76 23.9 46.8 29.3
1978-79 23.9 44.8 32.8
1984-85 27.0 39.2 33.8
Quoted in Stoker <1988>
Travis <1986> laid out the dilemma the rates created for the
1979 Conservative administration and the opportunities it
opened up to councils:
The Conservatives were committed to cutting 
spending on services which were not under direct 
central control. Local authorities had the power 
to raise any rates they chose... and could if 
they chose spend more than the new administration 
wanted <2>.
What is also notable about these alterations in 
central-local relations was the role of the trade unions. In 
Haringey, and in boroughs whose unions had gone through a 
similar development, there was a failure to realise the 
potential I have ascribed to them in the previous chapter. 
The realisation of that potential would have given a very 
different character to the defence that was actually carried
2. Travis, T. <1986>: The Politics of Local Government 
Finance. Allen @ Unwin, London, p 80.
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out, Blunkett and Jackson <1987> have rightly pointed out 
that the core of this:
was the imagination and ability of politicians 
together with the professional initiative of 
officers, combating wave after wave of government 
legislation and financial attacks <3>.
The reality was that the local government unions continually
played a subordinate role to the councils, and when they did
come onto the political stage, it was as auxiliaries to the
councils. The way in which councils did defend themselves
against government can be characterised as the 'bureaucratic
defence', most importantly among these being rate rises. It
was along these lines that the defence of the political
economy of labour was conducted. The formulation of these
policies to defend local government represented an element
in the reformulation of labourism, a reformulation which
gained substance through the practice of radical
municipalism. Both processes - the emergence of the rate
rise defence and the practice of radical Labour councils -
were political processes arising from within the labour
movement. The centrality of the labour movement to these
processes has generally been obscured by the local
3. Blunkett, D. and Jackson, K. <1987>: Democracy in Crisis: 
The Town Halls Respond. Hogarth, London.
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government literature because of the dominance of state- 
centred theories.
State centred theories
The way in which relations between the centre and 
localities have evolved during the 1980s has been analysed 
by many commentators; for example Loughlin <1986> has 
discussed the juridification of the relation and Rhodes 
<1986; 1988> has developed an analysis through the use of 
organisational theory concerning the degree of power enjoyed 
by different levels of government and different government 
agencies. The varied theoretical frameworks that have 
emerged to comprehend change have created a wide ranging 
debate. The groundwork for this debate was laid in the 1970s 
by an attack on the dominant orthodoxy of public 
administration theory. The most influential among those who 
were breaking new ground were those of the Community 
Development Projects (CDPs), for example Local. Government 
becomes Big Business <1976> and in particular the work of 
Cynthia Cockburn, The Local State <1977>. These works began 
to broaden the parameters of the study of local government 
by situating it in a wider social context.
The Althusserian framework, however, in which the CDPs 
and Cockburn developed their views of localities and the
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role of the 'local state' came under sustained criticism. 
That criticism came from other neo-Marxist and pluralist 
theorists alike, who criticised them for among other things 
putting forward a functionalist model of the state; the 
state acts for capital because that is the role of the state 
in capitalist society <4>. The ease with which Cockburn and 
the CDPs' theoretical framework was dealt with also came 
about because the theory made meaningless any attempt to 
work within the 'local state' which belied much of the 
experience of the CDPs' and Cockburn's own research <5>.
4. For example, see Duncan, S, S. and Goodwinn, M. <1982>: 
'The local state: functionalism, autonomy and class 
relations in Cockburn and Saunders.' Political Geography
Q u a r t e r l y ,  1 « 1 . p - 7 7 - 9 6 .5. The importance of this theory for its advocates was that 
it provided an ideology for working within the community. 
Placed in its wider context this represents part of the 
development of a critique of post-war labourism. (For 
example see the work of O'Malley 'The Politics of Community 
Action' <1977>). This point was acutely summed up by 
Donnison in The Good City in relation to the CDPs. After 
commenting on their deliberately 'cutting themselves off 
from central and local government' he states that:
Coolly examined and shorn of a certain 
romanticism about shop stewards and tenants 
leaders, the answer suggests that the movement 
may be laboriously reinventing the wheel - or 
to be more precise the Labour Party.
Donnison, D. with Soto, P. <1980>: The Good Citv. p.33-34. 
This political formation will be encountered below, in the 
1980s within the state.
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By the end of the 1970s, pluraliste had learnt from 
Marxists to recognise that central-local relations needed to 
be approached with reference to core theoretical questions; 
political power and domination, class relations and the 
state. Boddy and Fudge <1980> suggested that the strength of 
mainstream political science was that it had overcome the 
agency versus partnership debate but that it tended to be 
theoretically weak by focusing on the institutions of 
government to the exclusion of the socio-economic context.
On the other hand Marxist literature, while theoretically 
grounded in Marx's theory of the state, had been crude in 
its characterisation of central-local relations.
At the beginning of the 1980s the areas which had
emerged for analysis were around the rapidly altering
centre-local relations and a desire for local government
reform <6>. By 1982 Jones and Stewart <1982> were able to
claim, in a rejoinder to Page that they had:
urged major reform in financing in its 
political and organisational arrangement 
and its constitutional provision, all to 
promote more responsible, responsive and 
accountable local government <7>.
6. This is extensively covered in Local Government Studies, 
for example the 1981 annual review.
7. Jones, G. and Stewart, J. <1982>: 'The Value of Local 
Autonomy-A Rejoinder' Local Government Studies. Vol 8, No 7 
September/October, p.10-15.
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By the mid-80s the pluraliste were able to move from 
having a theoretical desire for change to being able to draw 
on the actually changing practice of the councils. Such 
changes were largely to be found among the radical Labour 
boroughs, run by what has become known as the urban left or 
local socialists. For the pluralist theorists the practice 
of the radical councils placed into the sharpest of relief 
their conceptions of local-central relations and their 
conceptions about how local government should function, from 
which a sensitive if not uncritical review of local 
government emerged within a sustained defence against 
central encroachment. For mainstream social scientists, the 
dichotomy Boddy and Fudge had pointed to had by the middle 
of the 1980s been overcome; the public administration theory 
had evolved into what has become known as 'localism'. The 
strength of this pluralism was derived from its ability to 
bring together the two main areas of local government 
analysis: the altering centre-local relations, their desire 
for reform with a critical view of the practice of councils. 
The most rigorous of this work has came from Young <1986> 
and Jones and Stewart <1983>. These arguments of the 
localists are, as Dunleavy and O'Leary have noted <1987>, 
based on a pluralism which 'recognises the existence of 
diversity in social institutional and ideological
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practice' <8>. The problem for those neo-Marxists who 
claimed the most radical of the councils' practices for 
their own, was the ease with which that practice dovetailed 
with the pluralist theorists. As Livingstone commented on 
the GLC 'there was nothing a good social democrat couldn't 
do on a warm day' <9>. What united both Marxist and 
pluralist theorist alike was their state centred nature.
The common theoretical focal point for Marxist and 
pluralist literature was an analysis of the relation between 
centre and locality which took place in terms of an 
interaction between institutions. The common problem for 
these state-centred theories is that by understanding the 
councils' practice in relation to an interaction between 
centre and locality, the literature obscures the political 
process which gave it substance. The actions of Labour 
councils were the product of a political process within the 
labour movement which resolved how the councils were to 
defend the political economy of labour. There were then two 
sets of relations; those between the centre and localities 
and those between a Labour council and the local labour
8. Dunleavy, P. and O'Leary, B. <1987> Theories of the 
State. Macmillan, London.
9. Quoted in Wainwright, H. <1987>i Labour: A Tale of Two 
Parties. The Hogarth Press, London
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movement. As I have argued in chapter two it was the 
council-labour movement relation that was central to policy 
formation as the labour movement, particularly the Labour 
Party and local government union branches provided the 
mediation between the council and a borough's population. 
State-centred theories by analysing the political 
interaction between centre and locality but writing out the 
Labour Group-labour movement interaction were able to 
ascribe an independence to councils. Without this 
interaction being taken into consideration the mediation 
between a council and a borough's population is lost. It is 
the removal of this mediation which allowed the councils to 
be perceived as independent entities, their practice an 
expression of the "will of the people". On the rare 
occasions that the labour movement entered the literature it 
was in a neutralised, and therefore an unproblematic form, 
as a validation for the political actions of the 
councillors.
Behind the literature then there lies a concrete 
historical development within the labour movement of how it 
was to conduct the defence of local government. This absence 
in the literature necessarily overlooks the question of how 
political formations arose as part of the process of 
formulating a policy to defend local government.
219
Consequently the literature presents in a finished form the
forces who were to carry out the programme of the radical
councils. The most influential work on the local government
left is that of Gyford <1982> and his book The Politics of
Local Socialism <1985>. What Gyford put forward was an
unproblematic development of local socialists from their
origins in the community into the portals of local
government office. He has characterised this 'left' as:
the new generation of local politicians who 
emerged in the early 1980s committed to 
pursuing a decentralised road to socialism.
Rather then a mass proletariat, they seek to 
form a coalition of urban groups, and by 
mobilising them around local issues, transform 
popular consciousness <10>.
The above characterisation of Gyford's is in fact quoted in 
Gurr and King <1985> and could have come from any number of 
commentaries on local government. In reality the formation 
of this left was itself part of the political process by 
which the rate rise defence came to dominate. It is a 
characterisation which finds support from the major 
participants of local socialism, such as Livingstone <1987> 
and Blunkett <1987>, and from among socialist theoreticians, 
for example Wainwright <1987>. This type of analysis places
10. Gurr, T, and King, D. <1987>: The State and thè City. 
Macmillan Education, p 179.
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the local socialists as an element of a new left who 
represented:
the new tradition by contrast (with the view 
that the Labour Party could be reformed) has 
emerged from circumstances, in the late sixties 
and early seventies, in which a minority of 
working class people were themselves in practice 
breaking out of labourism. Through their 
experience of occupations, work-ins, 
demonstrations and strikes. This minority 
perceived the possibilities of a popular rather 
than purely parliamentary process of change <11>.
The above quotations are indicative of a literature which
describes the end of a process where it is indeed possible
to speak of a new left or local socialist left who expressed
the concerns outlined above. What is absent in the analysis
is a consideration of the process of political formation
that took place within the labour movement. For example an
important element within the labour left described above was
women. A discussion in Feminist Review <1984> situates the
move of women from the women's movement, into the Labour
Party as taking place in 1980 and after:
I was one such feminist who joined in 1980 and 
I know a large number of others who joined at 
the same time... There was a radicalisation within 
the left wing of the party around the question 
of internal democracy... and the left wing current 
around Tony Benn strengthened its influence <12>.
11 Wainwright, H. <1987>: Labour: A Tale of Two Parties, 
op.oit.
12. 'The women's movement and the Labour Party', Feminist 
Review 1984, Summer.
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This (which I view as part of a wider influx into the Labour 
Party by those I define, below as the 'political radicals'.) 
took place after the major reforms had been achieved by the 
left and after the formation of what I wish to characterise 
as 'the municipal tendency'. In the Labour Party of the late 
1970s the focus on municipal politics simply did not fit the 
concerns of its left-wing, as the following examples from 
within Haringey show. What is apparent from the 
documentation is, however, that as the 1970s drew to a close 
the adherents of a more traditional labourism were on the 
defensive, in the face of an increasingly assertive left- 
wing, as the following discussion of the Haringey Labour 
Parties illustrates.
The demise of 1945 labourism?
In 1979 the report from the Hornsey delegate to the
Labour Party conference reported that:
There is no doubt that this conference was a 
major watershed in the history of our party. A 
number of very fundamental decisions were 
taken; immediately they will have a dramatic 
effect on the party internally <13>.
13. From the written report of the Hornsey delegate to the 
1979 Labour Party Conference to the Hornsey GMC, October 
1979.
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The report continued by reminding members of the long­
standing commitment within the local party to the changes 
which had been made at conference, 'Hornsey has been one of 
the most stalwart supporters of the Campaign for Labour 
Party Democracy (CLPD); we have put forward similar motions 
for some years.'. A similar position existed within the 
Tottenham Party, for example a resolution from West Green 
ward for the 1978 conference had called for support of 'the 
67 identical proposed constitutional amendments on automatic 
reselection, submitted to the 1977 conference' <14>.
This division between the old and the new is
illustrated on a somewhat broader terrain, by looking at the
impact of the 1979 low pay strike on the local Labour
Parties. An impending election usually demands the greatest
unity. A strike support committee, then a new phenomenon,
was established based on the Labour Party. It had the
support of the three GMC's, Norman Akinson, MP for
Tottenham, and Ted Knight, the Prospective Parliamentary
Candidate for Hornsey. It was indicative of the ascendancy
of the left that the initiative for the support committee
came from the Tottenham branch of the Labour Party Young
Socialists, and had the local parties marshalled behind it
14. Resolution to the Tottenham General Management 
Committee, June 1977.
within a week. It is within this broader context that the
local Parties response to government policy towards councils
was situated. By the time of the 1979 Labour Party
conference the issue of local government was already of
major importance as the Hornsey conference report shows:
Conference had 28 motions and amendments on this 
subject. The eventual composite included the 
section, 'this political campaign (against the 
cuts) must be accompanied by a determination to 
resist cuts imposed by the Tories whether at 
national or local council level' <15>.
These examples are indicative of the ascendancy of the left. 
The opposition was a minority who were organisationally 
marginalised within the local Party structures. On neither 
side of this divide is it possible to find any concern about 
municipal socialism.
In line with the literature's inability to show these 
wider concerns of the labour left it lacks a comprehension 
of the heterogeneity which existed among socialists at the 
end of the 1970s both within and outside of the Labour 
Party, from which the orthodoxy of the 'new left' was to be 
formed.
15. From the written report of the Hornsey delegate to the 
1979 Labour Party Conference to the Hornsey GMC, October 
1979.
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A divers* left wing
The following 'sketches' provide a characterisation for 
the reader of the most important of the different political 
groupings (including a characterisation of those on the 
right of the Labour Party) in 1979-1980. As these show, the 
left was far from being a homogeneous entity <1 6 >.
The Activists: This is a generic term to describe the Labour 
left- the label they themselves used. The activists can be 
divided into three categories. From 'right' to 'left' these 
were:
The Tribunite/Communist Party Axis: The Tribunites were the 
traditional left wing within the Labour Party. I have linked 
them with the Communist Party (CP) as this axis reflected 
the left wing of the post-war consensus. Both identified 
closely with the main left leaders within the Party and 
trade unions and both subscribed to the Alternative Economic 
Strategy (AES) <17>. At this time they had no organised
16. I have not made a distinction between those who had a 
national importance and those tendencies which were of 
parochial importance. These sketches are drawn mainly from 
Haringey and where appropriate from the London Parties. They 
are not exact, and do not fully convey the state of 
political flux at this time.
17. For a discussion on the 'AES' in relation to Tribune see 
Coates, D. <1980>: Labour in Power? a Study st the Labour 
Government 1974-1979. Chapter six. For the CP advocacy of 
the 'AES' see the Morning Star.
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grouping within the CLPs. In Haringey, as with many 
constituencies at that time, the influence of the CP was 
weak. The Labour Coordinating Committee (LCC) which by 1982 
had come to represent this axis, was at this time going 
through a period of self-definition <18>.
The Non-Aligned Left: The term was used by these socialists
to describe themselves. I concluded the last chapter with a
characterisation of the reforming union leaders as 'the
branch based militants', who were part of the wider
political emergence of the non-aligned left. The common
starting point for both the trade union and political side
of the non-aligned left was twofold. Firstly, it denoted
being to the left of labourism's traditional left wing, the
Tribunite/CP axis. Secondly, they viewed politics through
the unions; their political centre was syndicalism. The
substitution of the trade unions for a political force was
the result of a slippage between two distinct propositions;
a view of the unions as the necessary agency for
confrontation and a belief that the unions would
spontaneously become that agency. This created a
fetishisation of the unions and the substitution of the
18. With hindsight the LCC became the vehicle through which 
this tendency came to grips with the collapse of corporatism 
and the CP's industrial base.
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unions for their own political activity. Political struggle, 
in this syndicalist framework, was seen as a straightforward 
and inevitable progression from trade union struggle.
Workers, by virtue of fighting back against job losses, 
spontaneously moved onward to more militant struggles and 
more radical politics.
For the non-aligned left within the Labour Party this 
led to a view of politics which was fundamentally an 
instrumentalist one. Their role in politics was to 
facilitate the opening up of the Labour Party to the working 
class and particularly the trade unions, to clear away the 
bureaucratic excess which blocked working class 
participation. The non-aligned left were to be central to 
future developments, as they represented the bulk of the 
activists. Within this group two layers existed. Firstly, 
the local leaders, who were already councillors, and who had 
been Party members since the early 1970s. By the end of the 
decade they had become integrated into the higher echelons 
of the Party structures both at a London and borough level. 
It was from among their number that the core of the 
municipal tendency was to emerge. Beneath them was a layer 
who had joined the Labour Party from the mid-70s, and who 
through their numbers and energy provided the core of the 
CLPs' input into the national campaign for Party democracy
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and who were to be the most vociferous opponents of the 
cuts.
The Marxists: A number of organised Marxist tendencies 
worked within the Labour Party. These were; Militant, 
Workers Action and the Chartists. Nationally none of these 
organisations were numerically strong. The largest was 
Militant whose major strength lay in their national control 
of the Labour Party Young Socialists. The Chartists had been 
formed in 1968 by a group within the International Marxist 
Group who felt it important to work within the Labour Party. 
Workers Action had been formed in 1973 after their expulsion 
from the International Socialists. They had worked within 
the Labour Party from 1976 onwards. All of these tendencies, 
as with those who worked outside of the Labour Party had 
been formed by the experience of 1964-1970. Within Haringey 
neither the Chartists nor Militant had a presence. Workers 
Action had six people within the borough in 1979.
The Moderates: These were the forces within the Labour Party 
who stood to the right of the activists. They can be 
characterised as the defenders of traditional labourism.
They dominated Haringey council until 1985.
The Revolutionary Left: These were the counterparts to the 
Marxists, but outside the Labour Party the main grouping 
being the Socialist Workers Party, (SWP).
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The Political Radicals: This definition refers to those who 
during the 1970s stood outside the Labour Party or 
'orthodox' revolutionary organisations. They functioned 
within three main areas, community groups, the women's 
movement and black issues. Three areas can be itemised which 
represented an ideological coherence:
i) their conception of a working class fragmented by ethnic 
and gender divisions, creating oppressed groups, who were 
relatively economically disadvantaged and powerless, a 
position, which is at least partially sustained through 
racist and/or sexist practices, of the white and/or male 
working class and working class institutions.
ii) their conception of a hierarchical white male dominated 
trade union movement.
iii) the view that the Labour Party was 'reformist '
While the views of the political radicals both
paralleled and overlapped with those of the activists, there 
were a number of important differences. They had a coherent 
understanding of the question of oppression. (Views which 
were in 1978-1979 just beginning to permeate into the London 
Labour Parties), while through their decision to be outside 
of the Labour Party, they were logically part of those 
political forces who were engaged in building an alternative
labour movement.
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These examples of the Haringey labour parties and the 
above characterisations show that in 1979 there was a 
considerable diversity of views within the left of the 
labour movement and that within the Labour Party a movement 
for change within the constituencies was already well under 
way, a movement in which local government provided an 
element of a far broader reappraisal of labourism. Exactly 
what these struggles would do to the boundaries between 
Group and Party and between council and government were in 
1979 unknown quantities. The origins of what was to become 
the 'municipal tendency ' within London are found in 1978 
with the formation of a broad campaigning body within the 
Labour Party; the Socialist Campaign for a Labour 
Victory (SCLV).
The rise of the municipal left.
The SCLV was founded in 1978 by two Marxist groups. 
Workers Action and the Chartists, and a number of non 
aligned left activists. The SCLV aimed initially to prepare 
for a general election campaign to be fought by grass roots 
labour activists on the basis of a unity of socialist and 
democratic demands.
The campaign produced alternative election literature 
for the 1979 election and succeeded in getting several CLP's
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to use it. The literature covered both traditional socialist 
concerns (labour should not make the working class pay for 
the crisis) and "democratic" issues such as woman's rights, 
anti-racism and the struggle in Ireland.
The campaign published its own paper Socialist 
Organiser, which continued after the Conservative election 
victory with debate then shifting onto how Labour activists 
could use power bases in local councils to work towards 
bringing down the government.
This debate led to a major split over the issues of 
rate rises, with Workers Action and some independents 
arguing against rate rises as simply another manifestation 
of cuts, and the Chartist axis (including such future 
municipal leaders as Ken Livingstone) arguing that rate 
rises could be used tactically to buy time to organise 
opposition to the Conservatives. This latter position 
inexorably slipped into a position of support for rate rises 
per se as the better alternative to cuts in services.
The political split over rate rises rapidly replicated 
itself organisationally, resulting in the formation of 
London Labour Briefing, whose main raison d'etre was the 
winning of "power" in first the GLC and then across the 
London boroughs. From the original SCLV intention of using 
local authorities as a platform to mobilise a fight against
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the government, the potential for local authorities, in 
Briefing's terms, became that of maintaining islands of 
socialism in a Thatcherite state, with Labour 
administrations using the resources at their disposal to aid 
the "disposessed". This view, which came to dominate among 
the left during the mid 1980s, was formed out of the 
experience of the GLC. There the conception of harnessing 
the resources of the local state had arisen after it had 
acquiesced to the Lord Laws' ruling over Fares Fair. When in 
Carvel's words the GLC 'went legit' <19>.
The substance of the GLC's actions evolved from their 
innovative developments in social policy which have been 
highlighted by Blunket and Jackson:
The GLC took the lead, welding together a grants 
policy which gave particular support to black 
voluntary organisations; an equal opportunities 
committee to monitor racial discrimination and 
a serious attempt to implement positive action 
in its own recruitment policy <20>.
19. Carvel, J. <1985>: Citizen Ken. Hogarth Press, London, 
p. 109. Also see London Labour Briefing, March and April 1982 
for the debate within the left over what it should do after 
fare's fair.
20. Blunket, D. and Jackson, K. <1987>: Democracy in Crisis. 
Hogarth Press, London, p 91-92.
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The main elements of this policy were :
i) Taking forward equality - mainly through in house codes 
of practice against discrimination. This also provided a 
certain amount of support for women and ethnic groups in 
minorities.
ii) The provision of grant aid, for example to advice 
centres, and women's refuges, which plugged gaps in existing 
service provision.
The methods the council adopted to operate its 
redistributive function, that was dividing up the surplus at 
its disposal, and on what lines it would reform its own 
political and institutional practices evolved into a 
programme of equality which in the main addressed the most 
socially and economically disadvantaged, attempting to 
improve and change their immediate circumstances. I view 
this nexus of policies as the 'bureaucratic administration 
of equality' which represented the core of radical 
municipalism.
Reconstituting class-the role of the political radicals
As far as it is possible to discern the model used by 
the GLC for their programme of equality was adopted from the 
USA. Carr (a Labour member of the GLC) has commented that 
the impetus for their equal opportunities programme 'was a
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borrowed model from the United States' <21>. This model had 
two elements. Firstly, a recognition that certain sections 
of society were disadvantaged as a result of institutional 
and individual discrimination. Secondly it prescribed a 
method to redress these forms of discrimination through an 
interventionist role for central and local government, by 
using their employment practices and redistributive powers. 
The redistributive practice of the council allowed for 
oppression to be disengaged from class exploitation; class 
if it was viewed at all was done so through the lens of 
oppression and seen as "classism", a specific type of 
oppression. This conception of oppression and oppressed 
groups became the principle criterion, both theoretical and 
practical, on which the council's institutional changes and 
distribution of surplus took place. The theoretical effect 
of this practice provided a material basis around which 
class was reconstructed, it could now be viewed through the 
prism of oppression. This logically and in practice cut 
across the horizontal axis of class creating vertical 
communities of the oppressed (within which the unions were 
placed) , forming a hierarchy of the oppressed. The central
21. New Socialist. July 1985. For example, the concept of 
contract compliance had its origins in the federal programme 
for equality.
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element in this was not the shifting order of these 
competing groups but the centrality of the council. It 
became the arbitrator between conflicting interests amongst 
the hierarchies and over priorities of where the surplus was 
to go. This was legitimated in three ways:
i) That it was carried out against male and/or white 
dominated structures challenging their racism or patriarchy
ii) By the perception that it represented the demands of the 
council's constituency.
iii) It has become linked to a wider vision of a socialist 
future which these actions prefigured <22>.
Making this operational called for an agency to carry
it out, and it was the political radicals who had a clear
understanding of the importance of this. The GLC's programme
acted as a conduit for the political radicals into the
councils structures, either in a client relationship or as
administrators of policy. The latter, which was the most
important, took place mainly through the formation of
specialised units, which attempted to circumvent the
entrenched County Hall bureaucracy. The practice of the GLC
was to represent a fusion of the US model with the political
radicals' indigenous theories. Although many of the
22. For example see M Ward's article in London Labour 
Briefing on the Economic Development Unit, March 1983. Or H 
Wainwright, <1987> Labour: A Tale of Two Parties.
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political radicals joined the Labour Party the substance of 
their relations was the formation of an alliance with the 
Labour Council to carry out the programme of equality and as 
such was with the GLC as an institution. The GLC along with 
other radical councils during the mid-1980s provided an 
institutional home for the political radicals, and through 
the administration of the project a temporary ideological 
coherence of working within the state.
The 1981 decision of the left councillors to remain in 
office and the practice of the post-1981 GLC were seminal 
for the evolution of labourism. There were now three 
definable ideological currents on the left of the Labour 
Party; the various Marxists, the Tribunite/CP axis (from 
1982 the LCC) and, now inside the Labour Party, the 
political radicals. The basis for this was the assimilation 
of the political radicals' views through the GLC's practice 
of the bureaucratic administration of equality. The critique 
of Labourism that the political radicals had evolved from 
the mid-6 0s was now put into practice not from below but 
through the council. A period of transition had begun where 
the influence of the Marxists, which had grown during the 
1970s, over the non-aligned left began to be eclipsed by the 
political radicals. These shifting ideological parameters 
within the labour left occurred through the rise and decline
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of radical municipalism. The political practice developed by 
the GLC was of undoubted importance in providing a model of 
radical municipalism for boroughs such as Haringey. These 
ideas however only came to prominence in Haringey after the 
campaign against rate capping in 1985. Unlike the GLC, 
Haringey Council did not have the autonomy from the labour 
movement enjoyed by the GLC Labour group. Although the ideas 
of the political radicals were to hegemonise the non-aligned 
left within the borough this process occurred not only after 
the GLC had evolved its model but after the left within the 
borough had failed to come to terms with the alliance 
between the moderates on the council and the council unions.
Chapter seven 237 Part two
The Formation of Alliances 1979-1981
The impact of Government policy on Haringey
I have argued that at the end of the 1970s the left was 
extremely heterogeneous and that the rise of municipal 
socialism occurred not only as a response to the 
Conservatives but also out of internal conflict within the 
left. This picture is now shown on the borough wide level; 
in the Haringey case, however, in the period 1979-1981, 
radical municipalism was unheard of. Rather the debate and 
the shifting alliances which were to centre around the rates 
question, was over how and what forces were to defend the 
political economy of labour .
In June 1979 the Conservative Government declared its 
intention of holding public expenditure at the 1978-1979 
volume through 'tight cash limits' <1>. Haringey council was 
faced with a dual problem; expenditure was to be reduced in 
real terms,(as government was redistributing expenditure to 
other areas) and the planned expenditure levels for 1979- 
1980 had already been laid, based on the Labour Government's 
programme of expansion <2>. It was this, coupled with
1. This analysis of the impact of the chancellor mini­
budget of June 1979 was given in the Economist. 22nd June
2. HM Government <1976>: Public Expenditure to 1979-1980. 
Cmnd 6393, H.M.S.O., London.
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'tight' cash limits to enforce cuts, which croated the 
sharpness of the 1979 crisis.
One week after the Government's announcement of its 
intention to hold down Council expenditure the Labour Group 
voted to carry out cuts. Each service committee would have 
to make a 2% saving reporting back to the Labour Group 
sometime in September. Colin Were, the leader of Haringey 
Council, defended this decision as a means 'to avoid a 
supplementary rate increase' <3>. This decision was put to 
the Local Government Committee (LGC) meeting of July 1st, as 
a proposal from the Policy Advisory Group (a joint IX5C 
Labour group committee) and rejected. Instead a resolution 
was passed by a two to one majority calling for 'the Labour 
Group to consult frequently with the LGC and CLPs in order 
to adhere to the manifesto', with an addendum calling on the 
LGC to organise:
as early as possible a meeting of representatives 
of the Labour movement and community organisations 
of the borough to discuss what can be done to 
defend living standards. Meanwhile the LGC 
opposes any rent or rate increases or cuts in 
services <4>.
The following night, after a meeting between the Labour 
Group and the LGC officers, the councillors issued a
3. Quoted in the Hornsev Journal. 29th June 1979.
4. Local Government Committee [hereafter LGC) minute July 
1979.
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statement saying that they 'refused to be bound by the 
resolution' <5>. Any action the parties might take against 
the government would be interpreted as also being against 
the Group.
The meeting of labour movement activists initiated by 
the LGC was held on July 7th. Indicative of the concern felt 
was that over ninety people attended <6>. There they were 
confronted with a united response from the LGC officers and 
leading councillors. The officers defended the Labour 
Group's decision, while the councillors called for unity 
behind their leadership. The opposition to Council policy 
was to widen through the one concrete decision to come out 
of the July 7th meeting- the decision to launch the Haringey 
Campaign Against the Cuts (HCAC), which rapidly became a 
focal point for the borough's labour movement activity 
against cuts, including those in the health service <7>.
5. Quoted in the Hornsev Journal. 6th July 1979.
6. The figure of ninety was given in the report of the 
meeting to the September GMC of Tottenham CLP.
7. Organisationally the campaign adopted a delegate 
structure and held its inaugural meeting in October. Until 
then meetings took place supervised by a steering 
committee. The centrality of HCAC to the labour movement in 
relation to Government cuts is discussed below. Its role 
surrounding heath cuts was exemplified in it coordinating 
the campaign against the closure of the local hospital in 
Tottenham. For example see the report in the of Hornsey 
Journal. of 8th February 1980 of the demonstration to save 
the local hospital organised by HCAC.
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At the LGC meeting of September 19th a resolution was 
passed which not only supported cuts but endorsed the Labour 
Group's decision to increase the figure to 2.7% <8>. The 
nature of the opposition to cuts had also altered. The 
counter-position now put forward called for a rate increase, 
'it recognises that this may lead to a substantial rate 
increase next year' <9>. This shift indicates that the 
initial opposition of July 1st had arisen as an instinctive 
reaction to cuts, and that the no rate-rise addendum had 
been passed because delegates had voted for the only 
opposition tabled. The September meeting seemed to settle 
matters. However, between it and the LGC meeting of October 
12th, the issue was reopened.
Two of the service committees Education and Social 
Services, reporting back to the Labour Group on how to 
achieve budget reductions, reported that they were unable to 
carry out cuts without 'decimating services' <10>. Their 
decision to fight their corner led, for a brief period, to a 
complete reversal of policy. Councillor George Meehan
8. LGC minute September 1979.
9. LGC minute September 1979.
10. Angela Greatly chair of Social Services quoted in the 
Hornsev Journal. September 28th 1979.
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(Council leader 1983-85) stated that:
The majority group felt that there had been 
change of opinion, both nationally and locally, 
on the cuts... Since it was elected to administer 
and improve services, no cuts could be made in 
services... I don't think the people of Haringey 
would accept a large rate rise <11>.
Faced with a loss of support from amongst the councillors,
Colin Were offered his resignation <12>. The impact of this
act saw the Labour Group rally behind their leader, with, at
least publicly, both left and right calling on him to
withdraw his resignation. Meehen stated 'It would neither be
in the interest of the Group or Haringey' <13>. At a group
meeting on the 9th October other group officers also
offered to resign <14>.
The shift in the Group and Party was reflected in the 
minutes of the LGC of the 12th October where it was reported 
that a discussion between liaison delegates, (LGC members 
who liaise with the Labour Group,) and IX3C officers, agreed 
a motion that 'regretted the resignation threat', reaffirmed 
the policy of maximum resistance to the Tory cuts and called
11. ibid.
12. A 'tactic' he had pursued in 1977 during the Labour 
government expenditure cuts with similar success.
13. Quoted in the Hornsev Journal. 5th October.
14. These were: Young, Garwood, Meehen, Harrison, Whittle 
and Atkinson. Reported in the Hornsev Journal. 11th October.
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on the Labour Group and Group officers to agree that:
No cuts should proceed in the current year and 
they (the Group) should not take precipitate 
action at this stage, about the strategy for 
next year <15>.
The policy change of the LGC reflected a growing opposition 
within the Party, but more importantly it arose from the 
rejection of cuts by the service committees. A new alliance 
had been formed against cuts, which, temporally at least, 
had isolated the leader with a small coterie of followers. 
Behind this alliance the "revolt" of the committees was 
effective and the cuts were reduced to the original level of 
2%. This reunited the Labour Group around the leader and, 
ignoring the decision of the LGC of October 12th, the Labour 
Group met on the 14th and voted 21-16 for cuts <16>. These 
were then passed at the council meeting of Monday October 
15th <17>. It was on this note that the debate over the 1979 
expenditure levels ended.
The picture I have painted of confusion, uncertainty 
and of no clear lines of accountability, is if anything 
understated, as I have confined my remarks to the relations 
between the Labour Group and LGC. The intensity of the 
politicking during the five months between June and October
15. LGC minute October 1979.
16. Reported in the Hornsev Journal. 19th October.
17. Minute of October Council meeting.
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laid the foundation within the borough for the emergence of 
a range of political alliances in the Labour Party and wider 
labour movement. The experience of the debates between June 
and October generated within the Labour Party two separable 
but related processes concerned with the 1980 expenditure 
levels:
i) An attempt by the Labour Party to impose order onto the 
decision making process and to evolve some form of 
democratic control over the Group's actions.
ii) An attempt within these Party-based structures to carry 
out a debate on the budget.
Two Structures November 1979 until April 1980
The formalisation of these issues began at the IX5C 
executive committee meeting of November 3rd, where a 
discussion paper was commissioned, to be 'written in 
consultation with Haringey Campaign against the Cuts' <18>. 
This document: 'The Effects of Public Expenditure Cuts on
18. LGC Executive committee minute November. This ensured a 
consensus within the LGC and the GMC's for the executive's 
proposals.
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Harinaev 1980-81' outlined three positions:
One group of comrades has argued that we cannot 
put the burden on the rate payers and we must 
cut our expenditure even if this means reneging 
on our election promises... A second group has 
argued that if we are faced with causing hardship 
through cuts or with putting up the rates we 
should put up the rates. Finally there is a third 
group who think we should not confine our thoughts 
to these narrow options but instead we should 
concentrate on how we can help to unite the 
whole movement in a concerted opposition to the 
Tory Government's plans to force it to do a 
U-turn on public spending cuts <19>.
The LGC executive meeting of November 3rd also set out a
timetable for debate: the December ward and GMC meetings
would decide the policy of the parties, and their decisions
would be taken to the LGC meeting of January 7th. A
conference 'of the three GMCs and the group on cuts and rate
planning' was also scheduled for December 16th <20>. As this
was not a constitutional body 'no vote was to be taken.'
<21>. This structure had not simply arisen out of an
academic desire for clarity but had been shaped by a real
pressure from Labour Party members on the local Party
19. The Effects of Public Expenditure Cuts on Haringey 1980- 
81', LGC document. November 1979.
20. LGC Executive committee minute November .
21. ibid.
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The establishment of these procedures for determining 
the budget had instituted a parallel decision making process 
to the traditional one, based on the exclusive right of the 
Labour Group to decide the budget. The Labour Group had been 
party to the formulation of these structures and to the 
timetable, the Group even deciding to speak to wards and the 
GMC's about the budget <22>. In fact, far from abandoning 
their exclusive right to set the budget, by the beginning of 
December the Labour Group, independently of the Party, had 
decided on a cuts budget coupled with a 36% rate 
increase <23>.
This discrepancy between the Group's public support for 
the Party-based structures and their actions arose from the 
intense political pressure they were encountering from 
within the Labour Party. It is in this light that I 
interpret their decision to go out and speak to the wards; 
it was an attempt to regain support by engaging with a 
broader spectrum of Party opinion than the activists who 
staffed the GMCs and LGC. The actions of the Group 
represented the rejection of the delegate status which had 
been implicit in the Party's structures. A contemporary 
account of the meetings organised by the Labour Group with
22. LGC minute, November.
23. Tottenham January GMC minute, from the report of ths 
GMC's Group liason officer.
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the wards sheds considerable light on how far removed the
Group actually was from the views of the overwhelming
majority of Party members:
In fact, the debate in the Parties has not 
been so much between this policy (rate rises) 
and the right-wing councillors, but between it 
and the policy of organising the fightback now 
(i.e no rate rises)... The latter was only 
narrowly defeated at the Tottenham GC <24>.
Even if a certain amount of rhetoric is allowed for in the
above report, it situates the Party far to the left of the
councillors. This assessment is confirmed by the decisions
of the borough's GMCs and of the January LGC. The resolution
that was passed at that meeting called for a no cuts budget
with a possibility of rate rises 'to buy time to build a
fight against the government' <25>.
The January LGC decision marked the formalisation of
the two decision-making processes; the Group's and that of
the Party, and with this the formalisation of the
disjuncture between the Party and Group. The consequence of
this breakdown in consensual relations between Party and
Group was to force the latter increasingly into reliance on
their bureaucratic independence from the Party afforded them
24. From the GMC report of the Bruce Grove delegates to 
Bruce Grove Ward January 1980.
25. LGC minute January 6th, 1980.
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by Labour Party standing orders. As the LGC secretary's AGM
report for 1979-1980 somewhat diplomatically put it:
The last year has been dominated by a  major 
disagreement over plans to cut some council 
services which dozens of hours of discussions 
failed to resolve... Group members are willing 
to ignore decisions reached by their party by huge 
majorities after very careful consideration... 
Party rules provide Councillors with a 
constitutional defence between elections and give 
party members a constitutional solution at the 
time of reselection <2 6 >.
Far more forthright was the annual report to the LGC from
the Group secretary. He paints a picture of the virtual
breakdown of Group/Party relations:
The failure to implement LGC resolutions on the 
'rate' has considerably affected the relationship 
between the Group and LGC. The LGC rightly 
complains about the poor attendance of many Group 
members at LGC and GMC meetings but the hostile 
atmosphere and frequent vilification of the group, 
sometimes on a personal basis, does not encourage 
attendance <27>.
The Party-based decision making structures helped to 
legitimise an opposition within the Labour Group, which was 
carried over to the rate making meeting. There Toby Harris 
(council leader from 1987 until time of writing) proposed a 
45% rate increase with no cuts and Maureen Dewar (who I 
identify below as one of the core members of the Labour
26. Tabled at the LGC meeting June 1980.
27. ibid. This was not accepted by the meeting and was 
remitted to the Group secretary for redrafting.
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Group) a 40% increase with a cuts package. Both were voted 
down, and the 36% rate increase passed. This was achieved by 
the narrowest of margins; 26 votes to 25. Ten Labour 
councillors voted with the Conservatives (who wanted a 17% 
increase) <28>. It is difficult to view this as 
brinkmanship, as the Labour majority was only achieved by 
the defection of one of the left councillors to the majority 
Labour Group and another was 'taken ill' prior to the 
meeting <29>. The Spring of 1980 was the high-point of the 
left's ascendancy within the borough.
The left's victory of 1980
What is observable in this victory is how quickly the 
proto-Briefing group had achieved prominence, expressed 
through the informal leadership of the left councillors who 
had come to dominate the non-aligned left. A somewhat 
stereotypical division emerged between the 'leaders' and the 
'rank and file'. This is illustrated by the LGC document 
'The Effects of Public Expenditure Cuts on Haringey 198Q- 
81'. in which the no rate-rise option was absent and the 
left's position was equated with buying time. The document 
stated the need for the council to avoid 'going it alone'
28. Reported in the Hornsev Journal. March 28th, 1980.
29. ibid
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where it could end up facing defeat and surcharge as with 
Clay Cross', and added that by increasing the rate 'it would 
be difficult to buy more than one year's time because of the 
problems posed by a series of successive rate 
increases' <30>. These two points cited in the document were 
the central thesis advanced by Knight in support of his 
anti-cuts fight during the Autumn of 1979. The practice of 
Lambeth was then in a very real sense relevant to the debate 
in Haringey, Lambeth appeared to be building up an alliance 
which would result in a confrontation with the government. A 
view endorsed by the left councillors within the borough and 
through the proto-Briefing group in the SCLV. The division 
over rate rises seemed semantic but one which was 
counterposed to the "confrontationist" practice of Lambeth, 
which would inevitably come to Haringey.
The success of the rate rises to buy time platform
within the Haringey Parties signified that the left had
become a political force. The nature of their project
however determined their political development. The issue of
creating a political movement within the Labour Party to
confront the government was removed from the sphere of their
own actions and ascribed to other agencies, that was,
30. From the 'The Effects of Public Expenditure Cuts on 
Haringey 1980-81', LGC document.
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Government policy on the one hand and the trade unions on 
the other. It meant that this left had achieved its majority 
within the Party disconnected from any concrete tasks around 
the preparation for such a confrontation. The left's victory 
in 1980 can be characterised as one of good intentions.
The consequence of the Labour councillors' actions was 
to split the Labour Party into two 'warring factions'; on 
the one side, a moderate alliance, who formed the council 
leadership and their supporters within the constituencies, 
on the other an opposition alliance ranging from the 
activists to the wider labour movement: most importantly the 
majority of the local government trade unions.
The moderate alliance
The core of the moderate alliance was among the 
majority of councillors and I confine my remarks to them. If 
I had profiled this grouping prior to the 1979 election a 
more fluid picture would have emerged, with a more open 
right, centre and left wing <31>. The actions of government 
and Party, coupled with the councillors' own internal 
discipline, compressed these differences, largely obscuring
31. For example; Niki Harrison, (Chair of Education) 
profiled in 1976 by the Local Government Chronicle, 
described herself as an 'old style Tribunite'.
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them from public view. What became public was a dissent, 
usually in the form of gestures, "smoke signals" to the 
Labour Party indicating dissatisfaction within the ranks of 
this alliance. Two issues illustrate this point; the level 
of cuts and the question of cuts versus redundancies. On the 
first issue, for example, Dewar had moved and Meehan 
seconded the 40% rate increase (both voted for the 
majority) <32> and the Education and Social Services 
Committee's "revolt" over cuts in 1979 was effective in what 
I assume was the aim, of reducing the cuts back to the 
original level of 2%. These examples show that dissent 
existed which helped define the parameters within the 
moderates' camp over what was an acceptable level of cuts.
Understanding how the consensus evolved among the 
moderates in relation to the question of redundancies is 
more difficult. As a council leadership they were clearly in 
favour of municipal employment; its expansion during the 
1970s is ample evidence of this. It is, however, fair to 
assume that a debate took place over the proportion of cuts 
in service provision versus redundancies. An understanding 
of this is gained from one of the sponsors of the 1982
32. Reported in the Hornsev Journal. March, 1980
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resolution cited above, commenting to the Hornsey Journal:
the reaffirmation of the no redundancy policy 
is an appeasement to the left, and an attempt 
to widen the signatures of the resolution <33>.
An indication of the consensus forming around the
maintenance of jobs is found in the following resolution
from the Labour Group to the LGC in 1980:
The council in consultation with the unions will 
look at ways to save costs across services and 
through redeployment will be able to make the 
most effective use of the workforce <34>.
The documentation around this places it in the context of
the council's good housekeeping policy. Potentially the
implications for the workforce were severe, as it opened up
the potential of joint union - council regulation of the
workforce <35>. It is impossible to know exactly how much
weight the participants gave in their deliberations to their
own political preferences and how much the political
pressure exerted by the Party and unions was assimilated
into a common sense around what was and was not permissible.
It is to the strength and weakness of those external forces
I now turn.
33. Hornsev Journal. January 15th 1982.
34. LGC minute May 1980.
35. Although it is doubtful that the council attempted to 
implement a good housekeeping policy there were other more 
substantial reasons why joint council-union regulation could 
not work, which are discussed in chapter eleven.
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Th* left alliance
This can be characterized as a left alliance because 
although it was extremely broad it comprised all those to 
the left of the moderates both in and outside the Labour 
Party. From late 1979 through to 1981 this alliance 
dominated the Haringey labour movement. This is illustrated 
by the number of affiliations to Haringey Campaign against 
the Cuts (HCAC). By December 1979 affiliations stood at: 
twenty five trade union branches, (including the NUT, NUPE 
education, NALGO, the craft committee and the T@G,) twenty 
five Labour Party wards, twenty three community groups and 
thirteen political groups <36>. The community groups can 
largely be discounted as most were "front" organisations for 
political groups, including the Labour Party <37>. It is 
interesting to note that the only two tenants' associations 
affiliated to the campaign were dominated by the Communist 
Party.
The scope of HCAC activity was considerable. In 
September it organised a march and rally against public
36. The affiliation figures are taken from the minutes of 
HCAC December meeting.
37. I have use the term front organisations to distinguish 
my analysis from the notion that community groups had any 
independent existence outside of the labour movement forces 
under discussion.
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spending cuts with Tony Benn as the main speaker <38>. In 
the activity around the 1980 rate making, the entire borough 
was leafleted and a round of public meetings was organised 
in the majority of wards, culminating in a march and rally, 
with Alan Fisher (General Secretary of NUPE) as the main 
speaker. The campaign organised a lobby of the rate-making 
meeting in March and also sent a deputation into the 
meeting <39>.
To an even greater extent than the moderate group, HCAC 
represented a coalition of organisations with varied 
political viewpoints. Here again the differences were 
subordinated to a common goal - this time that of fighting 
cuts. The campaign was split organisationally between the 
Labour Party and other political groups, most importantly 
the CP and the SWP. These organisational divisions were cut 
across politically by the three anti-cuts positions <40>.
The beginning of 1980 found the Tribunite/CP axis, which 
included the majority of dissident councillors, supporting
38. HCAC minutes August 5th and 26th.
39. These events are recorded in the minutes of HCAC for 
January and February. These show that they split the borough 
on a ward basis and had a team of speakers who included Reg 
Race, Jeremy Corbyn and Peter Spencer. Spencer was the main 
speaker at the deputation to the council meeting.
40. These were: rate rises to buy time, rate rises on 
principle and no rate rises. The evolution of these 
different views has been touched on above in chapter three 
and particularly chapter six.
255
rate rises on principle, with a section of Socialist 
Organiser, part of the non-aligned left, and the 
revolutionary left constituting the no-rate rise grouping. 
The majority, however, took the centre position of rate 
rises to buy time, the position which had been passed at the 
LGC conference of January 6th <41>.
These divisions were replicated amongst the union 
leaderships. NALGO was divided between the broad left CP 
axis around Harry Lister and those to his left. The NUT 
leadership supported the no rate-rise line, whilst NUPE 
Education (and with it the G@M Education) in line with the 
position adopted by HCAC took a no rate-rise position in May
1980 <42>. The craft committee vacillated between supporting 
rate rises in 1980 and the no rate-rise position in
1981 <43>. The common denominator which united this alliance 
and where the union branches showed themselves to be an 
independent force was over the question of cuts.
How these differences interacted is illustrated by the 
debate that surrounded the founding statement of HCAC. At 
its first delegate meeting on the 6th of October 1979 a CP
41. Based on the voting figures of various labour movement 
bodies. See below.
42. HCAC minute, May 1980.
43. Minutes of the Craft Committee 25 January 1980 and 26 
January 1981. I move the no-rate rise resolution on both 
occasions.
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amendment, seconded by a Labour Party ward attempted to 
delete the phrase 'and ultimately bring down the 
government.' <44>. This amendment was narrowly defeated by 
an alliance of the no rate-rise grouping and those who 
supported the buying of time by the use of rate rises. The 
supporters of the no rate rise position attempted to delete 
the phrase 'the council should look for alternative means of 
income' (which without saying so meant rate rises) and was 
defeated by an alliance of the two pro rate-rise groupings. 
These interactions point to political divisions which were 
far greater than those within the moderate grouping, and 
belied the fact that HCAC was a considerable force within 
the borough. The campaigns documention provides a sense of a 
real movement, and at its heart were the Labour Party 
activists; they organised and staffed regular Saturday 
stalls in many parts of the borough, they carried out mass 
leafleting and ward by ward meetings in the run up to the 
demonstrations and rallies <45>. Underpinning the activities 
of HCAC were the council's trade unions.
44. HCAC minute of October 6th 1979.
45. This is indicated by the HCAC minutes which discuss 
where stalls should be, a rota of people to run them, who 
was to organise and speak at the ward based meetings. The 
campaign activists were mainly Labour Party members.
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The unions as an independent force
The core element of opposition to the council in 1979 
and 1980 was the local government trade unions. As early as 
July 1979 they had formulated a 'no cuts no redundancy 
policy'. A resolution from the employees side to Haringey 
Joint Council and Employee Consultative Committee (HJCECC) 
recommended to its constituent unions that 'the work of any 
vacancy left unfilled as the result of the proposed cuts 
shall not be covered' <46>. The opposition of the unions 
soon became more than just rhetoric. During September 1979 
both NALGO and NUT members took industrial action against 
the council's freeze on vacancies. One social services 
office was closed for 1 1/2 days a week, and a number of 
schools started a no cover policy. The latter occurred a few 
months prior to the coming to office of the new leadership 
and was organised through the SWP rank and file teachers 
group <47>. In 1980 when the education budget included plans 
to cut 90 teaching posts, the NUT responded by applying to 
their national disputes committee and receiving sanction for 
industrial action if the redundancies were confirmed. The
46. Haringey Joint Council and Employee Consultative 
Committee minute of July 26th.
47. Tony Brockman who became secretary of the NUT in 1980, 
and has never been a member of the SWP commented that 'we 
organised that no-cover policy, the left was altogether 
then'.
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redundancies were withdrawn. In April 1980, after an 
overtime ban by caretakers and cleaners, the council 
withdrew its decision to reduce the number of school 
cleaners through natural wastage and to cut lettings 
payments to caretakers. At the same time NALGO was carrying 
out a policy of non-cooperation due to the non-filling of 
vacancies, which again centred on the closure of social 
service offices <48>. The one area in which the unions 
suffered a partial defeat was through the Council's second 
attempt, which began in the Spring of 1981, to make inroads 
into the pay and conditions of education manual workers. A 
compromise was eventually reached in September over the 
reduction in caretakers' lettings payments but the reduction 
in cleaners' hours was dropped; as the NUPE secretary put it 
'we made a deal' <49>.
These strikes, which began in the Autumn of 1979, took 
place after the unions had undergone the substantial changes 
discussed in previous chapters and prior to the 
radicalisation of the council. This brief eighteen month 
period from the Autumn of 1979 through to the Spring of 1981
48. Minute of the Haringey NUT Executive Committee meeting, 
7th February, 1980. The resolution of the NUPE dispute and 
the NALGO dispute are reported in the Hornsev Journal of 
11th April.
49. PS3 side 'b'. See chapter ten for discussion on the two 
NUPE disputes.
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marked the zenith of trade union power and independence 
within the borough.
The trade unions' independent activity posed a 
substantial problem for the Council who had in one form or 
another to confront it, for here was a potential force which 
fell outside the Group's institutional ability to ignore.
The activity of the trade unions set a limit to the 
Council's independence from the labour movement. The 
evidence for this assessment is found in the Council's 
practice. Their attempts to make inroads into the workforce 
were either rescinded or reduced in impact as a direct 
result of union actions. The consequence of this was to 
create a set of priorities in relation to cuts which aimed 
to avoid conflict with the unions. As one NUT member wrote 
in 1980:
The Council seems to be hitting at the weakest 
and directing their cuts at the periphery rather 
than across the board so that opposition will 
be sectionalised <50>.
Cuts were made in service provision but in such a manner 
that they did not effect council worker's jobs, effectively 
removing the question of cuts from the direct concern of the 
membership. The corollary of this was that the necessity
50. Beste, P. <1980> : Haringey and the Cuts. Haringey 
Socialist Worker Party, London, page 5.
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for industrial action to defend jobs was removed from the 
agenda. The unions' militancy had been effective. The 
consequence of this was that the potential unity of the 
workforce with the left alliance forming through industrial 
action was never realised. It was this potential unity which 
provided the hidden strength to both the branch leaders and 
the left within the Labour Party. This activity by the 
branches, combined with the prominence of a number of union 
leaders within the left alliance provided one backdrop to 
the debate around the cuts.
The formation of the rate rise alliance
In 1981 the Labour Party formally arrived at the same 
position it had in 1980; a no cuts budget. This time the 
Party's policy was carried out by the Group with a 43% rate 
increase (which was above the inner London average) and with 
no lobby or deputations from HCAC <51>. In December 1980 the 
basis for this had been set when the Labour Group had 
changed course and called for a no cuts, rate rise budget.
The path to this decision had been eased in May 1980 at
the Labour Group's AGM when Colin Were, after ten years as
51. Unlike the run-up to the 1980 rate making, HCAC minutes 
make no mention of any campaign activity surrounding the 
rate making. This is indicative of a decline in its support 
arising from the divisions caused by the rate rise - no-rate 
rise debate.
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council leader, resigned. His place was taken by Robin 
Young, (who was to leave the Labour Party in the middle 
1980s to join the Liberals) and the ten Labour councillors 
who had voted against the Labour Group at the 1980 budget 
were reintegrated into the Group, with key "rebels'* being 
given committee chairs <52>.
The basic reason for the Labour Group's change of line 
was, however, the failure of the moderates' strategy; that 
is, their failure to find an accommodation with the 
government. Haringey's grant for 1981-82 was again reduced, 
this time by £3.5m from the 1980-81 level. In terms of the 
left-right debate within the borough the left had been 
proved correct, the Government had not 'left Haringey 
alone', and with this further reduction in grant the core of 
the moderates' position collapsed.
The inability of the council to reach a resolution with 
the Government created the logic for the move to a localised 
bureaucratic defense of rate rises. They were left with the 
prospect of making further cuts which may well have spread 
to the workforce and revived the cycle of confrontation with 
the Party and the wider movement. All this occurred in the 
penultimate year of the council's tenure, when traditionally
52. Reported in the Hornsev Journal. 23rd May.
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a high rate had been levied so that it would be possible to 
set a low rate in election year <53>. Also the Labour 
councillors faced, at the end of 1981, reselection for the 
1982 council elections, the mechanism by which Party members 
can assert control over councillors. Coupled with these very 
powerful local considerations there was also an emerging 
consensus for rate rises among the national trade unions, 
most importantly within NUPE. At the beginning of 1980 in a 
letter to Ron Hayward, (then General Secretary of the Labour 
Party) Alan Fisher called on Labour councils not to make 
cuts and to compensate for loss of government funds through 
rate rises <54>. Later that year, at one of the national 
conferences called by Lambeth about cuts, in which 
Haringey's Labour Group and unions attended as HJCECC 
delegates, Ron Keating, then the main political speaker for 
NUPE, came out strongly in favour of rate rises. Speaking 
against a no rate rise motion (which was passed), he stated 
'my members will not be Kamikaze pilots.' <55>.
The 1981 rate represented a watershed for 
Haringey <56>. It marked the beginning of a reformulation of
53. This pattern is visible after 1975 by looking at 
Haringey General Rate Estimates on a year on basis.
54. Quoted in Tribune. January 1980
55. From my notes taken at the conference.
56. Haringey 1981-82, General Rate Estimates. Haringey, 
London.
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the political alliances within the Party providing the basis 
for the subsequent developments in the relationships between 
Party, Group and council unions. From this budget it is 
possible to date the start of the long march of the Labour 
Group back into a position of ascendancy over the Party and 
the unions. Pivotal to this was the manner in which the 
council adopted the rate rise strategy as it marked the 
emergence of a symbiosis between the Group and the local 
government unions.
To understand the centrality of this symbiosis it is 
necessary to recall that a disjuncture had arisen between 
the Labour Group and the Party which politicised and exposed 
the bureaucratic relation between them. The moderates' 
conversion to rate rises meant that the opposition, the left 
alliance, fragmented, with the defection of those who 
supported rate rises in principle, as the grounds for their 
opposition was now removed. The Labour Group was now 
carrying out the programme of the Party's centre. In spite 
of this the disjuncture between Group and Party remained 
unresolved. This was partly because of the continued 
dominance of the non-aligned left among the party activists 
who "inhabited" the Party structures, but more importantly 
the decision making process that had been created in the 
Autumn of 1979 had represented the breaking up of the old
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structures and a politicisation of the relationship relating 
to far broader questions than the budget. To summarise; 
while the Group could now rest on the CP/Tribunite axis for 
support, they could not depoliticise the situation in the 
Labour Party and return to the pre-79 administrative 
relation between Group and Party. The councillors were, 
however, now in a position to play the role of "tribunes of 
the people". By utilizing the Party's decision making 
process, set up in the previous year, the Labour Group had 
been able to set the terms for the debate with the Party 
over the 1981 budget.
The Labour Group passed a resolution on December 16th, 
the same day as the Government's announcement of Haringey's 
grant level, calling for 'a united response of the trade 
unions, Labour Parties, and the community to put forward a 
common strategy' <57>. Apart from the usual ward, GMC and 
LGC meetings, a major meeting was organised for January to 
decide on the budget. Unlike 1980 individual trade union 
branches were invited to send representatives <58>. The 
moderates' willingness to embrace these open structures was 
because they now had the support of the party centre; of far
57. Labour Group resolution December 16th.
58. Letter from LGC secretary Steve Hull to all conveners 
and branch secretaries, dated December 19th.
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greater importance however was the name in which the Labour 
Group announced their conversion to rate rises. This was 
neither the party nor the Group but the local government 
unions. The councillors proclaimed that they were %raising 
the rates to defend our no redundancy policy' <59>. Thus the 
basis of the union campaigning was removed.
The Group based its actions on the only potential force
who could challenge its autonomy from the labour movement.
For the Labour Group the support of the unions enabled it to
maintain its independence from the Party and to engage with
the new political forms which it had created, providing the
essential prerequisite for it to begin to reestablish and
reformulate its political relations with the party. Now
decisions were made in the name of the unions. This meant
that the constituency that the non-aligned left had
identified and viewed as a political force had now
"empowered" the moderates to defend jobs through rate rises.
This political resolution meant that the Labour Group became
the direct political representative of the unions in the
council, paralleling (if not parodying) the relations
between the unions and Labour Party in parliament.
59. From the Labour Group's resolution, to the special IX3C 
meeting January 1980.
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Both the theoretical and tactical problems this posed 
for the non-aligned left approach to the unions and class, 
through the prism of syndicalism, proved insurmountable. 
While this had lead them to fetishise the unions the 
moderates' were now able to carry out their programme 'in 
defence of the unions', and with the unions' support. In the 
context of a reformulated labourism, that is a reconstituted 
unity between council and unions, the left were incapable of 
forming an alliance with any sections of the working class, 
further marginalising relations between them and the working 
class. In the face of the rate rise alliance the Labour 
Party left programme of no rate-rises rapidly turned into a 
dogma. For the practice of the militant leaders of the trade 
unions the adoption of the rate rise defence in 1981 was far 
from the beginning of a process of disintegration of their 
programme but very near to its end.
Chapter eight 267 Part thraa
Tha End of the Dual Agenda
In 1979 the Haringey union branches were in the 
ascendant, as is shown most vividly in the low pay strike. 
The branch based militants where pushing forward on both the 
political and economic front, the two areas which had given 
rise to the dual agenda (see chapter 5). By 1982, however 
branch based militancy had suffered a series of major set­
backs, the most important of these being the formation of 
the rate rise alliance. The settlement over the rates was 
part of a pattern where the resolution of issues which had 
constituted the dual agenda was achieved outside of the 
context of the branch based militancy. The inability of this 
current to go forward in the altering world of the 1980s led 
to its demise and ultimate fragmentation.
The Branches and Wages Militancy
I have argued in chapter five that economic questions 
were central to understanding the evolution of the union 
branches. Roberts <1988> has commented in relation to wage 
increases for both manual and white collar workers 'a
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cyclical pattern is clearly evident' <1>. According to 
Roberts, for manual workers the cycle peaked in 1979 (then 
being depressed until 1986). For white collar staff it 
peaked in 1980 with the Clegg comparability award, and was 
maintained by the arbitration award of 1981 and then 
subsequently depressed (mainly amongst full time male 
workers) <2>.
This view of a wages cyclical is supported by the 
characterization by the Public Finance Foundation of the 
period 1979-82 as one of 'catch up' after the mid-70s which 
was one of retrenchment. This is shown in table 8:1
1. Roberts, G <1988>: 'Pay in local government 1970 to 
1986', in local government, in R Saran and J Sheldrake 
(ed.s) P u b l i c  Sector B a r g a i n i n g  I n  the 19803. Avebury, London.
2. The Clegg Comparability award gave white collar staff 
between 9.5% and 18% pay rise.
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Tabi« 8:1
Publio sector pay 1973-1982
Real Pay % Nature of
Year Increase change
73/4 - 1% Restraint
74/5 4.5% Catch
75/6 3.5% Up
76/7 -2.5% Restraint
77/8 -8.0%
78/9 2.0%
79/80 1.5%
80/1 7.0% Catch Up
81/2 -1.5% Restraint
Notes: Real pay increases of 2% per annum or less are 
defined as "restraint." The long term value for real pay in 
the economy as a whole is about 2% per annum. Real pay 
increases of 3.5% per annum or more are defined as 'catch 
up'. Catch up is followed by four or five years of restraint 
on each occasion. Catch up can occur in a single year, but 
usually takes two or three years to make up the gap.
Source: Public Finance Foundation. <1986>: 'Public Service 
Pay Over Two Decades Under Attack?', Discussion Paper 25. 
London.
Table 8:1 shows that the catch up in local government pay 
had taken place in one leap in 1980. In real terms an 
average pay rise of 7% had taken place.
This conception of Roberts <1988>, of a wages cycle is 
extremely useful in developing an explanatory framework for 
the relations between leaders and members in the Haringey
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union branches. The decline in real wages during the 1970s 
generated a wages militancy which acted as the spearhead for 
change within the branch. The ending of the wages cycle 
removed a mechanism by which the membership could have been 
brought into direct activity on a branch wide basis around 
economic issues. For the militants loss of this major issue 
was debilitating.
With the resolution of the economic question, the left, who 
had rested on the spontaneity of the members, now found that 
they had no mechanism to exert pressure and control on the 
higher echelons of the unions. The force of this development 
is brought out by considering possible alternative 
approaches by the branch-based militants. It is conceivable 
that they could have used the preceding period to form 
unofficial bodies which could have laid claim to control the 
official union structures. The importance of this is 
illustrated below in the relations of the branches to the 
larger union in the altered circumstances of the early 
1980s <3>.
3. Prior to becoming in 1979 MP for Wood Green, Reg Race was 
the chief research officer for NUPE. He commented that to 
his knowledge from 1974 until 1980 there was no informal 
grouping within NUPE which linked the branches together.
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Jud9«-made Law
The low pay strike had represented the tenuous
emergence of a unity between political and trade union
issues <4>. As in other boroughs, notably Camden, one of the
consequences of that unity was that the law entered into the
relation between union and council. In Haringey's case this
came about when a parent took the council to court under the
1944 Education Act and the council's statutory obligation to
provide education. The specific circumstances of this legal
challenge were that the council was continuning to recognise
the caretakers as the sole keyholders to the school during
the strike. Spencer recalled:
At that time, the caretakers were recognised 
as the sole key holders - very foolish of the 
authority- and they actually honoured it, in 
those days, and said no one else can unlock the 
school <5>.
The councillor who bore the brunt of this council 
decision was the Chair of Education, Nicki Harrison. Spencer 
recalled that Lord Chief Justice Denning had 'scared the 
life out of Nicki Harrison' <6>. She told Spencer that Lord
4. See Chapters four and five of this work.
5. PS3 side 'b'.
6. Peter Spencer tape 5 side 'b'[hereafter PS]
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Denning had:
told her quite clearly they should have opened 
the school, and accused her of collusion with 
the branch secretaries <7>.
Here for the first time in Haringey the law entered the
relations between the union and council, causing the council
'in their own way to enter into meaningful negotiations over
keyholding' <8>. Further, it was not possible to put this
issue on the back burner; negotiations were still going on
in the run up to the TUC day of action called for May 14th
1980. The day of action was going to involve strike action
by the caretakers and if they remained the sole keyholders,
then once again the schools would be closed. Either side
could have decided that non-compliance was a better option,
but according to Spencer:
there was no way they weren't going to get 
those schools open because Nicki Harrison had 
been scared shitless by Lord Chief Justice Denning 
and it wasn't going to happen again <9>.
The end result of negotiations was that the council
delegated its responsibility for the opening of schools to
head teachers. The unions tried and failed to get it written
into the key agreement that in times of industrial action it
7. ibid 
8 ibid
9. PS5 side 'b
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would pass back to the Education Committee. Spencer recalled 
that:
They wouldn't have that. Now they never ever 
have to make a political decision again because, 
if it was down to the Chair of Education then 
pressure could be brought to bear through the 
Labour Party and they weren't going to wear 
that <10>.
Of greater importance was the reaction of the national 
unions to this question. Their legal departments advised the 
branches to:
give up our keys to a designated officer because 
all the unions were getting taken to the cleaners 
by the courts <11>.
In spite of this advice, which was accepted by Spencer, the 
militancy amongst the caretakers was such that at a 
caretakers' meeting:
there were 30 caretakers who wouldn't give up 
their keys. They were prepared to go to court.
We had to issue strong advice to give up their 
keys. Still officers from Education had to go 
down to school with bolt cutters to open 
them <12>.
A comparison between the key holding issue and the 
caretakers six weeks strike in the 1979 low pay dispute (see
10. ibid
11. PS5 side 'a'
12. PS5 side 'a
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chapter 4), is stark. In the former, in spite of certain 
unique features the strike was clearly within the tradition 
of post war local government trades disputes. The legal 
intervention surrounding the key holding issue provided a 
new phenomena. I do not offer a judgment as to whether the 
decisions of NUPE nationally, and the Labour group were 
correct, rather to note how legal intervention acted as a 
block to pressure from below. Legal intervention empowered 
institutional authority over the rank and file <13>. With 
hindsight, the importance of the key holding issue was that 
it marked the start of the decline of branch based militancy 
and the beginning of a pattern, to adapt Loughlin's 
terminology, of the juridification of relations between 
councils and unions <14>. The main mechanism for this 
development was to be legislation rather than judge-made 
law.
13. The militancy of the caretakers was shown by the thirty 
who still refused to open their schools. There can be little 
dough that if the national union had given alternative 
advice this would have seen far wider support for keeping 
the schools closed.
14. Loughlin, M. <1986>: Local Government in the Modern 
State. Sweet and Maxwell, London.
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The impact of legislation
The wider changes in the objective situation 
confronting the unions is highlighted by the Local 
Government and Land Act (1980) and the Education Act (1980). 
Both the Local Government and Land Act (1980) and the 
Education Act (1980) indirectly threatened jobs. The former 
instructed DLO's to make a 5% profit after three years of 
trading. If this was not achieved the Secretary of State for 
the Environment had the statutory right to close down any 
part of a DLO which was loss making, with an attendant loss 
of jobs <15>. The 1980 Education Act removed the obligation 
on the council to provide a nutritious meal and children 
could now bring sandwiches. The problem this posed for the 
school meal staff was that they are employed on the basis of 
the number of meals cooked. Consequenly a fall in the number 
of children taking school dinners would lead to job losses. 
There is no evidence to show that the respective branches; 
the Craft Committee and the Education manual branches 
attempted to carry out a policy of non-compliance, rather 
their practice was to look for ways to circumvent these 
pieces of legislation. Yet I have identified the branch 
leaders as being branch based militants.
15. For a synopsis of the impact of the Local Government and 
Land Act on DLO's see: Direct Labour Collective <1980>: 
D i r e c t  L a b o u r  U n d e r  T h r e a t ,  Free Press, London.
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This apparent contradiction can be understood by an 
examination of the options facing the branches in opposing 
this legislation. The branches were faced with a situation 
in which they could not act directly; the law placed the 
onus of enacting the legislation on the employer. The 
predicament this placed the unions in is illustrated by the 
three possible models for confrontation:
i) The agency to take the first step would be the council 
through a policy of non-compliance.
ii) The national unions could either place demands on the 
council that they refuse to comply or call strike action 
against the legislation.
iii) The branches could take some form of unofficial action. 
Both options 'i' and 'ii' were untenable. An alliance 
between the councils and the local unions was ruled out by 
the councils' desire to avoid confrontation. As for the 
national unions, by 1980, the most militant, NUPE had 
sharply pulled back from its militancy of 1979. This is 
evidenced by their response to the key holding issue, and 
Keating's statement at the Lambeth conference. In these two 
respects then the branches were placed in an untenable 
position, they could neither make an alliance with the 
council over non-compliance nor could they look towards the 
national union to put pressure on the council to carry out
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such a strategy. The third option would have meant the 
branch confronting its own union, the council, and the 
state. These examples show that branch based militancy had 
now found very definite limits. The major limitation of 
branch-based militancy was a neglect of the issue of 
influence on wider union structures and polices. Had the 
reformers broadened their horizons and engaged with these 
questions then the possibility would have emerged of rank 
and file influence on national union policy with regard to 
legislation. As it was, localised protests occurred (as with 
the caretakers not opening the schools), whilst members were 
entirely without influence in the response of the national 
union. Branch based militancy was able to make gains on some 
local issues but was entirely incapable of dealing with the 
ramifications of national policy.
One of the major debilitating features of branch based 
militancy was the failure to built up any influence within 
the official union structures. If this had occurred then 
they would have had a voice in the decision making process 
on how to deal with the introduction of legal restrains. 
Instead they were left with gestures (such as the caretakers 
not opening the schools on May 14th, the day of action) and 
no doubt resentment but no real influence on the higher and 
largely impersonal authority who decided what they could and
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could not do. There was, however, a final area in which 
branch based militancy was "pushed backed". This was over 
the question of cuts and shows up the growing division 
between the political and trade union issues, as will be 
explained.
Dividing the political from the trade union
With the advent of the Conservative government the
branch leaders had reestablished the link between the
defence of jobs and conditions with broader political
issues. Not surprisingly NALGO provides the best example of
the phenomenon. At the 1979 AGM resolutions were passed
calling on the TUC to organise a day of action 'in protest
against government cuts in services and public expenditure'
<16>. A resolution against the sale of council houses called
on the Labour council to:
adhere to its manifesto commitment of refusing 
to sell its housing stock. Any such resistance 
will receive the full support of this branch 
who will seek to use all means at its disposal 
to assist the council... <17>.
In March 1980 a resolution was passed calling on the
16. Resolution to Annual General Meeting January, 1980.
17. ibid
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executive to
take all necessary measures to ensure full 
participation in the TUC day of action on May 
14th <18>.
This was backed up by branch support for the local march and
rally and a branch meeting held on the afternoon of the day
of action. May 14th. At that branch meeting the local Labour
MP Reg Race was the guest speaker and a resolution was
passed 'rejecting the suppression of trade union activity
represented by the so-called Employment Bill'. It continued
by calling on the union at different levels to 'ignore the
provisions of the act if it became law' <19>. Also passed
was a resolution calling on:
members not to participate directly in activities 
aimed at imposing further cuts, and calls for 
support by the branch, of members taking any 
action to oppose cuts and plan of action by 
departments aimed at resisting cuts <20>.
In the early part of 1980 the first resolution against 
privatisation was passed. This condemned the disbandment of 
in-house architects services and called for the 'blacking of 
architectural consultants established for the replacement of
18. Resolution to Ordinary Quarterly Branch Meeting, March 
1980.
19. Resolution to Special General Meeting, May 14th 1980.
20 ibid.
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in- house service and the blacking of consultants who accept 
new commissions from clients who had disbanded their 
in-house services' <21>.
These resolutions are examples of a trend of the early 
1980s where branch based militancy was able to link 
political and trade union issues. One way to see the wider 
franchise for these resolutions is for example found in 
their movers and seconders. The resolution over May 14th was 
moved and seconded by members who were far removed from the 
radicals; Reg Hart a member of over twenty years standing 
and Mike Tusher, a member of the Conservative Party <22>.
As in the mid-70s with NALGO's emergency committee this 
route to the political through the trade union was rapidly 
sealed off. The branches' ability to defend jobs was 
ultimately signified by the rate rise alliance. At every 
significant juncture the defence of jobs or conditions was 
ceded from the unions to the council. This removed the 
necessity of the branches to engage their defensive arm, and
21. Resolution to Ordinary Quarterly Branch Meeting, March 
1980.
22. Hart stood and lost as the moderates' candidate for 
branch secretary in 1981. He then left the union and join 
NUPE officers in 1983 because of the 'political nature' of 
NALGO. This information was given to me by Jeff Rudin.
Tusher had told me in the early 1980s of his membership of 
the Conservative Party.
281
with it the necessity for a collective approach by the 
unions. The resolution of these political questions broke 
the link between trade union and political issues.
The ending of branch based Militancy The Politioa of the Non-Aligned Left
The dual agenda, however inadequately, had represented 
a codification within a militant framework of issues and 
concerns which had evolved at the turn of the decade. By 
1982, at the very latest, these issues were resolved. The 
militant framework in which this had arisen was now dogma. 
What these examples have shown is that various external 
agencies had acted as the link between the leaders and 
membership, such as the pressure over wages and the 
perceived threat over cuts. Without these agencies the 
militant framework in which the relations between leaders 
and members had evolved was substantially disrupted. The 
branch based militants found they were now cut off from the 
possibility of 'releasing' the spontaneity of working class 
activity. In effect the substitution of spontaneity for 
political movements which had characterised the practice of 
the left (in particular see chapter three in relation to the 
practice of the left) had been undermined by the reemergence 
of labourist politics.
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The impact of the juridification of the relations 
between unions and councils and the emerging separation 
between the ability to maintain jobs and expenditure cuts 
have shown how labourism began to reform. All these 
developments show the beginning of the reimposition of a 
demarcation between what was and was not legitimate trade 
union activity. The reappearance of a demarcation assumes 
some form of breakdown in the traditional division between 
the political and the trade union.
What has been observed was that from the mid-70s a 
tendency emerged for the assimilation of political questions 
into the trade unions' defensive role; this had the 
potential to go beyond immediate issues. The problem for the 
branch based militant's was the nature of that political 
solution. The trade union issues of legislation, cuts, rate 
rises, flowed into the enfeebled and decaying structures of 
the local Labour Party as they looked for a political 
resolution. This tide quickly broke down the old 
relationship but was followed by a reshaping into a more 
formalised labourism, one where the Labour Group acted as 
the political arm of the unions in the council chamber. It 
was this which provided the basis for the réintroduction of 
a demarcation between the trade union and the political, 
creating a new set of parameters based around the alliance
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between Labour Group and unions. This alliance provided the 
framework in which the unions concluded their shift to 
institutional centrality and the context in which the 
'inevitable' extension of areas of trade union regulation 
and legality took place.
The problems raised by the issue of trade union 
legality have been commented on by amongst others; Gramsci 
<1919-20> Anderson <1967> and Hyman <1971 1975>. Anderson 
brought Gramsci's formulation into modern usage when he 
summed up this problematic as one of power-for as power over 
the working class':
The unionisation - or politicisation- of the 
working class requires the creation of 
institutions which are in one moment a control of 
it, as a necessity of any disciplined action. Of 
course in another moment, they are by that fact a 
liberation of the class as well. The working 
class is only concretely free when it fight 
against the system which exploits and oppresses 
it. It is only in its collective institutions 
that it can do so... it becomes the natural 
objective of capitalism to appropriate it for 
the stabilisation of the system... It is this 
ambiguity - power for as power over - which makes 
working class institutions the best of all anti­
working class weapons <23>.
23. Anderson, P. 1967. 'The limits and possibilities of 
trade union action', in R Blackburn and A Cockburn (ed.s): 
T h e  In c p m p a t a t i f r l e g ;  T r a d e  U n i o n . M i l i t a r i s y - a n d  t h e  Consensus. Penguin, Harmondsworth.
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If the existentialist framework is removed, Anderson has 
restated the problem that has engaged Marxist and 
syndicalist alike, and was to confront the leaders in 
Haringey where despite themselves they began to represent a 
power over the workers. It is this internal development 
which the next two chapters are concerned with, concluding 
my study of NUPE and NALGO in the context of this labourist 
political resolution.
Chapter nina 285 Part thraa
NALQO: Changa Trou Above
Organisational changes
For NALGO, probably more than any other branch, the 
shift to institutional centrality demanded a major expansion 
of the bargaining relation. To make that change operational 
called for a mechanism to formulate an agenda for the 
different service groups and a mechanism for enforcing 
procedures and regulations throughout the services. This 
process began almost immediately after Hatherway became 
secretary, and is seen most overtly in the reorganisation of 
the branch. Hatherway put these changes into perspective:
The first change had to be the establishment of 
a proper branch office which had been Norman 
Child's' work office... then there was the need 
to register members, a system for recruiting new 
members, a system for disseminating information. 
Ensuring the departmental representative knew 
who their members were, making sure the branch 
magazine actually happened on time. I also saw 
it as my job along with a group of others to 
ensure that other branch officers did the job 
they were meant to do <1>.
As part of this reorganisation the new leadership returned 
to their main theme; workplace representation. Hatherway
1. Bob Hatherway tape 2 [hereafter BH] side 'a
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very quickly:
set up a system based on the old emergency 
committee, where there was effectively a convener 
for each department, sometimes coinciding with 
the staff side rep', sometimes they weren't. We 
were able to use that as some form of basis for 
communication... <2>.
This business-like approach was to have a lasting effect on 
the branch's organisational structures. It was not simply 
down to Hatherway's organisational skills; the change of 
leadership opened up the branch to a "bureaucracy" in 
waiting - the Duke House group and a wider layer of 
activists. Bob Hatherway recalled 'people had a motivation 
for doing things they never had before' <3>. This keys into 
Jim Hopper's (branch secretary 1984-85) perception of a 
wider development:
The branch was still quite alive or relatively 
alive because we were still making the transition 
from a staff association to a trade union <4>.
It also began to make the branch far more representative.
Wilf Sullivan (Branch Secretary 1986-87) commented:
Bob Hatherway set up the basis of the branch 
office as it is today. I think he actually 
informed members about issues the branch was 
taking up ... The very fact of that sort of 
person being there [a residential social worker] 
positively encouraged people to get involved <5>.
2. BH2 side 'a'.
3. BH2 side 'a'.
4. Jim Hopper [hereafter JH] side 'a'.
5. Wilf Sullivan [hereafter WS] side 'a'.
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These alterations took place in a matter of months and were 
to act as a preparation within the branch for NALGO's first 
ever national dispute; 'the 1980 comparability dispute' <6> 
According to Hatherway its impact on the branch structure 
was considerable:
There's nothing that cleans a communications 
chain down better than to have to put it into 
practice in an emergency. It had that effect <7>.
An accolade for the left came from Roger Roles who 
commented to Hatherway that the 'right would not have done 
as well'. Roles had every right to be pleased with the 
outcome. The first national strike, led in Haringey by the 
left, helped reestablish grading differentials; the award 
comprised 9.5% for the low paid and 18% for the higher 
paid <8>. The ability of this branch to take effective 
action is added evidence to Sheldrake's <1985> contention 
that 'the union side were better organised than ever
6. Sheldrake, J.<1985>:'The local government comparability 
dispute of 1980, in J Donaldson and P Philby (ed.s), Pav 
Differentials: An Integration of Theories. Evidence and 
Polices. Gower Publications, London.
7. BH2 side 'a'.
8. Cited in Sheldrake, J. <1988>: 'The changing pattern of 
collective bargaining in local government, in R Saran and J 
Sheldrake (ed.s) Public Sector Bargaining in the 198QS. 
Avebury, London. This dispute represented the culmination of 
the wages cycle for white collar staff.
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before', due to NALGO nationally encouraging the development 
of workplace organisation <9>.
The rapidity of change in the branch structure and the 
success of the strike seemed to point to a continuation of 
the process of change begun when the branch reformers were 
in opposition. Change evolved around the spontaneous 
development from within services of service based 
organisation and the potential of the syndicalist model. 
Retracing the branch's development it is however apparent 
that this process of change very quickly ended once the 
reformers came to power. A new pattern began to emerge, 
which took shape within the context of the ending of the 
dual agenda and the political resolution over rates. It was 
not that the moves towards institutional centrality were 
stopped or concluded, but within the context of the new 
political settlement, the movement from below rapidly lost 
momentum. What began to "substitute'' for a growing 
workforce involvement was the creation of a strong branch 
centre and the layer of activists from among the radicals. 
Although the reforms were seen by the new branch leaders 
primarily as a mechanism to open up the branch to the 
members, in reality the centralising of the branch
9. Sheldrake, J. <1985>: 'The local government comparability 
dispute of 1980, op.oit.
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guaranteed a continued expansion of the negotiating agenda 
without the necessary corollary of membership involvement. 
This was to mean that the achievement of institutional 
centrality took place largely as an interaction between the 
reformers altering the branch structures from above rather 
than an interaction between members and leaders, a process 
which occurred service by service and was not concluded 
until 1983.
What highlights this detachment of the wider members 
from reformers is that on a range of issues the leaders 
found that it was not possible to expand its support outside 
of its power base amongst the radicals. Indicative of this 
was the pattern surrounding sectional disputes.
Tbe establishment of sectional disputes
Sectional disputes remained largely, although not 
exclusively, confined to the service groups dominated by the 
radicals. They had originated in the late 1970s within 
Housing and Social Services, and between 1980 and 1981 they 
were firmly established creating a method for industrial 
action based on the principle of calling on the branch to 
give automatic support to members taking action, or service- 
based initiatives around disputes which would then be
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processed into the official union machinery. The following
examples are typical of the resolutions to the branch:
instructs the branch officers to, if 
necessary invoke the official industrial 
action procedures for non co-operation 
with excessive duty work <1 0 >.
... branch to support any action taken by 
social services over sacking of worker <11>.
Failure to expand this sectional militancy from those 
groups dominated by the professional sub-group highlighted 
an aspect of the differentiation within the branch. The 
radical services had entered the 1980s with their 
organisation established, while the other services were 
still dominated by the core managerial grades (who had just 
had a 18% wage increase). In the context of the growing 
stabilisation the reformers found that this type of 
sectional militancy could not be transposed to other 
services. Jim Hopper, for example, who was a workplace 
representative in Public Works provides a characterisation
10. Resolution to Ordinary Quarterly Branch Meeting, October 
1980.
11. Resolution to Ordinary Quarterly Branch Meeting,
February 1981.
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of the type of NALGO member within this service:
Working as a NALGO rep in Public Works 
was always a difficult job. In the main 
you were dealing with a fairly 
reactionary group of people; there was 
always a degree of militancy about pay 
and conditions but there was very little 
perception of white collar trade 
unionism <12>.
By the time Hopper had become a representative in 1982, 
NALGO members within that service had become an important 
element in the "broad left" alliance which had helped 
replaced Hatherway with Harry Lister as branch secretary.
The new branch secretary
Hatherway resigned in July 1981, and Harry Lister was 
elected in September in a three cornered fight between Steve 
Powell (who acted in the interim, and who after losing to 
Lister took up a full-time job with the branch becoming its
12. JH side 'b'. Although Hopper worked for the Public Works 
Service he came form the radicals milieu - public school 
Cambridge - were he studied History. When I interviewed him 
in 1987 he was working as an officer for the borough's 
Employment Development Unit (EDU). He commented that his 
degree had been originally been designed for the Colonial 
Civil Service and he had been determined to get away from 
that type of job. That was why he had become a bonus 
surveyor within the Public Works Service. He had however 
failed to escape Cambridge; his EDU job was, he felt akin to 
what his degree had trained him to do.
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administrator) and Reg Hart (the moderates candidate) <13>. 
At the centre of this change was the end of the non-aligned 
left as the major force within the branch; Hatherway's 
alliance had collapsed while Lister had been able to reform 
the broad left.
Lister's election marked a major watershed in the
branch's development, for two reasons. Firstly Reg Hart
represented the right-wing's first and last attempt to
regroup the old leadership. His failure is definitive
evidence of the major shifts which were taking place among
the members. Secondly, and of far greater importance
Lister's election paralleled the failure within the Labour
Party of the non-aligned left to form into a coherent
entity. The process of the disintegration of the dual agenda
had only just run its course when Harry Lister was elected.
The consequences however were felt by the non-aligned left;
without an active membership there could be no interaction
between members and the non-aligned left to evolve a trade
union practice for the non-aligned left in office. Within
Haringey NALGO this manifested itself as a problem for an
individual; the branch secretary. The failure of greater
membership involvement meant that the ambiguity which had
13. These were the three candidates who appear on the ballot 
paper. The characterization of Hart as a moderate is 
discused in the previous chapter.
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surrounded the moderate/non-aligned left alliance which had 
put Hatherway into office in 1979 could not be sustained.
The rise and decline of the moderate/non-aligned left
and the broad left was exemplified by two disputes in the
Summer and Autumn of 1981. The immediate impetus for
Hatherway's resignation arose in June 1981 after members of
the manual unions were, on the advice of NALGO members in
Audit, apprehended for allegedly stealing lead from a depot
roof, where-upon the manual unions set up a picket at the
depot. The right in NALGO wanted a branch instruction to
cross the picket line; the left an instruction not to cross.
According to Hatherway at the Branch meeting:
there was three things up for grabs; the rights, 
my own which was pretty isolated to myself, and 
the left wing... I can't remember what won in 
the end, anyway I was defeated. I basically 
came to the conclusion then that I wasn't 
prepared to be isolated. I was losing my natural 
power base <14>.
Following this dispute Hatherway resigned. The second 
dispute took place after Lister had become Branch secretary 
in the Autumn of 1981 when the DLO supervisors took strike 
action in pursuit of greater control over the shop floor 
workers. Hatherway pointed out how this related to the
14. BH2 side 'b'.
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changing alliances within the branch:
I had been using every trick in the book, 
bureaucratic, persuasive and otherwise to prevent 
the DLO supervisors starting what became the 
'clocking in and clocking out dispute'... I sat 
on this simmering pot all summer and the moment I 
stood up it erupted. Harry had been winding it; 
that's where his alignment with Ron Wyatt (NALGO 
convener in Public Works and future Branch 
president) came from <15>.
The alliance between Lister and the DLO injected a 
pragmatism into the branch which represented a break from 
the more abstract and normative values about class and 
solidarity associated with the non-aligned left. The ability 
of Lister to make such an alliance does however, point to 
the branch being increasingly seen as important by the 
members. This final phase of moving towards institutional 
centrality took place after the defeat of the dual agenda 
and increasingly took place on the terrain of the growing 
need for the branch leaders to regulate procedures.
Gender and race
The last redoubt of the branch based militancy and an 
example of the growth of regulation was the Women's 
Committee, which along with the Black and Ethnic Minority
15. BH2 side 'b'.
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Committee had a major influence on developments within the 
branch.
The Women's committee was established at the 1979 AGM
and had been an integral part of the consolidation of the
new leadership <16>. Mary Corbishley recalled that the
Committee had been established as a consequence of a motion
to the Branch from the Executive Committee:
There was some hostility to it on the basis 
that it wasn't purely accountable to the Executive 
Committee. Unlike the other sub-committee its 
membership wasn't purely confined to members of 
the executive committee <17>.
Corbishley and other women from among the radcials were out 
to build a movement, which was a variant of branch based 
militancy; here the project was to break from their nuclei 
among the radicals to involve women support staff. This was 
to be achieved by taking up the specific issues facing women 
workers, which were largely democratic in character with the 
premise that these could only be achieved through the union. 
This involved a dual perspective of building from below and 
placing demands on both branch and council.
These considerations which underlay the establishment
of the committee meant that from its outset it was more than
a executive sub-committee. Part of its function, according
16 Resolution from the Executive Committee to the 1979.
17. Mary Corbishly tape 2 [ hereafter MC] side 'a'.
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to Corbishley, was for women to gain confidence to 
participate in the union and to 'act as a caucus within the 
union'. She recalled:
We got together as women and tried to organize 
as a group, to get more women on the Executive, 
to ensure that we had motions going to the branch, 
and conference <18>.
Due to the Committee, the branch in 1982 became the first in 
the country to operate a system of positive discrimination 
for delegates to NALGO conference.
This committee was to reach in zenith during 1982-83 in
a campaign around child care. The campaign was broadly based
and extremely active, organising a number of demonstrations
and lobbies of the council. Indicative of its energy was the
production of its own badges, then quite a novel phenomenon.
The documentation for the claim was drawn up by women and
Corbishley recalled that it was:
the women's committee who negotiated it directly 
with the personnel committee. It then went 
through to staff side <19>.
The campaign which ended in the spring of 1983 found 
the woman's committee at the height of its powers. The 
methods and goals of the women's committee stood in marked 
contrast to how the question of race evolved within the 
18. MC2 side 'b'.
19. MC2 side 'b'.
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branch. The first time the question of race was placed on 
the branch agenda was in October 1980 (four years after 
women had started organising in the union). Diane Desmuli 
moved a successful resolution supporting ethnic record 
keeping.<20>. This position was consolidated in January 1981 
by a resolution from the newly formed NALGO Black and Ethnic 
Minority Committee (NBEMC) which put forward a closely 
argued report to the branch on racism and the need for an 
ethnic head count <21> which the branch endorsed.
Unlike the Women's committee the views of the NBEMC had 
not emanated from the non-aligned left; they had a more 
orthodox origin. From the outset they advocated a regulatory 
role for the council rather than the branch, exemplified by 
the vigorous way in which the NBEMC supported the Leaders 
Investigation Panel (LIP). This took the question of racial 
complaints out of the hands of the union and supported the 
council as the arbiter of racism. The LIP was endorsed at a 
Special General meeting in October 1982, after the executive 
committee's resolution of uncritical support was amended to
20. Resolution to Ordinary Quarterly Branch Meeting, October 
1980.
21 Report from the NBEMC Combating Racism, presented for 
endorsement at the Ordinary Quarterly Branch Meeting, 
January 1981.
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include the trade union principle that the 'document 
constituting LIP was to be a negotiated document' <22>.
By this October meeting a number of different 
undercurrents had began to come to the surface. The LIP 
provided one of the reasons given for the break-away from 
NALGO and the formation of MATSA. The meeting also marked 
the first example I have been able to find of the activity 
of an informal black caucus involving NALGO members and 
councillors. Pat Tounge (one of the first black councillors 
and ex-Communist Party member, providing a link with the 
NBEMC, two of whose leaders were in the Communist Party) had 
been invited to speak at the branch meeting in support of 
LIP. This represented the surfacing of a powerful axis for 
the advancement of "black demands'' between workers and 
councillors. Alliances between council and sectional 
elements within branches or with the branches were not 
unusual, what made this unique was that for the first time 
blacks had attained this pivotal position. The NBEMC not 
only rested on the goodwill of "white liberals" within the 
branch but more importantly on black councillors.
22. Special General Meeting October 1982, Amendment to the 
Executive Committee's resolution.
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By the beginning of 1982 two very different views were
established within the branch on how democratic questions
could and should be taken up; through workers self activity
and through the regulation of the employer. These were
exemplified by the different approaches of the NBEMC and the
Women's Committee and centred on the role of the council.
Corbishley recalled that:
The first big debate, when I came back from 
maternity leave in 1982, was over the question of 
whether issues to do with racism in the workplace 
should be dealt with by the union in a union forum 
or disciplinary hearings. They opted for going to 
this special sub-group of the council (LIP) rather 
than seeing it as... a trade union issue <23>.
It was the role of the council which predominated as is seen
most graphically in the consequence for the Women's
Committee in the success of their child care campaign. The
result of their activity was, according to Corbishley 'the
best maternity leave in the country'. In spite of this
retrospective assessment, at the time a ballot was held over
the council's final offer, with the branch leadership, at
the behest of the Women's Committee, arguing for rejection.
This was decisively lost, where upon the Women's Committee
asked for an investigation into the ballot. The
investigation by the branch executive showed that apart from
23. MC2 side'a'.
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some minor criticism the ballot was fair and the vote lost 
on a 27% turnout <24>.
What is difficult to comprehend is the reason for 
holding the ballot, let alone an inquiry. The difference 
between the council's offer and the claim was minimal and by 
any criteria it represented a substantial advance <25>. The 
action of the Women's Committee reveals the high level of 
their political expectations: if they had won it would have 
shown that a unique movement had developed. The ending of 
the child care campaign, however, represented a watershed 
for the committee. Unable to find a comparable issue to 
organise around, it was never to regain its elan or 
momentum. This had two consequences.
Firstly the committee soon contracted back into a hard 
core of support among the radicals, reintroducing the 
division between the radicals and support staff. This was in 
the area in which that division had most thoroughly broken 
down. Cobishly's explanation of the failure to maintain 
links with the support staff was premised on the rise of 
equal opportunities and the more general problem faced by
24. Report Submitted to the Executive Committee June 1983.
25. The agreement has been cited as a product of municipal 
socialism, for example Stoker, G. <1988>: The Politics of 
Local Government. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
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women support staff arising from the nature of their labour 
process:
It was difficult to do something about women 
in the lower grade jobs; we stumbled constantly 
over their inability to attend meetings. We tried 
to organise the women's group meeting at the 
different town halls so that telephonists and 
women like that could nip up in their lunch 
breaks. The difficulty was you could formalise 
it at the level of getting council to agree that 
women should have time off for woman's meetings 
but in practice they say you can have time-off 
and keep the service running and it's a total 
impossibility <26>.
The problem surrounding the support staff labour process is 
an important one and is taken up below in relation to the 
wider question of their failure to become shop stewards.
The second major consequence was not so much as 
Corbishley viewed it, one of the council 'highjacking equal 
opportunities', rather the ending of the child care campaign 
marked the transition from the women's committee to the 
council taking over the regulation and administration of the 
democratic aspect of the committee's programme. This was a 
problem which Corbishley viewed as being further compounded
26. MC2 side 'a'.
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by the national union:
The union nationally also began to develop forms 
challenging sexism in the workplace very much 
in a disciplinary and legalistic sense. So issues 
like sexual harassment, which we had begun to 
talk about in terms of how we could take it up 
in the workplace, began to be diverted into 
discussions about what sort of disciplinary 
committee we could set up to look at it and how 
the union would look at things like that <27>.
The fate of this Committee fits into the broader 
pattern of the demise of branch-based militancy. In this 
instance the theoretical framework of the women's committee 
fused together the winning of material benefits with 
democratic demands for women workers, as well as identifying 
those workers and the branch as the only force who could 
achieve these demands. The theory failed to comprehend the 
ability of other forces to carry out their demands, in this 
instance the council. The very success of the child care 
campaign saw a re-run in microcosm of the ceding of 
militancy to the council. The committee's leadership was 
unable to fully come to terms with the 'problematic of 
success', and its limitations the failure of women to remain 
mobilised after the success of the child care campaign. It 
was in this context that the council can be said to have
27. MC2 side 'a'. It was also the case that the committee 
tended to lose its rationale as women's questions were 
integrated into the bargaining structure of the branch. This 
removed the necessity for a specialised grouping to carry 
out that task.
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'highjacked equal opportunities'. It was within the 
framework of the growing appropriation by the council of the 
branch's functions and the stabilisation of the branch's 
regulative role that a shop stewards structure was finally 
adopted.
The hybrid steward system <28>.
The move towards a shop stewards system took place in
three stages. First, the revamping of the emergency
committee into an 'action' committee had occurred at the
1980 AGM; second, the drive was continued at the branch
meeting in June 1980 with a resolution stating that:
while recognising a 'shop stewards system' would 
be inappropriate at this stage, the branch calls 
on the executive committee to devise a system 
which would ensure adequate local 
representation <29>.
Finally, the following year's AGM approved the rule change 
to set up the system <30>. This was ratified by NALGO HQ in
28. The interviews were conducted in 1987-88 at a very low 
ebb of the branches life. Looking back on them they are 
extremely subjective as my respondents looked at the 
formation of the stewards through the prism of the first 
round of redundancies and the inability of the branch to 
stop them.
29. Resolution to Ordinary Quarterly Branch Meeting, June 
1980.
30. Resolution form the Executive Committee to the 1980 AGM 
January 1981.
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July 1982, and the branch finally adopted it in April 1983. 
Rather than replacing the departmental representative 
system, the stewards system was grafted onto it, creating a 
rather complicated hybrid structure, which would seem to be 
the norm for shop steward based NALGO branchs <31>.
Sue Cannon, a sociology graduate, was employed by the 
branch to implement the new structure. The original 
timetable was two months, although it was to take seven from 
October 1982 till April 1983. The problems she confronted 
were compounded by the failure of the leadership to 
fundamentally think through the issue and the inadequacies 
of the organisational changes of 1980; these had not 
equipped the branch leaders with an adequate understanding 
of the membership. For example, global membership figures 
existed but there was no departmental breakdown? no-one knew 
where the members were <32>.
31. The occurrence of this hybrid structure in other 
boroughs points to similar debates between left and right 
and the compromise which is expressed at the level of 
language where stewards were introduced to aid 
communication. Seen for example Nicholson, N., Ursell, G. 
and Blyton, P <198l> The Dynamics of White Collar Unionism. 
Academic Press.
32. This point was made to me by Cannon, who was confronted 
with the task of providing a membership breakdown on a 
departmental basis.
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Cannon identified her first problem as defining what in
reality was a workplace constituency:
you would have workplace constituencies based on 
either physical location or groups of workplaces 
joined together to form one constituency. There 
was no real identity of what the constituency 
would be <33>.
This was resolved by visiting workplaces and deciding in
consultation with the members what constituted a
constituency, a process completed by January 1983. The
second stage consisted of the organisation of publicity
which Cannon felt was surprisingly low key:
We did leaflets for the whole branch along the 
lines; 'You may vaguely be aware that somebody 
has been drifting around sticking their nose 
into your office speaking to you, and the 
elections are about to happen'. We did some 
minimal publicity on that level <34>.
Formal elections followed in March and April, by the branch
secretary sending out nomination papers; if positions were
contested a secret ballot was held under the supervision of
the branch office. In the first election seventy five
stewards were elected <35>, which was perceived as a major
success by the branch officers. The first meeting of the
33. Sue Cannon [ hereafter SC] side 'a'.
34. SC side 'a'.
35. SC side 'a'.
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stewards was held In May and was addressed by Lister and 
Cannon who explained the stewards' responsibilities <36> .
The new structure called for three sets of elections; 
firstly for workplace representatives (stewards); those 
eligible to vote and to be nominated are members within a 
given workplace constituency <37>. Elections are then held 
for departmental representatives; all stewards are eligible 
to stand plus up to two non-stewards who can be nominated by 
anyone within the service. Finally there are elections on a 
service-wide basis for departmental representatives. Those 
elected sit on a service stewards committee covering their 
service, for example, all of housing. This replaced the 
departmental representatives service committee. The 
importance of departmental representatives is that they, and 
not stewards, are eligible to sit on the branch Executive 
committee, the membership of which is in proportion to 
members within a service. For example. Social Services with 
600 members were entitled to 15 representatives, the minimum 
number being two. Service conveners have to be departmental 
representatives as they can only be elected from service
36. By this time Cannon had been employed full-time as a 
support worker for the stewards producing a regular bulletin 
for stewards and collating information on membership for the 
branch.
37. This structure was explained to me by Cannon several 
times!
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members who sit on the Executive. There are very few branch 
members who understand this structure. In reality the system 
is much simpler because competitive elections are the 
exception for stewards while the departmental 
representatives have largely collapsed into the stewards; 
creating a unitary body, with the stewards nominating from 
among their number who will sit on the executive.
Five years after the debate over shop stewards had
begun the left had finally achieved their goal; the above,
however, had shown that the context in which this was
adopted was through the sponsorship of the branch
leadership. In spite of this and its hybrid nature, the
ideology which fuelled its introduction remained firmly
rooted in the manufacturing model; for the left the
identification of stewards with class and power was, as
Hopper comments, as strong as ever;
it allied us more closely with blue collar 
workers, with the standard trade union format of 
shop stewards and conveners, as opposed to a 
seemingly antiquated white collar set up <38>.
The process of implementing and running the system, however,
rapidly overturned the imagery, as the following example
38. JH side %b'. The formation of the shop stewards system 
shows a remarkable similarly in the language used between my 
respondents with those of Nicholson, N., Ursell, G. and 
Blyton, P <1981> study of Sheffield NALGO branch. The 
Dynamics of White Collar Unionism.
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from the Education Service shows. NALGO organises school 
support staff; secretaries, lab technicians in schools and 
the central schools' administration staff. The numbers of 
NALGO members within this service was equally divided 
between the schools and central administration: 373 and 327 
respectively making up the largest single group of union 
members 700, with the second lowest union density, 50% of 
any service <39>. In individual schools membership was 
small, between one and ten scattered through the borough's 
schools. This fragmentation precluded a collective workplace 
identity, and their position within the labour process meant 
they had little to no economic power, relations being 
ordered largely through paternalism. Richard Cotton (Branch 
secretary 1985-86) understood this point when he approached 
a 'twin set and pearls school secretary' in the extremely 
difficult circumstances following the riot at Broadwater 
farm. She:
was very hostile and I wore my old Stationers 
tie ( one of the borough's Grammar Schools) and 
she said; 'Oh, you went to Stationers'. Somehow 
you can put forward the same message without 
being seen as a wild eyed Marxist <40>.
39. Figures taken from Cannon's quarterly breakdown of 
branch density by service.
40. Richard Cotton [hereafter RC] side 'a'.
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It was this type of worker that the stewards system was
meant to draw into activity, the intention in Education
being that batches of schools would be grouped together. The
reality was to be an individual running the section single
handed, as Cannon very quickly found out:
What it took was for somebody to decide; well 
shit I'm just going to do it and get on with it. 
Dorothy Burke was around. Dorothy did it virtually 
single handed <41>.
As with the other services which had failed to make the
transition from below, this suggests an amalgam of Terry's
and Kessler's views on sponsership. The branch effectively
sponsored a steward to act as a key steward, as defined by
Terry, opening the way for the emergence rather than the
'imposition' of a representational figure. It was the key
steward Dorothy Burke who built up the organisation within
the Education service; Rudin recalled her pivotal role:
For the first time ever the Education Service 
started to be organised that was starting from 
virtual scratch. It was a major battle, head 
teachers and the Education Office were accustomed 
to teachers being organised but not the support 
staff. It took a tremendous amount of struggle 
and determination and guts <42>.
This led to a level of organisation previously unseen 
among schools. The fact that Cotton could even go into
41. SC side 'b'
42. Jeff Rudin tape 3 [hereafter JR] side 'a'.
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schools and get a hearing after Broadwater Farm is testimony 
to this. The most important development, however, was shown 
in an Executive Committee minute when it put forward a claim 
for two seats on Staff-Side for non-teaching staff, due to 
the proliferation of their issues <43>. What had taken place 
was that the shop stewards system had opened up a conduit 
between the membership and the negotiators, so that it was 
possible for workers with a detailed knowledge of their own 
labour process to begin to formulate their own agenda and 
through either a key or a number of stewards to expand the 
areas of the branch's negotiations. The creation of the 
stewards structure had then, immediately overturned the 
imagery which had fuelled its development; in its stead what 
began to emerge were a number of service based structures 
equating to occupational groups who started to develop their 
own bargaining agenda. In effect the stewards system had 
opened the way for creating a number of sub-branchs based on 
services and around the occupational groups within any given 
service. These sub-branches were held together by the branch 
office which provided both administration and overall co­
ordination of activity.
43 Executive Committee minute November 1983.
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Two major (although possibly transient) problems were 
highlighted by the hybrid system. These were the divisions 
between support and professional staff - the problem of 
status and hierarchy - and the centrality of the radicals to 
the whole shop stewards system. The lack of involvement of 
support staff was, as with the Women's Committee, a major 
problem. This corresponds to the Nicholson N., Ursell, G. 
and Blyton, P. <1981> 'picture of union involvement being 
unevenly distributed across the formal job status 
hierarchy' <44>. The problem of status that the branch 
confronted was not solely, as Nicholson N., Ursell, G. and 
Blyton, P. have put forward, one of access to knowledge and 
information available to high status workers. There were two 
other debilitating factors which mitigated against support 
staff taking up shop stewards positions. There was firstly 
the effect of the workers' different position within the 
labour process. Corbishley (who by 1983 was a senior manager 
in change of a neighbourhood Housing Office) contrasted her 
ability to get time off for union duties to that of a 
support worker. For example, while a telephonist was crucial
44. Nicholson, N., Ursell, G. and Blyton, P <1981> The 
D y n a m ic s  Off W hi t e  CPl i a r  U n i o n i s m ,  Academic Press, London. 
P* 45.
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to keeping the service running, for Corbishley:
In the sort of workplace I worked in there 
wasn't that sort of pressure. It was possible 
to organise work in a different manner it doesn't 
mean you didn't do the work <45>.
Secondly there was the tension engendered between the 
two hierarchies - that of the council and the branch's. This 
expressed itself most forcefully although not exclusively in 
NALGO because the hierarchy within the union was more likely 
to invert the status of workers, for instance a women 
secretary being the senior steward within a department of 
professional workers. To continue with this example, the 
union hierarchy may place the secretary, as a senior 
steward, in a negotiating position that is of comparable 
status to senior management. Seen as two competing 
hierarchies where the union is continually in a position of 
subordination, the status relations had to be constantly 
renegotiated and the secretary's position continually 
reaffirmed. The pattern which initially emerged within the 
branch was for low status workers not to become stewards and 
in so doing challenge the council hierarchy or the dominant 
power relations within the workplace. The council hierarchy 
remained a powerful imperative in keeping the union amongst
45. MC2 side %b ‘
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the professional staff precisely the opposite to the
leadership's desires. This provided the context for
Cobishly's observation that despite:
the stewards system; you still got a situation 
where the support staff didn't tend to represent 
themselves, they were represented by someone on 
a higher grade. <46>
Not surprisingly it was my women respondents who had fully 
grasped the problem posed by the hierarchies of council and 
branch. Both of these problems were also present within the 
NUPE Education branch and are discussed in the following 
chapter. The second problem was more specific to NAIXIO that 
was the centrality of the radicals to the system.
In line with the other parameters that were imposed on 
the branch it rapidly became apparent that, while the 
stewards system had brought more members into activity, the 
core remained the radicals. By 1983, with the major 
expansion of the workforce, union membership stood at 3,620. 
It had risen by 1,773 (over 100%) from its 1973 total of 
1,847. The base among the radicals had undergone a 
substantial increase, notably in the Library service and the 
Architects Departments. The take-up of stewards positions by 
the radicals was to a large extent the formulation of their 
activist status. What is shown by Cannon's records of
46. MC2 side 'b
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stewards is the gradual tapering off of support for the
stewards system, the further away from the jobs undertaken
by the radicals <47>. The branch leadership were unable to
break out from their "ghetto". Cannon recalled that the
biggest response to stewards was from:
services that were already organised. Social 
Services, Housing, Architects, Planning. I can't 
remember now whether we had any service which 
didn't have a representative as we do at the 
moment. The system wasn't generated across the 
branch <48>.
What makes this specific to NALGO is the maintenance 
of one generic group, the professional sub-group, as the 
core of the system rather than specific workplaces. I was 
unable to find a correlation between this greater 
involvement and economic advantage; rather it rested on the 
political conceptions of these radicals.
The high tide of the stewards
The zenith of the stewards came during the first flush 
of success in September 1983, four months after they had 
been set up, in the 'Les Butler dispute' <49>. Butler was a 
surveyor from PELAW who was sacked for allegedly embezzling
47. This is shown in Cannon's six monthly breakdown of the 
distribution of stewards which is by service and department.
48. SC side 'b'.
49. See, Greater London Whitley Council Joint Secretaries' 
Inquiry, <1984>: Les Butler. January 1984.
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his car allowance. NALGO viewed this as victimization and 
took strike action. This was made possible by the stewards 
as Rudin recalled:
What happened was that once a section of Public 
Works had decided to go out, a meeting was then 
convened of workplace stewards and the 
recommendation the strong recommendation from 
Harry and all branch officers was that we had to 
give support. That meant workplace stewards going 
back to their workplaces and we were now being 
invited to support them. It worked amazingly well. 
The whole thing didn't last that long but the 
large services and probably Housing were out in a 
matter of hours; there was a snowball effect <50>.
In spite of the fact that 'it wouldn't have happened 
without the stewards', it was not an action called by the 
stewards. The documentation backs up Rudin's assertion that 
the branch Executive organised a meeting (attended by the 
FTO) at which a recommendation for strike action was made as 
opposed to workplaces walking out spontaneously in support 
of Butler. In this sense the stewards facilitated the 
functioning of the branch rather than the branch leadership 
responding to the stewards.
This was the high point for branch development: the 
successful setting up of the stewards, the Les Butler 
dispute and a general air of optimism and crucially the 
expansion of areas of negotiation such as in the schools. At
50. JR3 side's'.
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no time did the branch have more authority than in the 
autumn of 1983. The cumulative effect of these developments 
ended the period begun in the mid-70s of transition to 
institutional centrality.
The branch can now be characterised as being 
constructed around what amounted to a range of service based 
sub-branchs for example Housing Education etc. Negotiation 
remained centralised on Staff-Side which by then had been 
enlarged to include representatives from all of these sub- 
branchs. Staff-side negotiations were largely conducted on 
behalf of occupational groups within a service. The branch 
secretary and branch office providing overall administration 
coordination and direction. This was to remain the 
substantive structure of the branch until the end of the 
1980s. Cannon, however, was able to make the point that the 
stewards system 'began to collapse where it was difficult to 
organise' this showed up at the 1983 AGM when there were 
fresh elections:
We have always had this core number in Services 
who least needed representation and services 
that do haven't got the representatives. So while 
I don't remember losing a lot of people, I don't 
remember getting many more <51>.
51. SC side 'b
317
This "fraying" of the system predated the deselection 
of Harry Lister as branch secretary in March 1984 over 
unauthorised appropriation of branch funds for a car loan. 
The two wings of the branch leadership, the broad left and 
what had been the non-aligned left had maintained a genuine 
working relationship since 1980, but were now thrown into a 
major factional struggle, which was to last until the late 
1980s. The most immediate effect was on the stewards, as the 
factional struggle crippled the branch executive. The effect 
of this was to act as a form of centrifugal force on the 
sub-branch's which began to pull in as many directions as 
there were sub-branchs. This factional struggle and the 
rise, in 1985, of radical municipalism within Haringey 
tended to obscure the fact that the hybrid stewards had 
begun to falter prior to both these events. The domestic 
organisation was a product of the defeat of the dual agenda 
and the political resolution of 1981. It was these factors 
which had provided a set of parameters that had shaped the 
actions of the actors within the branch and was largely to 
determine how the branch reacted to the rise of radical 
municipalism. A similar pattern of development is observable 
in NUPE Education.
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The Bvomtion of an Active Framework 1979-1984
Achieving institutional centrality
In chapter four I showed how the process to replace the
sectional centrality of the caretakers in NUPE by
institutional centrality had been laid. As with NAIX30,
institutional centrality was achieved occupational group by
occupational group, and from Spencer's election this took
just under three year. This process of change was concluded
by the end of 1980. By then, branch meetings had been moved
from a Sunday to a weekday evening, and sectional meetings,
that is meetings for occupational groups, had been
established. Spencer recalled
We have often large sectional meetings
held at half term. For example, we've had meetings
for caretakers and cleaners with between 400
and 500 in attendance <1>.
If opening up the structures of the branch, that is, 
democratising it, provided one element of change, a turn to 
a more active negotiating stance provided another. Ray 
Gillard, my respondent from personnel management, remembered
1. Peter Spencer tape 3 [hereafter PS3] side 'a
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the impact Spencer had on management:
When Peter Spencer came in, he made a significant 
impact and people didn't know what hit them with 
school strikes. It made a lot of people think 
very hard about the vulnerability of the schools. 
That was the one [the 1979 strike], people didn't 
believe what happened. By God he made an impact. 
It's noticeable now he doesn't have to call them 
out, he just has to talk about it and they sit 
down <2>.
The strike was an undoubted fillip to the branch in 
developing negotiations. By the middle of 1979 important 
agreements were being concluded for the cleaning and kitchen 
staff. For example, in September 1979 a 'procedural 
agreement' was obtained concerning the transfer of school 
meals workers between kitchens <3>. Also attempts were made 
to extend the union's efforts to obtain plus payments; 
negotiations took place around such issues as 'the payment 
of £5 a week for the maintenance of burglar alarms', 'extra 
payment for the cleaning of light fittings' and 'overalls 
for kitchen staff' <4>. The branch negotiated to introduce 
'doublebugs'- a specialised machine, which allowed kitchen 
floors to be cleaned without the workers going on their 
hands and knees to scrub them. Not all of these items were
2. Ray Gillard [hereafter RG] side 'b'.
3 Education manual Workers Local Joint Works, September 
1979.
4. These issues are a selection of the type of plus-payments 
that Spencer began to negotiate at the Local Joint Works.
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obtained, while others took a considerable period of 
negotiation before management conceded, particularly issues 
which related to the kitchens. However, there can be no 
question that the branch leadership was actively negotiating 
on behalf of all the members. It was not until the end of 
1980 that the above can be said to represent a stable form 
of organisation, as by then a clear pattern had been 
established where cleaners' and kitchen staff issues were 
regularly appearing as agenda items for the Local Joint 
Works Committee <5>. Seen in conjunction with the 
establishment of regular occupational group meetings this 
concluded the process of shifting the branch framework to 
one of institutional centrality.
The reorganised NUPE branch can be characterised as 
being branch-based, constructed around service level 
negotiations conducted primarily, although not exclusively, 
on behalf of occupational groups. These alterations have 
been shown to have been initiated by the branch secretary, 
with very little formal membership involvement. The opening 
up of the branch to the members, however, generated an
5. As the above has intimated agenda items for these groups 
began to appear very soon after Spencer became secretary. My 
reasoning for citing the end of 1980 is that by then the 
expansion in negotiations had shown a consistency over a 
period of time rather than an initial burst of enthusiasm 
only to be replaced by the old routine.
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Interaction between them and the branch which qualitatively 
altered the relations within the domestic organisation. 
Underneath the formal changes, and the role of the branch 
secretary was a much richer involvement which centred around 
unofficial spokeswomen. In a far less mediated way than 
change within NALGO, alteration within NUPE occurred through 
an interaction of these unofficial spokeswomen with the 
branch officials, in effect the branch secretary. The 
unofficial spokeswomen (alongside their counterparts among 
the caretakers) became the backbone of the branch activist, 
providing the leaven for the secretary's actions <6>. Within 
the framework of the altering domestic organisation a 
tension arose around the role of workplace representatives 
and who was to carry out the bargaining and regulation of 
custom and practice; the stewards or branch officers. This 
tension only arose within the kitchens where a shop stewards 
committee was formed. This as I will show, was to falter, 
unable to sustain itself as a self-generating stewards
6. The validation of the existence of these spokeswoman 
comes from two sources. Firstly their origins are discussed 
in the narrative around Marie Williams. Secondly I could not 
understand how Spencer was able to act. On replaying the 
nearly eight hours of interview material conducted with him 
and Coral Adeniz a pattern emerged that when they spoke 
about workplaces they usually did so in terms of an 
individual. It was that person who played the link role 
between branch and workplace.
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grouping. The tension, as with NALGO, represented an 
interaction between the problem of evolving workplace 
organisation within the context of the defeats of branch 
based militancy - the political settlement of 1981. Unlike 
NALGO it occurred after the branch had achieved 
institutional centrality.
Organisation amongst the cleaners
In 1981 cleaners and caretakers took industrial action 
against council cuts (one of the last "political" 
confrontations between union and council until 1988) <7>. 
According to Spencer this action, 'unlike the 1979 strike 
which 'didn't unify the branch, this fight against the cuts 
in 1981 did' <8>. In deciding to challenge the cuts the 
branch was confronted with the problem of what type of 
activity the cleaners could undertake given their 
economically weak position. The resolution of this arose out 
of a unity with the caretakers which created the basis of a 
limited economic power at the workplace. For example, one of
7. This was the last strike in the wave that had begun in 
1979 surrounding the rates and cuts (discussed in chapter 
seven and eight), hence the political characterization. 
Between 1981 and 1988 industrial action did occur but of a 
more mundane nature, for example the 'Area two' social 
services strike of 1984 over office accommodation.
8 Peter Spencer tape 4 [hereafter PS] side 'a'.
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the tactics adopted was to send the cleaners into schools 
without supervision, this according to Spencer saw head­
teachers :
pulling their hair out. Heads were sending 
cleaners home because they weren't prepared to 
stay in the schools until the cleaners were 
finished <9>.
The joint action won the reinstatement of the cuts for 
the cleaners but not the caretakers where upon the cleaners 
took solidarity action, a decision which surprised Spencer. 
If the cleaners' victory had provided the immediate fillip 
for their solidarity it was, as with the original decision 
to take industrial action, premised on a substantial level 
of organisation, built up within the branch during the 
preceding years.
Two factors had preceded the industrial action which 
made it possible. The cleaners had seen the emergence of 
their bargaining agenda which by 1981 was firmly 
established, as was the practice of sectional meetings. With 
these meeting a collectivity developed which altered the 
situation from the one which surrounded the lead up to the 
low pay strike. By 1981 not only was the branch secretary 
able to play a leadership role but also unofficial 
spokeswomen existed who were looked to for leadership. It
9. PS4 side 'a'.
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was these unofficial spokeswomen who would, by and large 
have become the activists during the industrial action 
proving the link between branch and workplace. The 
industrial action highlights the substance of the new 
domestic organisation; the existence of an interaction 
between branch and members based on a collectivity of the 
occupational group.
In the dispute against the cuts the branch and members 
reaped the benefits of the alteration set in train by 
Spencer. There were however limitations to this new domestic 
structure. What did not take place was the evolution of the 
self-selection process, from the level of unofficial 
spokeswomen to official union representatives. This failure 
arose from both the cleaners' and the branch leadership's 
avoidance of confronting the problem of status and hierarchy 
within the workplace. Once the branch began to alter, the 
patronage relations between cleaner and caretaker, involving 
the cleaners' time bonus became debilitating obstacles to 
the emergence of cleaner shop stewards. As far as I have 
been able to ascertain, there was no demand from the 
cleaners for representation from among their own number.
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Spencer recalled the fate of the one cleaner who became a 
steward:
I think we had one school cleaner elected as a 
steward cleaner. One of the big secondaries.
She had a real hard time, a real hard time.
Caretakers seem to resent a cleaner more
than anybody being elected as a shop steward <10>.
The cleaner challenged the core of the hierarchical
relations at the workplace; the relations between cleaners
and caretakers. This exemplifies the argument put forward in
the preceding chapter about the conflict between the
councils' and the unions hierarchies. This also represents
further evidence for the Fryer et al <1978> understanding of
transposing job hierarchy to the union:
to such an extent that the majority of the 
membership have difficulty overcoming the 
dominance of their supervisors within the 
union <11>.
To this problem it is necessary to add another 
debilitating factor - the branch secretary. As a direct 
consequence of his job he already had a detailed knowledge 
of the cleaners' labour process, which he was able to 
transpose to his trade union work. This technical ability to
10. PS4 side 'b'.
11. Fryer, R, H., Fairclough, A, J., and Manson, T, B. 
<1978>: 'Facilities for female shop stewards: The Employment 
Protection Act and collective agreements', British Journal 
of industrial Relations. Vol XVI, No2, p. 160-174, July. The 
ability to show a similar development in NALGO tentatively 
points to a substantial relationship between job hierarchy 
and union relations.
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understand and negotiate around cleaners' issues meant that 
there was no necessity to draw on the cleaners expertise in 
evolving a negotiating agenda. Spencer's knowledge of the 
substantive negotiations issue, and the time bonus, provided 
the basis for his attitude where he neither saw the need 
for, nor believed the cleaners wanted cleaners stewards.
The experience of the cleaner shop steward is an 
expression of a boundary to the alterations of the domestic 
organisation. The branch secretary was unwilling to confront 
the problem of hierarchy and status engendered by the labour 
process. The failure to do so, and sponsor cleaner stewards 
"exposes" one of his limitations. For both him and the 
cleaners the heart of the matter was that the potential 
disruption to the hierarchy between cleaner and caretaker 
was too great a price to pay for the development of cleaner 
stewards. The legitimacy of such a view rested on the 
ability to achieve a collectivity without this level of 
representation. There was no imperative on either the 
secretary or the cleaners, to challenge the status and 
hierarchy within the workplace. To progress beyond 
unofficial spokeswomen it demanded an extremely conscious 
act on the part of the cleaner who was willing to confront 
the dual obstacles of disrupting her working relations and 
the apathy of the branch leadership. The failure to evolve
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cleaner representation, meant that the limits placed on the
development of the domestic organisation arose from a
recognition that the establishment of cleaner stewards would
implicitly challenge the relations of patronage between
caretaker and cleaner.
The organisation of the Kitchen Staff
It will be recalled that the major characteristics of
the kitchen staff were their inability to achieve a time
bonus, an independence from the caretakers and areas of
concern such as; the right not to be arbitrarily moved or
sacked, to have the correct size rubber gloves, and a
machine to clean the floor. It is then not surprising that
the documentation shows the major area of contention in
establishing institutional centrality was among the kitchen
staff. By the spring of 1979, if not before, the branch
secretary confronted the Senior School Meals Organiser:
you start going to meet the senior meals organiser 
who was a problem. You begin to realize that, 
Christ you are going to have to organise against 
this one, if you are going to get anything done. 
So you say we'll have a meeting of school meals 
workers, which start highlighting the 
problems <12>.
12. PS3 side 'a'. The senior School Meals Organiser left at 
the end of 1980 facilitating the process of normalising 
relations between branch and management. Adeniz during her 
second interview intimated that the activities of Spencer 
and the support he obtained from councillors helped to 
squeeze her out.
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This confrontation was in council terras a very bitter
conflict. It was over whether the union had the right to use
sanctions on the labour process. Thus obtaining a procedural
agreement which gave mutuality over transfer of kitchen
staff was not an easy matter. Management did not readily
give up the right to arbitrarily move workers around. It is
indicative of the period that these negotiations, which took
place towards the end of 1980, were difficult and conducted
by senior personnel management. As Spencer recalled
We spent ages and ages negotiating with personnel 
to get it taken out of their contract, because 
officers don't have it <13>.
The impact of Spencer's approach led to an unorthodox
response from the senior school meals organiser who tried to
mobilise 'her ladies' against the dangerous militant who had
come from Fords Dagenham. To counter this Spencer had:
a very private, very secret meeting with 
George Meehan and Niki Harrison (two 
leading councillors) about that. I said 
you'd better do something about it <14>.
Spencer's ability to by-pass the managerial structure 
is an example of the existence of an informal political 
network.
13. PS2 side 'b'.
14. PS3 side 'a'.
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This network was one where the branch was increasingly 
able to utilise the emerging political alliance with the 
Labour Group to overcome management's unwillingness to 
concede ground. These confrontations between the union and 
the organiser were in general resolved in favour of the 
union. To a far greater extent than among the cleaners these 
conflicts helped generate unofficial (and unseen) 
spokeswomen.
The emergence of unofficial spokeswomen
Unlike Spencer's relations with the cleaners he lacked 
any understanding of the substantive negotiations issues, or 
any intimate knowledge of the day to day problems in the 
kitchens that confronted members. The latter problem was 
only to be tackled with the formation of a shop stewards 
committee after 1982. The former was overcome at the 
beginning of 1979, through the use of the national union's 
publication, 'A Recipe for Action' <15>. The importance of
15. National Union of Public Employees. <1979>: A RQ<?iP? for 
Action. NUPE, London.
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this pamphlet, was how Spencer used it:
it told me what to do in school meals. There 
was all sort of things which we had to go 
for. It taught me the basic rules of 
calculating hours in kitchens and dining 
centres. It helped us locally to formulate 
items for meetings. We tried to implement 'A 
Recipe for Action'. This is how unions work, 
things happen nationally and we have to 
implement the dam thing, make sure they 
happen. In the early days perhaps I was more 
aware than now of initiatives we were taking 
nationally <16>.
It was possible just to use the booklet as a guide to
negotiations, however it also served the role as an
organiser for the branch. A meeting was called for school
meals workers around the booklet with the Local Government
National Officer, Rodney Bickerstaffe as the speaker:
We had a evening meeting where about eighty 
people turned up, late on in '78 or maybe 
after the strike early '79. I remember saying, 
we'll give him ten minutes, and then give him 
questions, he spoke for an hour and half, typical 
Bickerstaffe. The women were extremely interested 
in the publication <17>.
The fact that eighty attended shows the sort of 
dramatic impact the branch was able to have once it started 
to address the issues of direct concern to these workers.
In this instance the branches ability to do so was a direct 
product of the national union putting school meals on the 
agenda. It was not just that the branch had finally become
16. PS2 side 'b'.
17. PS2 side 'b'.
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concerned about the kitchens, it had became relevant to the 
members through the implementation of this pamphlet. If the 
meeting with Bickerstaffe was the most dramatic, it was not 
to be a one off occurrence; rather it was the start of 
sectional meetings which developed around specific issues. 
Very soon after the Bickerstaffe meeting, a second evening 
meeting was held in May 1979. This set in train a formal 
connection for Marie Williams with the branch <18>. It was 
'the beginning to get to know Peter', and was also where she 
raised the problem of her victimization 'I had been asked to 
move and felt it was unfair and I asked for a trade union 
representation to argue my case with me' <19>. The meeting 
was held jointly with the G@M called over the council 
reducing kitchen staff hours <20>. Williams recalled that at
18. Marie Williams was briefly mentioned in chapter four, 
she had started work just after the low pay strike. Williams 
had been active in the trade union and women's movement 
since the early 1970s. She stated that she had explicitly 
sought out the NUPE branch because of the union's national 
record of militancy. She had no prior knowledge of Spencer.
19. The steward sent along to deal with her case nearly led 
to her coming out of the union, the shop steward sided 
'totally with the supervisor'. It was this experience which 
provided the common bond between Williams and Adeniz. In the 
end she 'sorted things out' herself.
20. A discussion on the reduction of hours took place at the 
May Branch meeting which resolved to call the evening 
meeting. Branch Minute Book Two May, 1979.
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the meeting Spencer:
encouraged some form of action, the 
recommendation was, a work to rule. He then 
left the floor open to debate, whoever wished 
put their hands up and put their viewpoint 
about it. In retrospect a work to rule was 
pie in the sky. I recognise that doesn't work 
in the kitchens <21>.
The meeting voted for the work to rule which had none of the 
implications that had surrounded the low pay strike, the 
issue being both local, and defensive. In spite of these 
qualifications, just a few months after the caretakers 
strike, the school meals workers had embarked on their first 
industrial action, which they lost.
The work to rule raised a number of problems, which
centred on the lack of workplace representation. Who was
going to monitor it given it could only be carried out by
the workers in each individual kitchen. It was this problem
which Williams confronted. She recalled:
The effect in the kitchen was a very positive one, 
because we started discussing certain issues. 
Everybody got together, and discussed how we'd 
carry out the work to rule. The supervisor tried to 
get heavy handed about it, and some of the women 
found it difficult to cope. I'm not saying they 
couldn't, they just found it difficult. Through I 
wasn't a shop steward, I was asked if I would go 
and talk to her about it, so I went and said, it 
was a trade union directive and she had no right to 
intimidate the women in that way.She apologised and 
from then on I was an unofficial spokesperson <22>.
21. MW side 'a'
22. MW side 'a'
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Williams assumed this role in her kitchen, as a direct
consequence of the work to rule, a role she was to maintain
until becoming a shop steward in 1982. The objective
problems faced by the workers in policing the action would
have seen a similar process take place in other kitchens. It
was the start of the process of creating spokeswomen in
individual kitchens, the beginning of a link between the
branch and the workplace; at this stage, to anyone outside
of the workplace, a hidden development. In spite of the
changes within the branch Williams's experience was that it
was very difficult to carry out this informal function:
What I tried to do was, without being too pushy, 
to try and get the women to value their viewpoint. 
One of the ways I did that was to stick my neck 
out, I wasn't totally dogmatic but, I did stand 
up for my rights and brought out the issue of good 
employment practices. Because I wasn't a shop 
steward I couldn't stand up and object to a woman 
doing something, what I did was talk to the women 
personally, and then go to the union about 
it <23>.
The emergence of these spokeswomen was at first unknown 
to the branch secretary, falling outside the branch routine 
and acting at a discreet level within the workplace. They 
began to become known through attendance at meeting and by 
becoming an informal contact point for the secretary with 
the workplace. It was from among their number that the shop
23. MW side 'a
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steward committee, which was to be 'sponsored' by the FTO, 
was drawn. The first school meals shop steward, however, did 
not wait to be sponsored; she was elected soon after the 
ending of the work to rule.
The First Shop Steward
In September 1979 the first of the 'unofficial 
spokeswomen' become a shop steward, Maureen (whose second 
name no-one could recall and who left the council at the 
beginning of 1981) . In the branch's development Maureen is 
the only example from the kitchen staff of someone who was 
able to take the step from informal to formal workplace 
representative independently of the leadership. I know 
nothing about how she was elected, or more importantly the 
discussions in the kitchen which led up to that election, 
Maureen was the sharpest consequence of the self-selection 
process at a time when the formation of unofficial 
spokeswomen was still very much in its infancy.
Once elected she was integrated, as far as I have been
able to ascertain, without any problems into the existing
branch structures. Spencer recalled that:
we did get a shop steward early on, and you are 
then talking to a school meals worker, and she's 
saying this is wrong that's wrong <24>.
24. Peter Spencer tape 5 side 'a'
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Maureen was the first official "toe hold" the branch 
had within the kitchens, where she was used to monitor 
agreements. For instance the minutes show that it was her 
kitchen where the machine to clean the floor with the 
'doublebug', was tested <25>. She must also have been an 
invaluable source of information about members' worries, and 
a counterweight to the arguments management were putting 
forward against the different initiatives from the branch.
It would seem then that Maureen played a very important role 
within the branch; one that was understated by the secretary 
and unknown by my other respondents. Maureen exemplified the 
type of role that the unofficial spokeswomen were carrying 
out. That of building up relations between the workplace and 
the branch through policing custom and practice within their 
workplace. Maureen and the unofficial spokeswomen provide a 
picture of an emerging collectivity. They show up a more 
complex interaction between members and branch officials and 
point to a far wider role than has been put forward for 
stewards by Kessler <1982> or Fryer et al. <1978>. Although 
largely obscured their role was an essential prerequisite 
for the shift to institutional centrality and the ability of
25. Branch minute January 1980.
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the branch secretary to act. The formation of this layer of 
unofficial spokeswomen and the relations to the branch 
represented, albeit limited, a genuine movement from below. 
They provided a real substance for the action that Spencer 
was able to take and in spite of its more obscure nature can 
be favourably contrasted to the developments observed in 
NALGO. One of the most important areas in which these 
spokeswomen were to be involved was the formation of the 
School Meals Working Party.
The School Meals Working Party
As with the unofficial spokeswomen among the cleaners 
who were central to the industrial action of 1981, so the 
unofficial spokeswomen for the kitchen staff played a key 
role in the formation of the School Meals Committee. This 
was the branches response to the 1980 Education Act which, 
as I have discused in chapter eight, threatened jobs, by 
potentially reducing the number of children taking school 
dinners and so decreasing the number of staff required. It 
will also be shown to represent one of the limitation on 
branch based militancy, the formation of this committee
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arising out of that weakness <26>. Spencer recalled that:
Maureen came, me, and an assortment of school 
meals workers. I can't remember how we got them 
involved. As they weren't all NUPE we probably 
had a response from a joint meeting of school 
meals workers <27>.
The main mechanism that the School Meals Committee focused
on for overcoming this was the extension of the choice of
meals around a system called Cash Cafeteria. Both Adeniz and
Spencer were emphatic that this, the main initiative of the
committee came from the workers. Spencer remembered:
the women who said, 'they're doing something 
called the cash cafeteria in Islington, why don't 
you go and have a look at it <2 8>.
The workers comprising the School Meals Committee were 
still treated as menials by their management, and until 
recently had suffered the same treatment from their union 
branch. They had however to comprehend that by diversifying 
what was cooked then more children were likely to have 
school dinners. This opened up the potential of a Cash
26. The evolution of this committee is followed from a 
device for saving jobs into a model of municipalism. See 
chapter eleven.
27. PS5 side 'a'
28. Cash Cafeteria was increasingly adopted by Education 
Authorities after the Act and one that was welcomed by the 
government. See 'Badge of Poverty' <1982> Poverty Pamphlet 
55. Child Poverty Action Group. There is no indication from 
either the branch or from the council's side that they were 
at this early stage aware qof this widespread move towards 
Cash Cafeteria.
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Cafeteria as the mechanism for diversification. Once this 
was recognised they worked out in detail how the scheme 
should be altered to fit their situation. This entailed the 
committee embarking on what amounted to a substantial 
reorganisation of the labour process. Here then was an 
alternative plan of sorts, the type of initiative which is 
usually associated with the most ''advanced sections' ' of 
the working class. Adeniz summed up the change for the 
workers:
I think its added more skill to the job, 
made it more interesting, you do 
different types of things now, the hard 
work comes in because you are thinking 
about three or four different things.
Where you use to be able to stick thirty 
jam tarts in the oven at a time, now 
your doing four or five different type 
of sweet <29>.
The council's gratitude for this major innovation was 
somewhat stilted. The union entered negotiations with a 
substantial claim; the councils response was to offer 'Till 
workers' fifty pence a week, and four pence an hour to the 
supervisors. According to Spencer the Till workers told the 
council to 'stuff it', and the supervisors accepted. Other 
workers such as Adeniz got nothing. The branch, via Spencer
29. CA side 'b
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29. CA side 'b'.
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did not seriously contest the issue, Adeniz commented:
I don't think the branch had the 
confidence in the school meals workers, 
in the women, that they would do 
anything <30>.
Whether or not they would have taken industrial action over 
this issue they were never asked.
Towards the end of 1982 the evolving collectivity was 
formalised from the union's side through the election of 
shop stewards and the creation of a shop stewards committee 
for the school meals.
The shop steward elections and the Stewards Committee
Spencer recalled that the impetus for the stewards'
committee came from outside the branch:
We had a change of full time officer, Mike 
Taylor. He said; 'have you got any women shop 
stewards'? I said 'no' he said 'I'd like to go 
round your kitchen staff and see if we can get 
some shop stewards'.[he did not ask to speak to 
the cleaners.] What happened was that I was forced 
to actually do what I had been wanting to do for 
ages. We started visiting kitchens, in some we 
were successful, in others they turned round 
and said, 'why should we have a steward when 
we can ring you up' <31>.
30. PS\ CA side 'a'.
31. PS5 side 'b
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It was at this time that Williams became a shop
steward. She recalled that Mike Taylor motivated the call to
the school meals workers in the following terms:
He felt it was important they were involved, 
because they would have more of an idea about 
what was needed than caretakers. There was 
nothing said about the particular importance of 
women, or women's issues, it was more about 
school meals workers having more information 
than the caretakers. He asked if anybody would 
be interested? <32>
Which provided the cue for someone to say:
'what about you Marie, you're always shouting 
your mouth off, would you be interested?'. I 
said I don't mind. I asked what it entailed, 
he said, 'that's up to you, you can be involved 
as much as you want, you need only open the 
mail and things like that'. I said, I'm not 
interested in just doing that. I think its an 
answer he didn't expect <33>.
Fryer et al. <1978> commented on the widespread view within 
NUPE among activists and full time officers that the 
'union's emergent system of shop stewards depends, initially 
upon the willingness of members to act as a "post-box” in 
their places of work' <34>. The approach of the Full Time
32. MW side 'a'.
33. MW side 'a'.
34. Fryer, R, H. , Fairclough, A, J.(, and Manson, T, B.<1978> 'Facilities for female shop stewards: The Employment 
Protection Act and collective agreements', British Journal 
of Industrial Relations. Vol XVI, No 2. p.160-174, July.
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Officer several years after the post-box concept had been
formulated points to a failure within the union's steward
system to evolve beyond this initial stage. While Taylor was
the catalyst, Spencer cites another impetus; the attempts by
the national employers to end the school meals retainer.
That galvanised the school meals service, we 
really got organised picketed the national joint 
council, we even went down to Weston Super-Mare 
to picket them there. We had a one day strike 
over it <35>.
Adeniz also saw the school meals retainer as being of major
importance, for the first time the kitchen staff had taken
strike action which had the effect that:
the school meals workers and the branch now see 
themselves as much more together <36>.
This issue was undoubtedly of great importance, probably
representing the high point of the school meals staff
involvement within the branch and it was only after this
that workplace organisation was formalised.
I do not consider however, that there was a major 
causal connection between the activity around the retainer 
and the election of stewards. What the regional organiser 
had keyed into was the existing layer of unofficial 
spokeswomen, as Williams's account of how she was nominated 
35. PS and CA 'b'.
36. PS and CA 'a'.
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indicates. The official's tour provided a framework for 
those workers who wished to make the transition from their 
informal to a formal position. It was from her vantage point 
of being a steward that Williams developed a critique of the 
way the stewards' committee began to function and the 
closing down of the women's section that she had helped 
initiate.
The role of the Stewards
The result of Taylor's visit was the election of six
stewards, their main role became one of formulating a
negotiating agenda. The basis for this was their detailed
knowledge of their labour process. Certainly, as the
following comment shows, it was this which dominated
Spencer's thinking about the role of the stewards:
Them early days were smashing, me Dot (a steward 
who became a supervisor) and the others... we 
had a committee who gave feed back from a good 
cross section, of the kitchen staff. You don't 
want more, its like setting up a working party, 
you want about six who can sit down and do the 
business <37>.
The stewards meetings were held in the evening and run in an 
informal manner where the stewards' knowledge could be
37. PS1 side 'a'.
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talked through. Adenlz recalled that:
The first problem I brought up was that, sometimes 
you had fish fingers and doughnuts on the same 
menu. I think it took about three meetings to 
get through to him, (Spencer) that it was a health 
and safety matter. As we were straining boiling 
hot oil on the same morning, to be able to cook 
two different types of food in the same fryer.
I think he started to see how things really 
were in the kitchen, and was willing to do 
something about them <38>.
For Spencer the impact of the stewards was a dramatic one in
expanding the branches bargaining parameters:
I think that's when we started to get issues on 
school meals that no one had dreamt of. We had 
shop stewards saying I thought for a long time 
that we ought to improve in this or that 
area <39>.
This narrow role for the stewards was contested by Williams
who believed that the stewards' committee had a potential
which was never realised. The reason for this failure was
rooted in her perception of Spencer and Adeniz (who became
branch chair in 1984):
It began to become very apparent that they 
preferred shop stewards who were interested in 
their own workplace and none of the other issues 
surrounding women and low pay. If you wanted to 
be much more involved and wanted to belong to 
various negotiating bodies it was not encouraged 
it still isn't <40>.
38. CA side 'b'.
39. PS3 side 'b'.
40. MW side 'b'.
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According to Williams the reason for this was because
Spencer and Adeniz were in the process of:
building themselves an empire and they wanted 
to hang onto it, they began to go very much to 
the right. I think one of the reasons for this 
was full-time release was introduced and that 
created a movement away from the understanding 
of membership needs <41>.
Williams began to view the meetings as:
beginning to be stage managed and the hierarchy 
system began to become very prominent it was 
like two head teachers and children if you 
like <42>.
By the middle of 1984 the committee had peaked and the 
following year it collapsed though this term is disputed by 
Adeniz:
It wasn't that it collapsed but we never got 
anymore, and two or three of them left, we never 
managed to get any replacements <43>.
By the end of 1984 there were two of the original six
stewards left <44>.
The debate over the role of the stewards was the 
background to the considerable amount of friction which 
surrounded the election in 1984 for branch chair. This
41. MW side 'b'.
42. MW side 'b'.
43. CA side 'b'.
44. Of the other four; one left the borough, one (Dot) 
became a supervisor, Williams was seconded to the 'School 
Meals Project' and Adeniz became branch chair.
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position was contested by Williams and Adeniz, Adeniz being 
the nominee of the stewards committee, won. The potential 
for continuing conflict within the branch was resolved in 
January 1985 when Williams was seconded full-time to the 
London Food Commission's newly formed School Meals Project.
The reason the shop stewards committee collapsed, or 
failed to get any replacements, was due to a combination of 
factors. The most obvious but the least important, were the 
inbuilt limitations put on it by Spencer which, in broad 
outline at least, equated to the view of the FTO. The 
dominant conception of formulating a kitchen workers agenda 
was a finite process that had by the end of 1983 largely run 
its course. At no time was there any attempt to develop a 
negotiating role for the stewards committee. The nearest the 
stewards got to this was attending the Local Joint Works. 
Adeniz recalled that:
None of us were used to formal meetings so he 
started taking us along, to sit and listen, and 
to have an input if school meals were being 
discussed. Then you could say to Peter, no it 
doesn't happen like that, or it does happen 
like that <45>.
45. CA side 'b'.
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What, however, were the alternatives? Fryer et al 
<1978> put forward three possible inodes in which NUPE 
approached problems; to rely on branch and full time 
officers, and 'two other methods which have been encouraged' 
the steward as a post-box and for the steward to act on an 
area basis. The traditional way around the fragmented 
workforce in the NUPE branch had been the practice adopted 
by the caretakers, where the stewards were peripatetic. For 
school meals staff this presented a considerable problem.
Due to the nature of their labour process, the schools meals 
steward would have difficulty achieving time off for 
industrial relations. To take the worker out of production 
meant other workers having to carry out their tasks. If this 
function was to be carried out in any serious way during 
working hours it would lead to a substantial amount of her 
time away form her own workplace. The most likely scenario 
arising from this would be the creation of an intolerable 
tension within the workplace between the steward and the 
other workers <46>. The Fryer el al. <1978> study shows up
46. Examples of shop stewards working in production and 
carrying out a similar, although not so geographically 
dispersed task do exist. For example the bonus steward 
within the building industry. This job was tied very 
directly to negotiations.
347
the lack of industrial relations time taken by the female
steward within Education. They comment:
They are more likely than their male colleagues 
... to perform their organisational and 
informational tasks for the immediate group 
with whom they work and without leaving the 
job <47>.
The way in which this issue has been approached 
theoretically has been an attempt to redefine the role of 
the steward and to alter the bargaining relation to include 
women <Byle 1982, Fryer et al. 1978>. This problem was 
resolved in Haringey (as it must have in other authorities 
during the 1980s) by the election of Adeniz as branch chair 
in January 1984 and the development of full-time release. 
Adeniz's election meant that the branch now had as one of 
its central personnel, a school meals worker who could play 
the role that Spencer had in relation to the cleaners and 
caretakers. The way was open to formalise the regulation of 
custom and practice and policing of agreements from the 
stewards to the branch officers. Some time prior to Adeniz's 
election Spencer had obtained full time release in 1983, at 
most seven to eight months after the stewards structure was
47. Fryer, R, H., Fairclough, A, J., and Manson, T, B. 
<1978>: 'Facilities for Female Shop Stewards: The Employment 
Protection Act and Collective Agreements', British Journal 
q£ industrial Relations, vol xvi no 2 P . ico-174, July.
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established. His reasons for taking this step where mixed:
It wasn't working, I never used to think about 
not being a caretaker, not doing my job. I mean 
my time in the trade union movement no one 
would give any bleenin time off, you did it the 
evening, in your own time, that's how I grew 
up. I wasn't use to Haringey their pretty good.
I had to come to terms with them. Anyway for 
various reasons, one I was doing an 18 hour 
day, and working weekends as well, and being 
the branch secretary, after five years it 
became a bit much, I thought sod this I'm 
going to kill myself here <48>.
By April 1984 Adeniz had also achieved full time release,
and linked with these developments was the setting up of a
union office. For the fragmented membership the
centralization of the branch - the combination of two
officials with full time status, equivalent to seventy hours
a week (excluding evening meetings) the telephone and car -
provided rapid access to the branch official. The formation
of a stable centre for the branch created a similar relation
between members and stewards that Cannon had observed in
NALGO, of members by-passing stewards and going straight to
the branch leaders. Adeniz recalled:
if there was a problem in the kitchen they 
ring us up. Even if there is a shop steward 
they by-pass them and contact us <49>.
48. PS1 side 'a'.
49. CA side 'b'.
349
The strong branch centre allowed for the formalisation of
joint regulation of the kitchens between the union and
senior management. The council's emerging corporate identity
had the effect of centralizing managerial power out of the
kitchens and a desire to standardize its functions, seen for
example in the shift in recruitment policy which was taken
out of the hands of individual kitchen supervisors and
centralised as a personnel function. Senior management were
now keen for a strong bargaining centre which would
facilitate the imposition of a more enlighten municipal
ethos among the kitchen supervisors. Adeniz commented that:
they have regular supervisor meeting and they 
always check to make sure I can attend. I think 
I'm a bit noisier than I should be at a 
management meeting. When management say 
something they tend to look at me to query 
it <50>.
Management's consultation with the union went as far as 'if
memos or ruling goes out they usually telephone us and check
first'. This went hand in hand with a more assertive
attitude in the kitchens. Adeniz concluded that:
the kitchens are beginning to act like the 
caretakers, they don't go to the toilet without 
checking first that's beginning to happen in 
the kitchens now <51>.
50. CA side 'b'.
51 CA side 'b'.
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In spite of the difference in practice between Spencer 
and the NALGO leadership a strong parallel exists between 
the two branches with both stewards systems faltering in 
1984. This points to a similar development where the limits 
to collectivity were placed on the branches by the evolution 
of the political resolution which had provided the 
parameters to the development of the domestic organisation. 
Also, as with NALGO the basic negotiating structure of the 
branch remained intact, again until the end of the 1980s. As 
Spencer pointed out:
Unfortunately, between you and me we have almost 
gone full circle. When I became secretary we all 
said right that's it, no more one man 
bands. Now its a one man, one woman band. We 
tend to do it all, we pick up the phone, and we 
go down to the workplace. We haven't got the 
sort of shop stewards network I think we are 
supposed to have. I tell you it works. There 
will be people in trade unions who will throw up 
their hands in horror and say you are denying 
your members their rights in their involvement 
in the union, and I'll say to those people, know 
your membership <52>.
As with the NALGO branch the above points to the limits of 
collectivity placed on them by the evolution of the 
political resolution. It was this resolution which provided 
the parameters to the development of the domestic 
organisations and also provides an explanatory framework for 
the debate between Williams and the branch leadership over
52. PS5 side 'b
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the Women's committee and her criticism of the stewards 
hierarchy. It is the failure to develop a role for the 
stewards and divisions among the left-wing leaders which I 
now examine in the following chapter.
Chapter eleven 352 Part three
The Demise of the Branche»
The Problematic of success
The extension of workplace organisation within NUPE and 
NALGO concluded the substantive alterations to these 
branches. This work has shown the development of their 
domestic organisation from functioning in the interest of 
specific groups of members, through the emergence of the 
branch reformers, to the evolution and implementation of 
policies to make the branches representative. Placed in the 
context of their militant aspirations the reformers' 
considerable achievements were only a qualified success.
They had wanted to do more. Broadly speaking the fate which 
had overtaken them was that their achievements had 
formalised two 'divisions' between members and the 
reformers <1>. Firstly, the institutionalization of the 
'trade union division', where the leaders took on the 
characteristics associated with a quasi-elite, and the 
domestic organisation exhibited the archetypal structure of
1. The notion of divisions or gaps between the members and 
stewards has usually been seen as a division between the 
short term views of the members and the more strategic view 
of the stewards. For example Beynon <1973> Working for Ford. 
Here I have separated out the divisions into trade union and 
political phenomena.
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an authority based organisation. Secondly, there was an 
expansion of the political gap between members and 
reformers. These divisions were to take on a greater 
momentum in the aftermath of the borough's campaign against 
rate capping in 1984-85, culminating in 1987 with 
redundancies. In this penultimate chapter these divisions 
will be explored in an account which concludes with the 
announcement of the first redundancies.
The crucial period in the branches' development was 
between 1979 and 1981, when two possible lines of 
advancement opened up. Firstly, there was the syndicalist 
model. The basis for this was the emergence of a new level 
of collectivity within the branches. This linked into a 
broader radicalisation within the Labour Party, where the 
consensual framework in which the Labour Group's political 
and bureaucratic role had functioned was disrupted, as the 
result of independent activity of workers (and signified the 
limited emergence of a class agenda.) The potential which 
the reformers looked to (like the strikes of 1979) was one 
where the existing labour movement institutions, notably the 
unions and the Labour Party, would evolve in a direction of 
large scale involvement of workers in these organisations. 
The dual agenda of the branch-based militants was an element 
of this wider development.
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This study has shown that events took a more mundane 
course, where labourism was able to reassert itself, 
culminating in the rate rise alliance, the second model. The 
failure of the syndicalist model arose paradoxically from 
the problems of success; in terms of the core concerns of 
the branches around job security and economic issues, the 
rate rise alliance represented a political resolution of 
these issues, so that the dual agenda woven together by the 
branch-based militants unravelled.
Prior to the political resolution the branch reformers 
had brought together the issue of the extension of the 
bargaining relation to encompass the entire membership, 
which I have characterised as forming the basis of 
institutional centrality, with the dual agenda. Underpinning 
this was the development of a limited collectivity. For the 
reformers these two sets of issues represented a single 
entity within their syndicalist framework. The proposition 
of the syndicalists of an intimate linkage between the 
extension of the bargaining relation and the dual agenda was 
shown by events to be incorrect. It is not, however, that 
the reformers were simply wrong. The substantive issue was 
whether the tenuous but nevertheless real links, seen in the 
late 1970s between reformers and members, would have become 
a stable set of relations based on such militant policies.
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This study has shown that they failed. The failure of this 
model provides a measure of class maturity, and with it the 
parameters of class formation. Firstly, it shows up the 
limits of a socialist consciousness among the workforce, as 
in the face of the rate rise alliance a class consciousness 
which understood the limitations of that alliance was 
lacking <2>. Secondly, it illuminates the failure of the 
branch based militants to develop an alliance with the 
members. Finally, the rate rise alliance removed any 
potential drive towards greater class cohesion within the 
branches. For example, it removed the necessity for the 
branches to take industrial action over job losses, which is 
not to say that such a policy would have been otherwise 
followed.
These limits to class formation provide the basis on which
the trade union and political divisions between members and
leaders were situated. This argument is not primarily
concerned with the question of the organisational form of
the domestic organisation but its content. With or without
the rate rise alliance the extension of workplace
organisation would have continued to follow the functional
2. Given the history of these workers and the limits of 
change to their working lives it would have been quite 
remarkable if they had been able to live up to the 
militants' expectations.
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form of local government structures, the bargaining relation 
expanding along the lines of the occupational group. The 
branch reformers would have still formed into a recognisable 
quasi-elite and a political division would have continued to 
exist between leaders and members. The content of these 
relations, however, would have been potentially very 
different as the tasks confronting the branches would have 
altered. The implication of this are considered in the 
conclusion.
Appropriating change
In the timescale of events it was the growth of 
collectivity within the branches and the radicalisation of 
the Labour Party which had emerged first. By 1979 an agenda 
from below - both from the Labour Party and the local 
government unions - had emerged. Part of its strength was 
that with a minimum amount of life being breathed into them, 
the bureaucratized structures of the labour movement - 
Group, Party and unions - were to varying degrees made 
accountable. This challenged the hierarchical relations 
within and between labour movement institutions, the 
exclusivity of the Labour Group and the role of the council 
as an administrative arm of government. It was this which 
helped to shape a number of issues which can be
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characterised as coining from above, primarily from the 
Conservative government, and the still to be implemented 
aspects of the corporate reforms of the 1970s. The political 
ascendency of labourism associated with the rate rise 
alliance could not return to the old labour movement 
relations nor return to the pre-1979 administrative 
relations which had characterized central local relations.
It could, however, appropriate change and in so doing 
reformulate itself. This meant addressing the agenda from 
below, the central element of which was the rise of 
independence within the branches.
The branches organised around three sets of issues: 
firstly, the extension of the bargaining relation to embrace 
the entire membership; secondly, the expansion of the 
branches' regulative role into new areas, and thirdly the 
development of a political role. It was the combination of 
these three sets of issues which signified a block on the 
reconstruction of bureaucratized political relations between 
the different institutions of the labour movement, and 
precluded their appropriation by the council's bureaucracy. 
The prerequisite for a new wave of bureaucratization was 
therefore the appropriation of these areas by the Labour 
Group. The 'modernisation' of the council had to be at once 
the expropriation of the unions.
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The rate rise alliance provided the basis for 
appropriation by facilitating the fragmentation of 
collectivity. The form in which that fragmentation occurred 
was expressed in the pattern of development generated within 
the branches which was centred on the removal of their 
defensive functions. This opened the way for the council 
either to alter or appropriate the branches' other roles, 
creating over a number of years a new set of relations 
between branches and council in its three aspects: the 
council in its role as employer and management, the 
council's own bureaucratic apparatus, and the council as a 
political entity run by the Labour Group. It was through the 
dynamic generated by these relations that the bureaucratic 
and political authority of the council was re-established. 
The material linkages between the internal changes in the 
branches and the re-establishment of the council's authority 
were mediated by relations between management and branches 
in the workplace.
Managerial strategy and union collectivity
I have argued above that the key issue within the 
branches was that of collectivity and its fragmentation. 
Rather than this what has tended to be revealed in previous 
chapters has been similarities with the 'incorporation
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thesis', for example the work of Hyman <1979> and 
Terry <1978>. Looking at events as the consequence of the 
fragmentation of collectivity the anomalies within that 
thesis now become more apparent.
There was neither a desire (on the part of the Labour 
Group) nor a mechanism to demarcate the council as a 
political entity from its role as an employer. The fusion of 
these two roles meant the Labour Group's initial political 
dependence on the unions translated itself into the 
council's employment policies. As the convergence between 
the Labour Group and the local branches developed, it became 
increasingly apparent that this alliance impelled the Labour 
Group to acquiesce to the branches. To date, I have 
discussed this in terms of the branches ceding the 'big' 
political questions to the council (chapter eight). This 
also involved, however, the council acceding to the demands 
of the branches on the more mundane issues of bargaining at 
authority level and circumscribing as far as possible the 
labour process as an area of conflict. In neither sphere was 
this absolute; the unions did not achieve everything they 
wanted and workers were still sacked, but during the early 
1980s they were increasingly able to have their way on these 
issues. Although very uneven, by the end of the rate-capping 
campaign in early 1985 this accession to the branches'
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mundane requirements had become a generalized phenomenon. 
Tony Brockman, who since 1980 has been the secretary of the 
NUT and was the "unofficial" senior negotiator for the 
joint union committees which proliferated in the period of 
rate-capping, commented on the relation between council and 
unions in the following terms:
You could ask for the moon and it was there.
It was even sometimes a question of management 
coming to you and asking if you would like a 
better deal than the one you have got. A most 
bizarre period in trade union negotiations <3>.
The narrative may appear to contradict this argument in that
the branches had a struggle to achieve institutional
centrality. This did not illustrate, however, a combative
relation between the council as employer and the branches,
but the council's lack of controls over its own management.
This point is exemplified by the way in which institutional
centrality was achieved; occupational group by occupational
group rather than branch by branch. If the latter had taken
place, it would have indicated the council's control over
management, but this was not the case in Haringey.
The second aspect of the relations between branches and 
the council was the attempt to sanitize the labour process 
as a site of struggle. The basis for this existed within the
3. Tony Brockman tape two side %b'. [hereafter TB]
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disciplinary code of practice which was extremely 
advantageous to the worker <4>. For example, an ACAS <1982> 
report on the DLO commented on the 'regrettable lack of 
discipline' <5> which had arisen through a loose 
interpretation of the disciplinary code. Probably the DLO 
represented the extreme among services. The question of 
discipline was until the late 1980s exacerbated by the 
growing hands-on approach of councillors in favour of the 
branches; for instance the departure of the School Meals 
organiser was due to her being 'squeezed' between the 
council and the union <6>. This represented pressure on 
management to take a conciliatory approach to the unions. 
Undermined by that alliance management and foremen 
increasingly turned to means other than direct disciplinary 
practices to assert control and achieve work. These can be 
characterised as the formal and informal.
The formal means consisted of managerial attempts to 
utilize stewards and branch officials to act as a 
disciplinary force over the members; an incorporationist
4. Haringey Council: Disciplinary Code of Practice 
(manuals), revised 1978.
5 . ACAS. <i982>: A  R e p o r t  o f  a  S v r v e Y  I n t o  E m p l o y e s  
Relations, ACAS, London, p. 94.
6. See chapter ten.
362
strategy <7>. For the majority of workers, whatever forms of
joint regulation were introduced, their stewards could not
act as management wanted - as a disciplinary power. The
basis of this understanding is derived from the nature of
the workers' spontaneous struggle around the labour
process,(discussed in chapter two) primarily the time bonus.
Such unofficial sanctions could not be formalised and
therefore regulated by the branches. This made the branches
a weak disciplinary mechanism, therefore management were
impelled towards informality. This involved by-passing the
branches and entering into informal negotiations with
individual workers and work groups and bargaining around
informal sanctions for output and discipline. While the
council's attitude towards bargaining increasingly took on
the character of patronage, the growth of informal
bargaining, as with the ''big'' political issues, led the
branches to cede their defensive role to the council. The
way in which the role of the branches was prescribed by
their resolution with the council provided the basis for the
draining away of collectivity. The main phenomenon generated
by the growth of formal and informal bargaining was an
7. For an elaboration of incorporation see Hyman, R. <1979> 
'The politics of workplace trade unionism'. Capital and 
Class. 8, summer, reprinted in R Hyman, R. <1989>: The 
Political Economy of Industrial Relations: Theory and 
Practice in a Cold Climate. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
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increasing disconnection between branches and members. It 
was the growth of this separation which has shown up as 
parallels with the 'incorporation thesis'. This however only 
functions at the descriptive level. With the growth of 
institutional centrality went the development of the 
archetypical authority based structure, generated by the 
primacy of the occupational group. Alongside this the branch 
leaders began to exhibit a set of concerns that diverged 
from the immediacy of the members' demands. The trade union 
division began to take shape around these divergent patterns 
of formal and informal bargaining.
With the growth of union centrality it is possible to 
point to characteristics adopted by stewards and branch 
officers which equated to Hyman's <1973> 'moderating 
pressures [that] operate upon the full-time officials' <8>. 
This can be seen in the emergence of a 'dual loyalty' <9>. 
For example, the Craft Stewards who monitored the actions of 
the surveyor and NALGO member Butler, reporting his actions 
to management; or the NUPE secretary stating that he had
8. Hyman, R. <1973>: 'Industrial Conflict and the political 
economy', in R Miliband and J Saville (ed.s): The Socialist 
Register. 1973. Merlin Press, London, p.114
9. This term was used extensively by Nicholson, N., Ursell, 
G. and Blyton, P. <1981>: The Dynamics of White Collar 
Unionism. Academic Press, London.
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'moderated his claims on the council because of financial 
restrictions' <10>. There is also evidence from among the 
NALGO radicals that their concern for the public acted as an 
external discipline on their actions <11>. This moderation 
can be seen as diverging from the actions of the members 
which occurred underneath it. During the mid-1980s a major 
renegotiation of order <Strauss et al. 197l> occurred in 
favour of the workforce. For instance, Haringey had the 
highest sickness rate of any London borough <12>. Viewing 
this divergent development as a process of the fragmentation 
of collectivity (rather then in terms of an inappropriate 
incorporation thesis) is exemplified by the issues 
surrounding absenteeism, an activity which transcended race, 
gender and ''collar". The reasons for its high level were 
that local negotiations had achieved full pay for sickness 
and that the disciplinary code of practice was liberally 
interpreted. The sickness level reflected the renegotiation 
of order, a concept which has been interpreted by 
commentators such as Beynon <1973> and Hyman <1989> as an
10 Peter Spencer tape four [hereafter PS] side 'a'.
11. Without exception all of my NALGO respondents commented 
on the need to show a commitment to the public.
12. Survey carried out by the Association of Metropolitan 
Authorities reported in the Evening Standard.
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expansion of the arena of workers' autonomy. As Hyman 
commented :
Through the process of negotiation of order 
the 'frontier of control', in each workplace 
is set <13>.
In such a framework the high level of absenteeism would 
represent the rational act of a considerable number of the 
borough's employees pressing home their advantage. This 
rationality pointed to the removal of the branch, and class, 
from workplace relations, and the willingness of management 
to negotiate individually with the workers.
If Cohen and Fosh <1988> are correct that trade 
unionism is rooted in 'the fundamental pressure undergone by 
workers in their everyday experience' <14>, the 
renegotiation of order in fact attacked the very foundation 
on which the branches had emerged in the late 1970s: that of 
branch collectivity <15>. This process does not, however.
13. Hyman, R. <1989> 'Trade Unions, Control and Resistance, 
in R Hyman, The Political Economy of Industrial Relations: 
Theory and Practice in a Cold Climate. Macmillan, 
Basingstoke, p.32.
14. Cohen, S. and P, Fosh. <1988>: 'You are the Union: Trade 
Union Workplace Democracy', Studies for Trade Unionists. 
Workers Educational Association, London.
15. The anecdotal evidence of trade unionists from both the 
docks and car factories points to this being a general 
phenomena, one which is of obvious importance for 
incorporationist theories. Unfortunately though this has 
only found scant attention in the literature concerning 
manufacturing industry.
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present itself as the H fragmentation of collectivity" 
rather as the type of issue which the dichotomy between 
formal and informal bargaining generated and the form in 
which the division between member and branch presented 
itself. Indeed this issue of absenteeism shows how the trade 
union division evolved; branch leaders acted as a 
quasi- elite <16>. As the guardians of trade union principle 
they could not condone the "abuse" of sickness, as it put 
the substantive negotiation of sick pay into question. At 
the same time they could not act against their members who 
"abused" the system. All they could do was attempt to act as 
a moderating influence. This type of trade union division 
proved intractable because although, as Hyman called for, 
strategies for the lessening of the gap were adopted, the 
problem did not rest with either structure or agency within 
the domestic organisation <17>. Rather it was the product of 
the limitations to the development of collectivity within 
the branches. The inability of the leaders to develop a 
response opened the way for the appropriation of the 
branches' regulative and political role.
16. The use of this term comes from, Batstone, E. Boraston,
I. and Frenkel, S. <1977>: Shop Stewards in Action; The 
Organisation of Workplace Conflict and Accommodation. 
Blackwell, Oxford.
17. Hyman, R. <1979> 'The politics of workplace trade 
unionism', op.cit. p. 164
366
present itself as the " fragmentation of collectivity" 
rather as the type of issue which the dichotomy between 
formal and informal bargaining generated and the form in 
which the division between member and branch presented 
itself. Indeed this issue of absenteeism shows how the trade 
union division evolved; branch leaders acted as a 
quasi- elite <16>. As the guardians of trade union principle 
they could not condone the "abuse" of sickness, as it put 
the substantive negotiation of sick pay into question. At 
the same time they could not act against their members who 
"abused" the system. All they could do was attempt to act as 
a moderating influence. This type of trade union division 
proved intractable because although, as Hyman called for, 
strategies for the lessening of the gap were adopted, the 
problem did not rest with either structure or agency within 
the domestic organisation <17>. Rather it was the product of 
the limitations to the development of collectivity within 
the branches. The inability of the leaders to develop a 
response opened the way for the appropriation of the 
branches' regulative and political role.
16. The use of this term comes from, Batstone, E. Boraston, 
I. and Frenkel, S. <1977>: Shop Stewards in Action; The 
Organisation of Workplace Conflict and Accommodation. 
Blackwell, Oxford.
17. Hyman, R. <1979> 'The politics of workplace trade 
unionism', op.oit. p. 164
367
Appropriation of regulation by the bureaucracy
Alongside the challenge to the institutions of the labour 
movement posed by the militancy at the turn of the decade, 
this work has shown how the functions of the council 
bureaucracy - policy formation, execution of council policy, 
and mediation between councillors, workforce and management 
- were challenged and in some instances supplanted by the 
branches. The origins of the retrenchment of the bureaucracy 
has been discussed in chapter five around the interaction 
between the failure to implement the corporatist reforms of 
the 1970s and the pre-existing localised bargaining 
relation. On the one hand the undermining from below of this 
bargaining relation and on the other the start of the 
shifting of power from the localities to the centre under 
the Conservative government gave the bureaucracy its 
defensive posture during the early 1980s. The expansion of 
the regulatory role of the union branches was considerable, 
from concerns around equal opportunities to those 
surrounding the labour process. Although the impetus for the 
branches to take up these issues had not come exclusively 
from the shop floor, they had emerged as part of the fabric 
of a living movement.
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The journey from shop floor demand through to
appropriation by the council bureaucracy is illustrated by
the development of NUPE's School Meals Committee. As chapter
8 showed it arose out of the limitations of branch-based
militancy as part of a defence against government
legislation which breached the defensive wall the council
was erecting around the workforce. As shown in chapter 10
this led in the School Meals Service to a reorganisation of
the labour process, designed to bureaucratically circumvent
government policy. This was overseen by the School Meals
Working Committee which in 1981 had a second tier added to
it creating a formal link with the council, the School Meals
Working Party, the purpose of which was to process the
committee's ideas within the council machinery. The NUPE
Branch Secretary recalled that:
we formed an informal School Meals Working 
Party with councillors and officers where we 
took all the initiatives which came from our 
committee. We took them forward and said these 
are the things we would like to see happen <18>.
The key was its informality; at that time neither was the
council politically "tuned into" nor the bureaucracy
familiar with the issues being raised. During 1983 the
informal School Meals Working Party began to be transformed
18 PS2 side 'b'.
369
into a more formal body. The NUPE Branch chair pointed out 
that:
It had already formulated the Cash Cafeteria 
and practical things and the women were coming 
off it; it began to take up issues about healthy 
eating <19>.
The central issue of concern here was the altering substance 
of the committee; by comparison its formalisation was 
unimportant, certainly as far as the workers were concerned. 
For the workers once its real purpose had been served, the 
protection of jobs, the school meals staff left. It had 
fulfilled its usefulness. Yet while the workers' goal had 
been achieved the council had exacted a hidden price; the 
workers' knowledge of the labour process was now 
appropriated by the council's bureaucracy <20>. The basis 
was laid for the committee to take on an autonomy from the 
branch.
A similar process has been shown in chapt 9 in relation 
to the impact of the council bureaucracy's appropriation of 
NALGOs Women's Committee's mediating role over equal 
opportunities. Inexorably such issues became formalized 
under the control of the council's bureaucracy, over the
19. CA side 'a'.
20. Like so many workers, they did not perceive their 
knowledge of the labour process in such a light. It was just 
work.
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branches and members. This process of appropriation had 
started in 1981 with the establishment of the Leader's 
Investigation Panel, and continued with such issues as the 
council's codes of conduct concerning sexual harassment in 
1982-83; the formalisation, in 1983 of the School Meals 
Working Party? and contract compliance. This ascendancy was 
an inevitable consequences of the defeat of branch-based 
militancy. That defeat had seen the workers involvement in 
the branch activity recede leaving a vacuum surrounding how 
and who was going to organise and control the labour 
process. It was the council's bureaucracy which filled this 
vacuum. One effect of this expansion of regulatory functions 
by the council was to provide social mobility, as the 
bureaucracy assimilated trade union personnel; thus a dlo 
convener became the borough's first contract compliance 
officer, and a school meals steward accepted a post on the 
London Health Commission's School Meals Project <21>. By 
1984, with the advent of the rate capping campaign the 
appropriation of these regulative issues was well on the way 
to completion, a process which helped define the branches 
political role.
21. The DLO convener was Dennis McCracken who is now a 
teacher; the school meals steward was Marie Williams who is 
now a social worker.
371
The branches' role was increasingly perceived by the 
members as a political one. In the period up to and 
including the rate capping campaign council concerns in 
relation to the workforce were necessarily presented in a 
political rather than a regulative or administrative 
framework; a framework that was edging towards a radical 
municipalism and one with which the branch leaders were 
increasingly associated. Given this political framework the 
council-union relations still remained central. This is 
exemplified in the following examples of the rate capping 
campaign.
The branches' support for the council's campaign
against rate capping conferred a legitimacy on the council
and showed up the crucial mediating role for the
branches <22>. Although the council had a considerable
organisation working around the campaign, it was forced to
rely on the stewards' infrastructure as its major support.
This is illustrated by the numbers involved in the campaign.
At its height the council had just under thirty senior
officers working within the services on a part-time basis
which represented a major commitment of resources, while
22. All of the council documentation for this campaign shows 
that the Labour Group's relation to the workforce was 
carried out either through or in conjunction with the union 
branches.
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NALGO alone had considerably more stewards. The branch 
structures acted as a 'transmission belt' from the council 
into the workforce for the diffusion of a local government 
political culture. Its ethos was a common set of 
assumptions, the central element of which was the ordering 
of relations between politics and trade unionism. It will be 
recalled that during the late 1970s political issues entered 
the branches through the defence of jobs <23>. With the 
ending of the dual agenda, the relation between trade union 
and political questions was inverted: instead of politics 
being conceptualised through the trade union struggle, trade 
union questions were conceptualised through politics. This 
was reflected in the rate capping campaign, as it called on 
workers to defend the council in not setting a rate. For the 
majority of council workers, particularly blue collar 
workers, who were not already involved in 'big' political 
questions, this ordering of issues excluded them. On the 
other hand, the radicals within NALGO and the NUT who saw 
the political importance of supporting the council 
represented a ready-made constituency for the campaign. For 
instance, the NUT Branch Secretary, who was the chief 
steward on the major demonstration of the campaign, observed
23. In particular see chapter three.
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that its composition was:
mainly middle class, there were lots of 
teachers. I am sure that manual workers were 
not represented <24>.
The branches' political role as agent for the council
was formalised through the expansion of time-off for
stewards. This is illustrated by the minutes of a meeting
between the branches and the Chair of Personnel <25>. The
minutes show that the union-side complained to Chair about
attempts by some managers to restrict time-off <26>. While
supporting the unions he reported that
he had received that morning applications for 
time-off totalling 110 weeks... further 
applications were being received every day <27>.
The chair nonetheless conceded the time-off due to 
'abnormal circumstances'. Rather than overcome the division 
which had arisen between political and trade union issues, 
the union policy and the expansion of time-off facilities by 
the council helped institutionalize the political gap 
between the members and stewards.
24. TB2 side 'b.'
25. Minute of a meeting between the Chair of Personnel and a 
delegation from Haringey Campaign against Rate Capping. 
September, 1984.
26. ibid.
27. ibid.
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From the formation of the rate-rise alliance in 1981 
until the ending of the rate capping campaign in 1985 the 
processes which have been discussed above grew apace. The 
completion of institutional centrality seen in the light of 
these three sets of issues - the appropriation from the 
branches of defensive issues, regulatory practices and 
political initiative by the council - illuminates both the 
type of union and political divisions between leaders and 
members, and why the branch leaders were unable to form 
anything more than a tenuous link with the members. It was 
this practice which led to a sense of demoralisation among 
the branch leaders and activists.
Prior to the campaign against rate capping in 1984-85 
the issues discussed above had not yet formed a clear 
pattern; they represented a number of disconnected threads, 
due to the continued central role played by the branches. 
While the regulative and political roles undertaken by the 
branches began to parallel those carried out by the 
political radicals within the GLC, the branches were 
entities independent from the council. For the process of 
appropriation to be completed the Labour Group had to 
formulate a political consensus around its ascendancy, to 
find an entity other than the unions to legitimate its 
actions, and to activate its own bureaucracy to carry out
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its agenda. The final phase in the development occurred 
through the rate capping campaign and was consolidated in 
its immediate aftermath when the workers definitively ended 
their "flirtation" with radical politics.
The formation of a political consensus
The documention surrounding the rate-capping campaign 
makes it quite obvious that from the outset the Labour Group 
was in the ascendancy. It was George Meehan (council leader 
until March 1985 when he resigned because of the threat of 
illegality) who set up the campaign's political structures. 
These consisted of a campaign officer (Adrian Roxan) and a 
small campaign working group who controlled its central 
political direction and its £50,000 budget. Under the 
working group were campaign liaison officers for each 
council service, many of whom were chief officers.
By September 1984, a month after the campaign began, 
the Labour Group had won support from the local Labour Party 
and branches for their policy of not setting a rate and had 
created their campaign structure. The Labour group from this 
consensual basis began to centralise political control into 
their own hands. The Labour Group had established a 
political leadership, seen in the support for their no-rate 
policy, and found a cohesion within its own ranks not seen
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for a decade. Indicative of this latter point was Roxan's
recollection of how Harrison, the Chair of Education, (who
was identified as part of the moderate alliance in 1981)
carried out workplace meetings:
... until she dropped, literally dropped down 
with weariness. It was quite significant that 
someone like Niki Harrison, who for many years 
had been seen as an autocratic chair, went out 
and met all the workers <28>.
This activity at the start of the campaign was symptomatic 
of a political shift within the Group, from the dominant 
moderate alliance of the early 1980s to one that can be 
characterized as a centre grouping. The campaign 
consolidated that shift, so that although Haringey achieved 
notoriety as a radical borough under the leadership of the 
left-winger, Bernie Grant, it was a coalition led and 
dominated by the centre which initiated that radicalism.
What had dissolved the moderate alliance was the 
corrosive effect of rate rises. At the beginning of 1982, 
the moderates had put out a statement calling for unity and 
questioning excessive rate rises <29>. They wanted a 
manifesto based around no cuts, no job losses and were of 
the belief that rate rises had to be curbed otherwise 'we
28. Adrian Roxan side 'b'.[hereafter AR]
29. Resolution to Haringey Labour Group January 1982.
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will be deserted by our traditional supporters' <30>. The 
moderates had recognized the growing strength of the rate 
rise lobby, whose support for higher rates went beyond the 
left problematic of 'buying time' to confront the government 
to an expansion of the boundaries of municipalism. By 1984 
raising rates had become a limited but proven financial 
means of achieving political autonomy from government. This 
had fatally undermined the moderates, as a financial 
underpinning had been found for the extension of the 
council's functions. Either the individual members of the 
alliance changed their views, or others from among the 
growing consensus for rate-rises would take their place and 
administer this expanding surplus.
On the basis of this financial autonomy it is now 
possible to see how the radical municipal model of the GLC 
fused with the centre grouping on Haringey Labour Group and 
the wider labour movement, a process which became apparent 
in 1984 with the onset of the rate capping campaign. The 
Labour Group assimilated from the GLC two themes: how to 
campaign and more importantly how to subordinate the 
unresolved political issues concerning opposition to
30. ibid. I take this to be code for the white working 
class.
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government policy to the development of local social 
policies. On the wider terrain of the labour movement this 
policy began to gain support in a slightly different manner 
to that seen in the GLC. In Haringey convergence between the 
political radicals and the activists occurred within the 
framework of the local Labour Party, with the activists 
shifting their political concerns and conceptions away from 
the class based views of the early 1980s to embracing the 
views of the political radicals, filtered through the 
experience of the GLC <31>. The consensus around rate rises 
within the Labour Party and Group can thus be seen to have 
come from both the left and right. Implicit within this 
emerging municipalism was the need for control of the 
council by the Labour Group so that it could act to carry 
out policy <32>.
The campaign and its immediate aftermath
Further evidence that the council began the transition 
to radicalism under Meehan's leadership is found in the
31. This is evidenced by the Party's documention of this 
period particularly the 1986 Manifesto for the local 
elections.
32. The structures which centralised Group control were 
formalised and put into practice by the left when they took 
over the council in 1985 and are explicitly stated in the 
1986 Manifest«?.
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council's campaigning structures which were laid during his
tenure <33>. Two months prior to the end of the campaign a
new head of the Press and Publicity Department was appointed
to build up the department. According to Roxan:
regardless of the outcome of the rate capping 
campaign... because the council needed to sell 
itself... to the public... getting involved in 
popular campaigns and festivals, the way the GLC 
had <34>.
After Meehan resigned, and the ending of the campaign, the 
move to a high profile campaigning council was rapidly 
consolidated under the new left leadership with the support 
of the centre. The structure of council-union relations 
underwent a major expansion, in which an elaborate and 
labyrinthine range of committees was created linking 
together the Labour Group and branches. The Press and 
Publicity Office became the Press and Publicity Unit, its 
budget increased by 315% and its staff from four to sixteen. 
A new campaign committee was formed under the title of the 
Publicity Coordinating Committee (PCC) with equal 
representation and voting power for the trade unions, the 
voluntary sector and the Labour Group members. Linked to 
this committee was the provision of out-reach workers for
33. This point is derived from Roxan's comments and the 
dates when both political and campaigning initiatives began.
34. AR side 'a'.
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the community and trade unions. Although an advisory body, 
the PCC reported directly to the key Policy and Resources 
Committee of the council. Prior to the rate capping campaign 
the council had set up Women's and Race Equality units; in 
its aftermath the number of units blossomed. In the year 
1985-1986 there were set up an Under 7s, Lesbian and Gay, 
Disabilities, Irish, Police, Health and Environment units.
By the summer of 1985 Haringey already had all the 
attributes of a radical municipal borough, which had also 
centralised the council's bureaucracy and put into place 
through the units a cadre of political radicals directly 
accountable to leading members of the Labour Group.
Linked closely to the development of the radical 
municipal structures was a notable shift in the basis on 
which the Labour Group and Parties legitimated their 
actions. These were no longer rooted solely or even mainly 
in the unions but, as the following will show, in the 
community. In the documents of this period there is 
continual reference to "the community", but there is no 
clarity as to what the term denotes <35>. Haringey is a 
thoroughly cosmopolitan borough: it is multi-ethnic with 23
35. For example, see Haringey's Labour Party 1986 Manifesto. 
There sections are written by black, gay, and women party 
members but these are not done in the name of the Labour 
Party but, for example the gay community of Haringey.
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mother tongues spoken in its schools; it is multi-religious; 
it contains men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals... 
The problem with all such social definitions of the concept 
of "community'' concerns their fit with a political discourse 
of "community"; the former presupposes real commonality 
among those who belong to a certain category; the latter has 
a necessarily prescriptive dimension, one of the functions 
of which became that of validating the actions of the 
council. Roxan provided a clue to the political meaning of 
community, when he noted the more assertive attitude towards 
the council which was expressed in the name of community 
during the rate capping campaign:
The community was radicalising; the GLC had a 
very strong part in that, it radicalised people's 
attitudes to what local government was about <36>.
For him the community that was radicalising was in fact the
voluntary sector, the extensive infrastructure of the
borough's voluntary organisations staffed largely by the
political radicals and funded through council and government
grants. Whatever else the community might be, it provided
the conceptual framework in which the voluntary sector was
drawn into local political activity, a process which had
36. AR side 'a
382
been given a major impetus by the GLC and the rate capping 
campaign.
In the immediate aftermath of the rate capping campaign
the process by which the Labour Group was reasserting its
authority rapidly became apparent through the use of the
council's bureaucracy and the shift in emphasis away from
the centrality of the unions to the community. That is, the
council was now able to replace the branches' mediating role
with its own newly expanded bureaucracy. This did not mean
however that the branches were suddenly excluded, rather the
council's continued financial autonomy provided the basis
for what the NUT secretary characterised as the 'most
bizarre' negotiating period. The documentation from the
Joint Union Committee shows that the demands of the
branches, and in particular the manual unions, for
harmonization and equal pay were still met by the council.
For example, when the Cash Cafeteria supervisors made a
claim for equal pay for equal work, the NUPE Branch
secretary found, to his surprise, that the council officers
were instructed 'to support the claim' <37>. Along the same
lines the DLO workforce became one of the highest paid in
the country. These were important developments which should
37. PS5 side 'b'. The claim was settled in 1979; the 
supervisors received a £75 a week increase.
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not be underestimated, but they were the exception to the 
overwhelming sense given by the documentation of lack of 
direction within the branches.
The council was now able to act independently of the 
branches through its own structures; the campaign committees 
and the special units, and the centralisation of the council 
bureaucracy and its support for the community <38>. The 
initiative was now clearly with the council. The council was 
now secure enough to sever its links of dependency on the 
unions. A shift began in the basis for justification of the 
council's actions from that of "defending jobs" to being 
couched in terms of service to the community. A consequence 
of this was that the council's high profile political agenda 
became increasingly estranged form the workforce. The 
documentation shows that the branches played a subordinate 
role, that of acting as conduit for Group and community 
concerns into the workforce. The minutes of the high-powered 
Publicity Coordinating Committee (PCC) highlight this point; 
the issues it discussed were almost exclusively agenda items 
from the Specialist Units or Labour Group <39>. Thus the 
Labour Group called on the unions to help them in their
38. For example, it is no longer possible to get a job in 
the borough by turning up at the workplace; recruitment was 
centralised through the Services Personnel Committees.
39. PPC minutes between March 1985 and January 1987.
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campaign to register voters <40>, the Police Monitoring Unit 
produced a major document for this committee on the police 
and the community, similarly the Press and Publicity Unit 
launched a campaign around the new social security laws 
<41>. The branches had no role except to convey these 
campaigns to the workforce; in practice there is no evidence 
to show that the branches did so. My attempt to follow these 
issues through the branch documents proved fruitless.
In a similar vein the altering political framework is 
exemplified by the developments surrounding the School Meals 
Working Party. As I have shown above, once jobs had been 
protected through the shift to Cash Cafeteria the School 
Meals Working Party lost its relevance for both the members 
and branch leaders. This indifference to the Working Party 
and its control by the council bureaucracy allowed it to 
evolve an autonomy from its original function of defending 
jobs. This meant the committee structures still with nominal 
branch involvement were opened up to other forces such as 
the London Health Group and local community groups, who 
attempted to impress their radical agenda onto the workers. 
By default these actions carried the stamp of branches
40 PPC minute June 1985.
41. Briefing document for the Press and Publicity Committee, 
Action on Social Security.
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approval which provided a legitimation for these forces 
outside the union and provided the appearance of council, 
community and union working in harmony rather than the 
branch leaderships' indifference <42>. Seen from the 
perspective of the workers the altered labour process had 
successfully protected jobs but it had also represented 
harder but more interesting work for no extra pay. For the 
municipal left by 1985 it had become an element in the 
experiment of municipal socialism.
The shift in the balance of formal power away from the 
branches to the Group largely retained an unstated tension. 
Occasionally at joint council union meetings the unions were 
berated by councillors (usually Cl Grant) for "blocking the 
council's progressive polices". For example it was, 
according to Spencer, one of the claims made by Grant 
against the Education branch in the "Broadwater Farm 
Caretakers dispute" <43>. This was the major instance where 
this shift to the community turned into a major conflict. 
According to Spencer the caretakers 'entered in dispute with
42. When asked both Spencer and Adeniz stated their 
indifference.
43. The dispute arose from the different interpretations 
between the caretakers and the council over the timing of 
the ending of a disco held by the Broadwater Farm Youth 
Association.
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the council over the breaking of a procedural 
agreement' <44>. At a meeting with the leaders of the Labour 
Group Spencer recalled that Grant's rejoinder was that apart 
from stopping the council's progressive polices, the 
caretaker 'was racist' <45>. This dispute, probably the most 
important since the early 1980s, brought to the surface the 
tension between the branches, the council and the 
''community'' and although the branch achieved what the 
secretary thought was a reasonable settlement, the shock was 
considerable as it showed the weakness of the unions outside 
of a political alliance <46>.
A number of commentators have made the valid point that 
an assessment of radical municipalism is difficult because 
the experiment was curtailed by the government <47>. The 
above has shown however, that the immediate post-campaign 
period concluded the period of the council's appropriation 
of branch functions and consolidated the dominance of the
44. PS/CA 2 side 'a'
45. PS/CA 2 side 'a'
46. Both Spencer and Adeniz went into great detail about 
this industrial action and their anger at the council. Part 
of this was a feeling of impotence as others, in this 
instance the Broadwater Farm youth organisation had the 
"ear" of the council.
47. See Briefing March 1988 for a favourable assessment of 
Haringey's 'experiment', Roxan on the other hand called it 
'gesture politics'.
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Labour Group. What had made this development possible was 
the way in which the rate-capping campaign ended.
The end of appropriation and the rate capping campaign
If the way in which the rate capping campaign had been 
constructed around support for the council had not 
facilitated the branch membership's involvement, the way it 
ended turned passivity into indifference. After eight months 
of the workforce being told that rate-capping was 
'Armageddon for council services', the council found the 
£20m shortfall between their proposed spending level and the 
Government's assessment <48>. The basis for this creative 
accounting (which the council called 'financial defiance') 
was the utilization of various devices to divert capital 
resources to revenue and then reconstituting the capital 
account, the most important of those methods of 
reconstitution being deferred purchase agreements <49>. The 
impact of the council's ability to close the £20m gap is 
revealed in this typical report by one of the council's
48. Paper presented to the Labour Group by G Meehen (leader) 
and A Love (chair of finance): A Balanced Budget, March 
1985.
49 'The 1986 rate', Leaders Briefing Paper no. 7.
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liaison officers:
Staff feel they have been used and let down.
They find it difficult to believe the last 
minute budgetary manoeuvres could not have taken 
place much earlier and some cast doubt on the 
truth of statements of the Council's financial 
position at the beginning of the campaign. A 
general air of disillusionment obtains and it 
is quite clear that it will be impossible to 
motivate staff again next time <50>.
This anger at being ''duped'' rapidly turned to indifference
- a judgment by the workforce who ruled a line under the
need or desire to lend support to the council. This view was
amply confirmed when the council found that financial
defiance could continue (Haringey borrowed £60m from
Guinness Mahon in a deferred purchase agreement) <51>. By
1986 the gap between council revenues from rates and grants 
and its expenditure was £46m <52>. The council's radicalism 
was based around the redistribution of an expanding surplus 
underwritten by city loans. The council's finding of the 
money had a qualitative effect on branches' relations to 
their members, particularly so with the white collar unions, 
who explained their inability to confront redundancies in
1987 by reference to the demoralization caused by the ending
50. Extract from, Report of Rate Capping Liaison Officer for 
Town Hall staff to Council leader, April 1985.
51. 'The 1986 rate', Leaders Briefing Paper no. 7.
52. ibid.
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of the rate capping campaign <53>. In reality this was the 
conclusion of a process that had begun in the early 1980s as 
a consequence of the defeat of branch based militancy.
Up until the end of the rate capping campaign, the evolving 
divisions between leaders and members, which was the 
manifestation of the ebbing away of collectivity, was the 
dominant trend, but one that it was possible to reverse. For 
that to occur however would have demanded that the workforce 
take centre stage, which could only have been achieved 
through strike action <54>. Instead the campaign had 
represented a watershed, definitely breaking up the 
collectivity achieved in the early 1980s. This decline in 
the branch's collectivity being matched step by step by the 
council's appropriation of the branches' or workers' role.
53. Without exception all of my relevant trade union 
respondents cited the rate capping campaign as the reason.
54. The scepticism within the literature about the 
willingness of the councils to break the law over rate 
capping, for example Stoker <1988>, is well founded. However 
from the perspective of 1984, strike action seemed quite 
possible. Firstly at the beginning of that year there had 
been mass demonstrations in Liverpool over their budget. 
Secondly the unions' national research departments were 
producing publications which made a direct equation between 
rate capping and job losses on a large scale. For example 
see NALGO <1984> Fact Pack on Rate Capping. It appeared both 
that the mood of the workers had altered and that the issue 
of cuts and job losses had finely come together.
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In doing so the Labour Group reconstituted itself as the 
dominant body within the local labour movement <55>.
The conditions under which the campaign ended pushed 
the fragmentation of the branches' base to an extremity; the 
subordination of the branches to the council was its 
reflection. On the one hand, the campaigning structures of 
the council pushed the branches into a political role; on 
the other, council support for the branches further 
undermined the branches' relations to the members. The 
members could see the political role played by the branch 
officials and shop stewards, but disorientation arose over 
who was the guarantor of the members' rights: the branches 
or the council. This is typified by an incident concerning 
NALGO members in which sometime after midnight at a 
Christmas party male staff were abusive to female workers; a 
meeting of the section called on the council - and not the 
branch - to invoke their disciplinary code of practice <56>. 
There was a pattern of awareness among the branch leaders, 
shown in the joint union documentation, of their
55. The workers, by removing themselves from activity, had 
handed over the defence of their interests to the council, a 
process which empowered councillors and which was part of 
the broader ascendency of the Kinnock leadership within the 
Labour Party. To pursue this point see Lankly, S., Goss, S.
and woimar, c. <i989>: Cgansllg in Conflict_The rise and
fall of the Municipal Left. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
56. These events were related to me by Wilf Sullivan.
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malaise <57>. They saw a growing divergence between the 
branches and the council as well as an ambiguity about their 
own role. The ending of the rate capping campaign led to 
strong criticism from nearly all quarters that the unions 
'had followed the council rather than having an independent 
presence' <58>.
The trade union leaders were however powerless to offer 
an alternative. The trade union and political divisions 
between leaders and members were now firmly established 
which can be viewed as a irresolvable problema of 
powerlessness. By late 1987 their lack of power became all 
to apparent when the Labour Group under financial pressure 
abandoned the radical 1986 manifesto and united with the 
Labour Party around a document based on retrenchment <59>. 
With its publication, 'this most bizarre negotiating period' 
ended in redundancies; the problematic of the political and 
trade union division between worker and branch were resolved 
by other forces. The branches' inability in Haringey to 
resist showed that they were no different from their 
counterparts in the rest of the country.
57. It is the lack of initiative in the documention which 
illustrates this point. Also among my respondents the 
attitude summed up by Brockman's statement about management 
'asking if you would like a better deal'.
58. Haringey Joint Committee against Rate Capping minute 
March 1985.59. Haringey Labour Party document, A Strategy for 1988-90.
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Dndarstanding Change
In this concluding chapter I take up the central theme
of this study: the relationship between trade unionism and
politics. I shall attempt to answer what I consider to be
the major question arising from this work: change and
continuity within the union branches. The interesting issue
for me is why it was that the reformers lost their momentum,
after the initial ease with which change came about, when
the old structures and shibboleths seemed to melt in the
face of reform. The branch reformers substantially altered
the relations between branches and their members - which I
have called the 'domestic organisation' of the branches -
through shifting the bargaining relation from sectional to
institutional centrality <1>. Yet continuity has been
summarized by the NUPE branch secretary's comment 'we have
gone full circle'. This observation reflected the reformers'
increasing subordination to the existing forms of local
government workplace trade unionism: the primacy of
occupational groups and the subsequent institutional
divisions between workplace and branch. If change occurred
1. Within this use of Batstone, E. Boraston, I. and Frenkel,
S. <1977> concept of 'institutional centrality', I have 
insisted that the form in which the branch organises is a 
reflection of how the economic power of the branch is used. 
This has been shown in how and by whom the bargaining 
relation is conducted.
393
mainly through altering the bargaining relation, its limits 
were set by the reformers' inability to overcome the 
problems presented by the local government production 
process and by their failure to come to terms with political 
relations with the wider labour movement.
This work has attempted to show that an understanding 
of workplace organisation is found neither in the 
traditional view of workplace structures and bargaining 
relations <Flanders 1977, Kessler 1985, Batstone 1977> nor 
solely through the labour process <Thompson 1990>. Rather 
this work has concentrated on the interaction of these 
different levels, as well as relating them to the political, 
thus forming a multi-dimensional picture of the authority- 
based structures. A further aspect of this work addresses 
the relation between the theory and practice of the branch 
reformers. They were not passive victims of impersonal 
forces but captives of their own theoretical 
misunderstanding.
To understand how this complex relationship functions,
I shall review what, for want of a better term, I have 
called 'the radical paradigm' of the labour movement. This 
is important for two reasons. The first is that it offers an 
overall framework for explaining the dynamics of trade 
unionism and in this case the failure of the reform drive.
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The second is that the radical paradigm provided the 
framework within which the branch reformers themselves 
functioned and served to shape their response to events. I 
shall argue with the tendency in this paradigm towards an 
idealisation of a model of industrial militancy based on the 
manufacturing shop stewards of the 1960s and an explanation 
of deviations from this model through the concept of 
'incorporation'. Theories of trade unionism within this 
tradition have evolved in terms of sophistication and 
breadth, but I shall argue that they have not fundamentally 
broken from the limitations of its syndicalist foundations. 
My critique of the radical paradigm is carried out in the 
same spirit that David Coates prefaced his 1980 work on 
'Labour in Power'; addressing the Labour left he wrote that 
his criticism arose ' not because I reject their aspirations 
but because I share them' <2>.
The syndicalism of the Radical Paradigm
The radical paradigm, which idealises the manufacturing 
model of shop steward organisation, comprises a considerable 
body of theory. It has produced a sustained critique of 
mainstream industrial relations <Hyman 1972, 1985>, an 
incorporationist theory of the evolution of trade unions in
2. Coates, D (1980) Labour in Power? p. viii, Longman, 
London.
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the 1970s and 1980s cTerry 1977, Hyman 1973, 1979>, a 
conception of participatory trade union democracy 
<Fairbrother and Waddington 1989,Fairbrother 1989, 1990> and 
a prescriptive view of union good practice <Cohen and Fosh 
1989>. <3>.
The syndicalist premises of this paradigm are
exemplified in a number of ways. For example, Hyman <1984>
constructs an ideal type of trade unionism based on the
manufacturing steward, suitably updated to incorporate race
and gender. He argues for the unions to take up the question
of the home-work division, pointing out that the dominance
of the capitalist is not solely found in the labour process.
Addressing the unions, he states that:
The manifold but interconnected sources of 
hegemony and subordination will yield only to a no 
less integrated challenge <4>.
In this extreme case Hyman's recommendation verges on being
a recipe for a trade union to assume the functions of a
political party. This is a hallmark of syndicalism. Whatever
3. I am unsure whether the authors cited above would be 
pleased to be placed in the same paradigm. It is certainly 
the case that during the 1980s the work of Hyman, its 
academic founder, began to break from its syndicalist roots, 
while on the other hand the work of Fairbrother has tended 
to chart a path back to a more fundamentalist syndicalist 
view of the unions, seen in his conception of trade union 
renewal.
4. Hyman, R. <1989>: 'The sickness of British Trade 
Unionism', p.185 in The Political Economy of Industrial 
Relations Theory and Practice in a Cold Climate. Macmillan.
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other difference on the trade union question existed between 
Marxists, the one area of major agreement was that the 
unions should not substitute for political parties <5>.
The most penetrating critique of syndicalism remains that of 
the early Communist Party and Communist International 
<Murphy 1922, 1924, 1972, Rosmer 1971, Lenin 1963> and their 
summation by Pearce and Woodhouse <1975>. There were three 
areas in which they challenged syndicalism: its equation of 
workplace organisation with socialism (see also Tasca's 
critique of Gramsci <1978>), its opposition to party 
politics and its abstention from the battle to control the 
unions. It is this final point where the syndicalist premise 
of the radical paradigm is most clearly to be found: in its 
concept of 'autonomous workplace organisation' and its 
relationship with the 'larger union' beyond the workplace. 
Hyman <1979> states:
The proximity of shop stewards organisation to the 
shop floor represented a key defence against the 
incorporation of the national organisation; for if 
the official leadership were to compromise too far 
(by collaborating, for example, in government wage 
controls) they would be faced by a rank-and- file 
revolt spearheaded by the stewards' movement <6>.
5. For example, see Marx's debate with the Lassallean-based 
trade unions of Schweitzer in Hal Draper: Karl Marx's Theory 
of Revolution. Vol. 2. ch. 4, Lenin's What iff to bfl DOHA, 
Trotsky's 'The Errors in Principle of syndicalism', in Trade 
Unions in the Imperialist Epoch, New Park, 1968.6. Hyman <1979>:'The politics of workplace trade unionism', op.oit. This article marked Hyman's shift from the views
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Hyman's conception of the role of shop stewards'
organisation bears a close similarity to Woodhouse's
characterization of the classic period of syndicalism before
the First World War. Commenting on the 'Miners Next
Step' <1912>, Woodhouse argued as follows:
Essentially, the aim of such a movement was to 
encourage the rank and file to assert control over 
the apparatus of the union and direct it to 
their own ends. The official leaders would become 
subordinate to an unofficial executive of 
rank and file members from whom the policies of 
the union would flow in accord with the wishes 
of the memberships. In practice this form of 
syndicalism was in the last analysis the purest 
'rank and filism'; it confined its attention to 
agitation among the rank and file on a ginger 
group basis, on immediate issues, with the 
aim of pressurizing the existing union leaders 
into the adoption of specific polices <7>.
It was this role of ginger group that Hyman ascribed to the
autonomous workplace organisation in relation to the larger
union. In its current form this rank and filism has provided
a theoretical underpinning for not confronting the trade
union bureaucracy: either the rank and file are strong
expressed in the above quotation which he saw as an 
oversimplification. My argument is that in spite of a range 
of alterations his syndicalist core has remained intact.
7. Woodhouse, M. <1975>: 'Marxism and Stalinism in Britain', 
in Essays on the History of Communism in Britain. New Park, 
London, p.30. This critique of the 'Miners Next Step' should 
be seen in the light of its use as good practice in the 
radical paradigm.
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enough to circumvent the leadership or too weak to do 
anything <8>.
The conceptions of the radical paradigm were buttressed 
by those commentators who can be classified as the orthodox 
industrial relations theorists. The links between the two 
exist at a number of levels, not least in Hyman's sustained 
critique of orthodoxy < Hyman 1973, 1975, 1978>. Yet looking 
back on these debates in the decade of the rediscovery of 
the labour market, product markets and mass unemployment, as 
Streeck <1988> has commented the 'very idea of a unified, 
strategic interest of the working class as a whole is as 
such becoming difficult to conceive' <9>. These debates have 
taken on an almost historical quality. The edifice of 
industrial democracy created by such pluralist writers as 
Clegg <1975>, Flanders <1967, 1970> Fox and Flanders <1969>, 
seem just as out of date as the militant shop stewards it 
was intended to incorporate. Yet it was precisely the image 
of the militant shop steward which drove both radicalism and 
orthodoxy and provided their common point of reference. The 
axis around which the debate revolved reflected the reality
8. This view is found in the presentday political practice 
of the Socialist Workers Party; see, for example, my article 
in Socialist Organiser on the 'History of the left in the 
CPSA', June 1987.
9. Streeck, W. <1988>: 'Editorial Introduction', p.315, in 
Economic and Industrial Democracy. Vol 9, Ho 3, August, Sage 
London.
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of shop steward militancy which stood outside the post-war 
corporate structures. The common ground of radicalism and 
orthodoxy lay in their mutual articulation of the militants' 
practices, in one case as advocates and in the other as 
detractors. The consensual knot between orthodoxy and 
radicalism was tied by Donovon's view of two industrial 
relations systems <10>. Arguments in support of or against 
the stewards were either premised on the rank and file being 
a problem for the trade union leaders or the possibility of 
the rank and file placing limits on the actions of the union 
leaders; the concept that working class power could be
10. See Hyman <1979> for his use of Donovan to buttress his 
conception of the classic manufacturing model. In the 1969 
article by Fox and Flanders - 'The reform of collective 
bargaining from Donovan to Durkheim', BJIR. vol 1, no. 2 - 
the division between the official and unofficial movements 
was conceptualised in terms of anomie, which they translated 
as normlessness. As Hyman <1972>, Goldthorpe <1974>, 
Fairbrother <1990>, D Coates <1988> have subsequently 
commented, this breakdown was to be cured by giving power 
back to the union officals. As David Coates states about Fox 
and Flanders, 'they knew too that what was at stake here was 
much more than a simple question of wages' (p.26). It is not 
necessary to agree with Fox and Flanders Durkheimian 
framework or their commitment to capitalism in this 
ideologically motived work. Yet the problem it raises for 
its detractors is its recognition of the breakdown of class. 
Speaking about the informal system, Fox and Flanders wrote 
that it 'hardly merits this title when the absence of any 
integrating principles is [its] most outstanding feature' 
(p.163). What the radicals counterposed to this view of 
class was an abstract conception of the militant worker. Fox 
and Flanders posed their own concept of a reformed 
industrial order, while the radicals' ideal of militancy 
allowed for no alternative order.
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expressed in any other way than that of rank and file 
®ilitancy was not considered. What was lost from the 
radicals' side and accepted, no doubt thankfully, from the 
other was the lack of a political dimension open to this 
rank and file.
The origins of the contemporary radical paradigm lie in 
the rise of industrial militancy in the mid-1960s. This 
militancy defined a considerable amount of academic 
literature, and provided the basis for Marxists to 
counterpose this independent development to the prevailing 
bureaucratic conceptions of the Communist Party. They linked 
the activity of the shop floor militants to their 
syndicalist predecessors cHolton 1976, Hinton 1973> and 
rediscovered an array of concepts which had their origins in 
the Communist renaissance in the aftermath of World War One 
and the Bolshevik revolution <Hyman 1972, 1975>.
In the first instance this syndicalist heritage was 
adopted by the political left as a way of understanding the 
links between the problem of the Communist Party, the 
building of the 'revolutionary party' and the rise of 
industrial militancy. At a later point these political
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expressed in any other way than that of rank and file 
militancy was not considered. What was lost from the 
radicals' side and accepted, no doubt thankfully, from the 
other was the lack of a political dimension open to this 
rank and file.
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literature, and provided the basis for Marxists to 
counterpose this independent development to the prevailing 
bureaucratic conceptions of the Communist Party. They linked 
the activity of the shop floor militants to their 
syndicalist predecessors <Holton 1976, Hinton 1973> and 
rediscovered an array of concepts which had their origins in 
the Communist renaissance in the aftermath of World War One 
and the Bolshevik revolution <Hyman 1972, 1975>.
In the first instance this syndicalist heritage was 
adopted by the political left as a way of understanding the 
links between the problem of the Communist Party, the 
building of the 'revolutionary party' and the rise of 
industrial militancy. At a later point these political
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concepts were appropriated within academic debate <11>. For
example, Gramsci's contrast between the union being a 'power
for workers' and 'power over workers' are found in every
theoretical and political article by Hyman since the early
1970s which I have read. Yet even at its height industrial
militancy in post-war Britain was never akin to the factory
council movement of Turin of 1919. The problem is that
Gramsci's ideas, in being transposed onto the very different
terrain of post-war Britain, have been given an autonomy
from the politically insurgent working class which first
gave them life. It was from these revolutionary strands,
combined with the shop steward militancy of the 1960s, that
the radical paradigm arose. This raises the question of the
relationship between the theoretical paradigm of the
radicals and trade union practice: a relationship which goes
far deeper than one of individual influence.
Practice and theory - the Woodhouse thesis
An understanding of this is found in a present day
parallel with Woodhouse's thesis <1975> on the relationship
between Marxists and the working class prior to the
formation of the Communist Party. Starting from the
11. A number of articles acknowledge their links with the 
work of the International Socialism (IS); see Terry <1978> 
and Hyman <1979>. Many of the contributors to this paradigm 
had also been supporters of IS; for example, Sheila Cohen, 
Richard Hyman and Peter Fairbrother.
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traditional Communist critique of syndicalism, Woodhouse 
argued that the Marxists - the British Socialist Party (BSP) 
and the Socialist Labour Party (SLP) - avoided confronting 
the problems posed by the evolution of reformist working 
class organisations, the Labour Party and unions, and the 
attendant bureaucratisation of these organisations. Instead 
of engaging with this development, they attempted to annul 
it; thus their refusal to form tactical alliances with 
'reformists' and their belief that their party was the 
beginning and end of all wisdom.
In spite of these attempts they empirically mirrored the
'reformist' division between trade unions and politics, as
each party reacted to the emerging labour movement by taking
up one of its dimensions - the industrial for the SLP and
the political for the BSP - as the key which would unlock
the door to the working class.
Both were an intuitive recognition of the 
need for mass work at a time when the working 
class was only beginning to develop an 
awareness of its separate class interests, 
but because the two tendencies (the SLP and 
the BSP] were completely separated...the two 
aspects of mass work in the Labour Party and 
the trade unions were not united in an 
overall revolutionary perspective <12>.
12. Woodhouse, M. <1975>: 'Marxism and Stalinism in 
Britain', op.oit. p 32.
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This was one reason why forces other than the Marxists 
shaped the early development of the labour movement. 
Consequently syndicalism cannot be seen as a spontaneous 
reflex action of workers turning away from 
parliamentarianism to industrial militancy. It was also a 
practice which marked a level of Marxist comprehension of 
working class development which reflected what Miliband has 
called 'the cycle of labourism' <13>. Syndicalism as a 
political practice was given ideological and political 
coherence by the Marxists.
An analogous development is found in post-war British 
Marxism, with the added complexity of having to come to 
terms with the theoretical legacy and, until the mid-1970s, 
the industrial power of the Communist Party. The two poles 
of the labour movement - the trade union and the Labour 
Party - were mirrored on the left with its own divided 
emphases <14>. The radical paradigm replicated this division 
by justifying the practices of trade unionists who 
spontaneously replicated the division between unions and
13. Miliband, R <1961>: Parliamentary Socialism. Merlin 
Press, London.
14. In the early 1960s there were numerous examples of the 
division between those who looked towards the Labour Party 
or the unions as a road to the working class, illustrated in 
the debates in the International Socialist in 1965-66. See 
also the articles from this period by Ken Coates in his 
anthology, The Crisis of British Socialism.
404
politics, making an empirical adaptation to one of the 
dimensions of the labour movement. Any attempt to understand 
the dual structure of the labour movement was distorted by 
this one-sided view.
Theorising syndicalism.
The major characteristic of the radical paradigm is a 
divorce between its ideal type of trade unionism and the 
reality of actual unions. Since syndicalism is theoretically 
incapable of explaining this division, the radical paradigm 
draws on a range of sociological and Marxist concepts so to 
do. The gap between the model and reality is typically 
analysed in terms of a theory of bureaucratisation, which in 
the classic manufacturing model functioned to explain the 
'incorporation' of shop stewards. For example, Terry <1978> 
Hyman <1972, 1973, 1979 1984> view the approach of the 
Donovan Commission as the intensification of the attempt to 
'incorporate' workplace trade unionism, by exerting similar 
pressures to those experienced by the unions at the national 
level.
In the wake of the 1974-1979 Labour Government's 
ability to curtail industrial militancy, the concept was 
extended to explain the success of the social contract 
<Hyman 1979, D Coates 1980>. and provided one of the major
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threads to the discourse surrounding corporatism <Panitch 
1979, 1980, Crouch 1979, D Coates 1980, 1988>.
On the micro level this study has shown similar 
sociological characteristics ascribed to the stewards to 
those of the incorporation thesis: the reformulation of 
steward hierarchies, the emergence of areas of joint 
regulation and the making of procedural agreements. This 
has, however, provided a descriptive but not an explanatory 
framework of analysis. It may well be that the stewards in 
Haringey were incorporated, but the causal relations which 
led to that incorporation were complex and occurred after 
the decline of the reformers' project. Incorporation was one 
of the consequences rather than the cause of the reformers' 
demise.
It might be argued that the theory of incorporation was 
developed in relation to manufacturing and was historically 
specific <Fairbrother and Waddington 1990>. I have, however, 
in the previous chapter alluded to the similarities between 
the 'problematic of success' within the borough and in core 
areas of manufacturing militancy - docks and cars. This 
points towards the division between what I have attempted to 
do - place events in a political framework - and an analysis 
based on the syndicalist view of incorporation.
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The syndicalist assumptions behind the radical paradigm 
become more apparent at the macro level. For example, 
Jeffries' <1979> discussion of the last Labour Government 
can be summarized, not too unkindly, by the idea that if 
only the rank and file had been that bit more militant and 
their leaders not so base, the world would be a different 
place.
A more considered argument is seen in the work of D 
Coates <1989>. In his account of industrial militancy during 
the 1960s and early 1970s, he correctly notes a shift in the 
strike pattern from unofficial to official stoppages. With 
the Industrial Relations Act the TUC was prepared to 
countenance 'for the first time since the 1920s limited 
Industrial action in pursuit of a general political 
goal' <15>. It was a development which he concludes, citing 
Hyman <1973>, was only taken under pressure from the 
membership. Although the trade union leaders were a more 
differentiated group than Coates portrays, the basic 
description is correct and the importance of these 
industrial struggles is given due weight as 'being possibly 
the most important domestic event ... in post-war
15. Coates, D <1989>: The Crisis of Labour; Industrial Relations and the State.-in contemporary Britain p-64, Philip 
Allan Publishers, Oxford.
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Britain' <16>. He concludes that among the 1974 Labour 
government's options was to harness that militancy for 
radical political ends, but that the tragedy was that there 
was no party willing to do so.
For Coates the linkage between this period of militancy 
and the subsequent period of the social contract is made 
through the incorporation / corporatist thesis. This 
provides a description of events but leaves unexplained why 
the stewards were incorporated and the Labour Party and 
union leaders were able to play the role they did. I would 
argue that, starting with the seamen's strike of 1966 and 
reinforced by the struggle against 'In Place of Strife' in 
1969, more political issues began to enter the agenda of the 
rank and file, with which they were unable to come to terms. 
Far from militant industrial action enabling the rank and 
file to circumvent trade union and Labour leaders, the 
leaders themselves played a mediating role and were 
accordingly able to re-assert their control over the 
members. The central reason why the protracted struggle 
between leaders and the rank and file was concluded in 
favour of the former was that the questions which confronted 
them demanded political solutions which were not available 
in a rank and file frame of reference.
16. Ibid., p.67
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An explanatory framework is possible and necessary 
which unites the political and industrial history of the 
working class. The stewards were adequate for periods of 
economic prosperity but ill equipped to deal with 
unemployment or take up the other political questions posed 
at the end of the 1960s. Such questions were addressed by 
the Labour Party leadership and trade union bureaucracy in 
their own 'corporatism fashion. The radical paradigm had no 
conception of the internal cohesion between the Labour Party 
and unions which was expressed through 'the cycle of 
labourism'.
The concepts of 'incorporation' and 'corporatism' 
constitute the core of the radical paradigm. Their function 
at the interface between the rank and file and officials 
within the unions and between the unions and Labour Party is 
to sustain the syndicalist view of rank and file militancy 
and trade union primacy. The descriptive power of these 
concepts provides a basis upon which other theories can be 
written into the analysis; for example, Hyman's view of 
bureaucracy as a social relation <Hyman 1979> or Coates' 
view of the hegemonic project of Thatcherism <Coates 1988>.
In the cold climate of the 1980s a Marxist concept of 
class has been used to buttress the ideal type. This is a 
view of class as a pre-formed revolutionary entity which is
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split asunder on the one hand by a host of 'external' 
divisions and on the other by the 'internal' false 
consciousness of its members. The use of this theory is seen 
in a number of articles dealing with the dual structure of 
the labour movement. Fairbrother <1990> has attempted to lay 
the theoretical foundations for a return to a more overt 
syndicalism. To achieve this, he has to address the dual 
structure, which he does by utilizing Clarke's <1988> view 
of the capitalist state in its liberal democratic form, in 
which a separation between economic and political spheres is 
institutionalised, 'thereby expressing the specificity of 
class exploitation in such societies' <17>. Fairbrother 
argues that this liberal democratic form of the capitalist 
state underwrites the unions as economic interest groups and 
attempts to secure the exclusion of labour from the 
political sphere.
Such a view is open to the criticisms that the concept of 
the 'liberal democratic form' is indeterminate: thus the 
dual labour movement structure was far more evident in 
Bismarckian Germany than in contemporary Britain <18>. 
Second, this argument leaves no room for political autonomy
17. Fairbrother, P. <1990>, 'Union democracy and socialism', 
p. 11, unpub.
18. See the discussion of Marx and Engels' debates with 
German socialists on this issue in Draper, H. <1978>: 
op.cit., Vol 2, chapter five.
410
either in the ruling or working classes. The view that 
capitalism has been able to 'tolerate the rights and 
liberties of citizenship ... because they are abstracted 
from the distribution of social power' <19> by-passes the 
whole issue. Doubtless the ruling class seeks to deceive 
workers, but this hardly explains the separation between the 
political and the economic! This separation represents a 
real terrain of struggle which constitutes the premise for 
understanding the working class. Thus in Britain more than 
in any other country, at least from the time of Bagehot, the 
political question of an overwhelmingly proletarian country 
with the vote has proved a problem. Both Bagehot and Marx in 
opposite ways were haunted by the spectre in the 1860s of 
the workers exercising their vote in their own 
interest <20>.
The basis for this mix of voluntarism and determinism 
would appear to rest on the most solid of theoretical 
foundations. Fairbrother, after Clarke <1977, 1978, 1988> 
uses the Marxist categories of appearance and substance, 
form and content. Clarke has argued that the theory of
19. Ellen Wood <1990>: 'The uses and abuses of "civil 
society"', socialist Register, p. 7220. Bagehot, Walter <1922>: The English Constitution. Kegan 
Paul, Trench, Trubner 6 Co, London, especially the 
introduction. For Marx and Engels, see the discussion in 
Draper: op. cit., ch. 5.
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fetishism, derived by Marx from his analysis of capitalist
relations of production, is an explanation of social
relations and not merely a theory of ideology; it should
explain why appearances are misleading or false in the sense
that they conceal their origins but not deny the materiality
of these appearances themselves. As B Fine <1984> commented:
The imagery of form and content is quite different 
from that of illusion and reality: the surface 
form of an object is no less real than its inner 
content, but it can be explained only by reference 
to its inner content <21>.
However, the theory of fetishism may be used in another 
way altogether: to deny not only the fetishised theory but 
along with it the reality which this theory captures. This 
inversion is present in Clarke's work <22> but in the 
radical paradigm becomes less equivocal. Thus Fairbrother
21. Fine, R. <1984>: Democracy and the Rule of Law. Pluto 
Press, London, p.98.
22. What is important about Clark's work was that, amongst 
others, he overcame the structural functionalist analysis 
associated with the Althusserian school of "Marxism". In 
overturning the certainties of the Althusserians he 
abolished the structural divisions by which they had 
conceptualised and departmentalised society - ideology level 
etc Although successful in this critique by reestablishing 
the capital-labour relation and the concept of social 
relations, the forms generated by capital-labour relation 
rather than having a materiality constantly veer towards 
being appearance. For example see Simon Clarke <1990>: 'New 
utopias for old: Fordist dreams and post-Fordist fantasies', 
Canital and Class. 42, Winter 1990 and Clarke <1980>: 
'Althusserian Marxism', in One Dimensional Marxism. Allison 
and Busby.
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employs this theory of fetishism to deny the reality of the
dual structure. He states:
the state underwrote a separation between the 
industrial and political aspirations of the 
working class, signified by the
inistitutionalisation of working class political 
parties... Secondly unions are recognized and 
procedural and substantive forms of Industrial 
relations generalised to cover all unionised 
workers. This legitimated particular forms of 
unionism and union activity...<23>
It is one thing to refute the reification of the dual 
structure, but another to refuse to recognise its 
existence <24>.
The same tendency to abolish the materiality of the
labour movement is to be found in Hyman, though he is both
more circumspect in his conclusions and comes to them from a
different and paradoxically more sociological starting
point. In his major critique of pluralism <1989>, for
example, he defines his aim thus:
to examine how far certain affinities in terms of 
orientation and underlying assumptions have 
shaped the academic analysis of Industrial 
Relations <25>.
23. Fairbrother, P. <1990>, p.12
24. The view of Fairbrother is in line with those who 
perceive the Labour Party primarily as a transmission belt 
for bourgeois ideology (discussed in chapters 1 and 2 ) into 
the working class.
25. Hyman, R. <1989>: 'Pluralism, Procedural Consensus and 
Bargaining', p.54 in The Political Economy or Industrial 
Relations Theory and Practice in a Cold Climate.
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While such a critique can identify anomalies and limitations 
in pluralist theories, it cannot explain their efficacy. In 
treating pluralist theories as ideological, the critique is 
premised on the view that it is pluralism which determined 
industrial relations rather than industrial relations which 
determines pluralism. The reader is left with a tautology: 
why should pluralism be so pervasive? because people have a 
false consciousness; why do they have a false consciousness? 
because of pluralist ideology. The key to the emancipation 
of trade unionists lies in understanding the dangers of 
pluralism and throwing off their false consciousness.
Reality is abolished through the power of ideas. <26> 
Representation and mediation
On the question of union organisation debate within the 
radical paradigm has been cast in terms of bureaucracy 
versus democracy and representative versus participatory 
democracy <Hyman 1971, 1975, Nichols and Beynon 1977, Beynon 
1973, Regalia 1988, Muller-Jentsch 1988, Jahn 1988, 
Waddington and Fairbrother 1990 and Fairbrother 1990>. The 
strength of these works lies in their implicit support for 
Gouldner's <1965> argument against the 'pathos of pessimism'
26. There is much more to be said about Hyman's theory of 
reification and bureaucracy as a social relation, but this 
would take us away from our central theme in this work.
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and his assertion that there can be no iron law of oligarchy 
... unless there is an iron law of democracy' <27>.
It is in keeping with their general presuppositions 
that the radicals should see the importance of union 
democracy and argue against the dominance of administrative 
rationality. The central problem, however, can be summed up 
thus: should attempts be made to abolish the unions' 
mediating role or not. Muller-Jentsch <1985> has argued that 
viewing unions as a mediation between capital and labour 
reinforces bureaucracy in the unions; Beynon's sensitive 
account <1973> of the gap between shop floor leaders and 
members reveals his unhappy resignation in the face of the 
necessity of that division. What such arguments do is posit 
another role for unions, for if unions do not mediate 
between workers and employers and workers and the state, 
then they would be an entirely different entity. Recognition 
of what unions are does not represent an acceptance of the 
'pathos of pessimism', but it opens up a different 
perspective on the issue outside of the radical paradigm. 
This may be formulated as the recognition of mediations.
27. Gouldner, A.,W. <1965>: 'Metaphysical Pathos and the 
Theory of Bureaucracy', in L A Coser and B Rosenburg (ed.s): 
Sociological Theory, p.114. His view is historically valid 
- seen in the context of periodic revolts of the rank and 
file.
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The concept of mediation points to the necessity of 
institutional structures mediating relations between capital 
and labour. Branch structures, for example, represent a form 
of mediation between workers and management. All union 
mediation is premised on the representation of individuals 
workers by a collective agency, the corollary of which is 
the separation between members and representatives. The 
institutional form of mediation structures but does not 
determine how representatives act within them: as 
arbitrators between workers and management, advocates of 
workers, etc. The concept of mediation differs from that of 
bureaucracy, which defines a specific form in which the 
union's mediating role is carried out, which has its roots 
in the dichotomy 'between administrative and representative 
rationality' <2 8>.
The dynamics of workplace organisation necessarily
involve the working out of relations, often conflictuel,
between members and representatives. Such problem-solving
within the collective represents the basic building block
for class formation within a given workplace organisation.
The development of class formation necessarily entails
confrontation with existing forms of trade union mediation
28. Child, J., Loveridge, R., and Warner, N. <1973>:
'Towards an Organisational Study of Trade Unions',
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as well as with their existing content. The argument is not 
about abolishing structures in the name of 'immediacy' but 
about control over those structures as the way to develop 
collectivity.
The importance of the radical paradigm goes beyond the 
relatively small group of academics I have identified within 
the paradigm. The naturalisation of the key concepts of this 
paradigm and their roots in the actual experience of 
militant trade unionism have made it difficult to move 
beyond its syndicalist parameters; the contemporary 
pressures to do so, however, are becoming far stronger.
The limits of proletarianisation
The fallacies of the radical paradigm are based on the 
practices of militant trade unionism, but their assumptions 
also helped shape these practices. In this sense theory 
became an active element in the dynamics of radical 
unionism. In Haringey the theory of the branch reformers, 
located well within the radical paradigm, informed their 
response to substantive issues.
Starting with the Prices and Incomes report No 29 in 
1969, the policy of successive governments has been to 
attempt to increase levels of productivity and alter working 
practices. The proletarianization thesis - and its 
counterpart 'deskilling' - purport to explain this change.
417
For example proletarianisation of local government white 
collar workers has been discussed by the CDPs <1974, 1977>, 
Cockburn <1977>, and most fully by American writers like 
O'Connor <1981>. O'Connor linked the decline in white collar 
workers' pay with an increase in bureaucratization and 
managerial control designed to routinise work.
The proletarianisation thesis provides a crucial bridge 
between the 'classic' manufacturing model and its 
application to local government work; though within the 
radical paradigm there seems to have existed a curious 
division of labour between those who focus on incorporation 
and those who focus on proletarianisation. I have argued, 
however, in line with Walsh <1982>, that the
proletarianization thesis is invalid in explaining change in 
local government branches. For different reasons both 
elements of the thesis are flawed.
The problem surrounding the depression of wages is 
apparent from its origins. Oppenheimer <1985> has explained 
how the proletarianization thesis in relation to the 
depression of wages was developed in Germany in the 
aftermath of World War One <Croner 1928, Engelhard 1939>. It 
referred to the economic collapse of the middle classes. To 
make a comparison between the proletarianization of white 
collar workers in Weimar Germany, however, and the local
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government wages cycle in Britain in the 1970s-80s is to 
make nonsense of the thesis. The decline in wages was 
central - though they were subsequently increased - but it 
cannot equate to proletarianization in the Weimar sense.
The second part of the thesis is the most important, 
rooting change in the increasing bureaucratization and 
regulation of work tasks. In spite of the formal development 
of productivity deals and corporate management during the 
1970s, this work has shown there were no detrimental 
alterations to the workers' labour process. Indeed the key 
characteristic of the different struggles observed in this 
work is that they were without exception external to the 
type of control exercised by management over the labour 
process <29>.
If an audit were carried out of the councils'
production process over a period of time, considerable
technological innovation, harmonization of work and
deskilling would be shown to have taken place; for example,
the shift from coal to oil and gas central heating for
29. Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) has to a large 
extent overcome the corporatist defence against market 
intrusion, relocating the council worker in a market 
environment. This has led to considerable alterations in 
labour process discipline and underlines what Hyman <1989> 
and Terry <1988> have drawn attention to, the importance of 
product markets. CCT, however, has not overcome the problem 
of managerial control, still representing formal rather than 
real subordination.
419
caretakers, the technological alterations to dust-carts 
(cited by Sheldrake <1981> as an element in the failure of 
early productivity schemes), computerisation of housing 
services and the attempt to divide carpentry work in first 
and second fixing (the latter demands the greater skill). 
These technological innovations had little impact, however, 
on this study because in general they had little detrimental 
impact on workers. This points to a need to distinguish the 
appropriation of the workers' skills from their use against 
the workers in the production process. These are two 
logically separate elements. It was the inability of 
management to link deskilling to greater control of the 
labour process which explains why attempts to get workers to 
work largely failed. From this perspective, the experiments 
in radical municipalism may be seen at least in part as an 
ideology for subordinating the worker to the labour process. 
For example, the comment aimed at workers by the leader of 
Hackney council, Puddephatt, who remarked that 'inefficiency 
is organised theft from the working class' <30>, was about 
exerting a moral pressure on the worker; it should be viewed 
as part of the attempt to shift the balance of power away
30. Cited in Lansley, Stewart., Goss, Sue., and Wolmar, 
Christian <i989>: c o u n c i l s  i n  C o n f l i c t ;  T h e  r i s e  a n d  f a l l  o f  the Municipal Left p 93. Macmillan, Basingstoke.
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from the producer to the consumer and to introduce a form of 
discipline over the workers <31>.
In this case study the tendencies associated with 
proletarianization were halted by the response of the labour 
movement. It meant that a substantial level of continuity is 
found arising from the lack of direct managerial control 
over the labour process. I argued that the impossibility of 
direct supervisory control arose because occupational groups 
carried out the same tasks at many workplaces; this implied 
a reliance by management on worker co-operation and its 
ceding a level of control over the labour process to the 
workforce <32>.
31. This was the rational core of radical municipalism; as 
such the ideology which has accompanied it, for example, the 
notion of non-hierarchical ways of working and of 
accountability to the community, should be treated with 
scepticism. For example, Adeniz' comment on cash cafeterias 
being harder but more interesting work. One of the 
extensions of the school meals project was the idea to get 
the community to supervise the kitchen staff - this did not 
take place. Such working methods point to a potential social 
democratic development where control of the labour process 
is carried out in a similar manner to Friedman's <1977> 
concept of 'responsible autonomy'.
32. Although this represents a different context it points 
to a similar conclusion to that of Eiger <1979>: 
'Valorisation and "deskilling": a critique of Braverman', 
Capital and Class. 7. Here he has argues that deskilling 
must be situated as a tendency within a historically located 
theorisation of the transformation of the capitalist labour 
process. By removing what can be seen as an absolute in 
Braverman <1976> - the total domination of capital in the 
workplace- Eiger has provided the theoretical basis for 
reconstituting workers struggle at the workplace.
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Without the tendencies associated with 
proletarianization one of the core roles of the branches, 
that of mediation between management and worker over the 
labour process, is if not entirely absent, severely 
curtailed, since the form of control exercised over the 
labour process remained the property of the worker or 
workgroup rather than the branches. In a number of areas 
custom and practice evolved on this individualistic sub­
trade union basis, exemplified by management-worker trade­
offs over time for work. Hence a perimeter fence was 
erected, making it impossible for the branches to engage 
fully in the day to day affairs of the members. 'The union' 
remained in all essentials an external agency. Its 
externality placed limits on the overcoming of sectionalism; 
for example, in spite of the way in which the NUPE Education 
branch was unified, the caretakers still had their private 
bargains at the workplace.
Politics and the branches
Although the branches' inability to assert their 
mediating role over labour process was rooted in production, 
the issue is not reducible to the labour process. Closely 
linked to the limits of collectivity posed by production, 
was how the branch reformers acted in relation to their
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political success in preventing redundancies at the turn of 
the decade. The second dimension of the limits to change was 
political.
I define the concept of the 'political' as referring to 
those issues external to the immediate worker-employer 
relation which affect workers as citizens of both the local 
and national state. The workers as citizens had the right 
and felt that they had the right to discuss and affect 
government and council policy, particularly as it affected 
what I have called 'the political economy of labour', that 
is, their fate as employees and consumers.
There were three stages in the political development of 
the branches. First, a direct correlation has been shown 
between the alteration in government policy towards local 
government expenditure, the cuts of 1976-77, and the 
emergence of politics in the branches. Second, these 
political issues were articulated within and subsumed under 
the branches' defensive role as protector of jobs, so that 
the fusion of political and economic aspects of the cuts 
became a property of the branches . Third, this apparent 
unity of the economic and political within the branches was 
shown to be extremely fragile as from 1979 the political and 
economic separated out.
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In this work I have characterised the political and 
economic issues which emerged in the mid-1970s as the 'dual 
agenda'. Its backbone was economic, the decline in wages, 
with the caveat that the political agenda was potentially of 
far greater importance. It was the result of the first major 
governmental push against the political economy of labour 
which for the first time turned non-industrial unions into a 
national force. Although the Haringey branches have their 
own particularities, the emergence of politics within local 
government trade unions was a general phenomenon <33>.
The shaping of the branches' political agenda had the 
strengths and weaknesses of militant trade unionism. Its 
strength was that it represented a militant defence of the 
workers' jobs. Its weakness lay in the reformers' 
understanding of overcoming the division between the 
economic and the political - both were encapsulated in the 
economic. Given the political nature of the employer, the 
council, it seemed that the branches had appropriated the 
political in so far as the council acceded to their demands. 
In reality the situation represented a primitive stage of 
politicisation, one that matured between 1977-1981. The
33. See Fryer <1979> for the history of this struggle 
nationally. For examples of this politicisation process, see 
Nicholson et al. <1981> and Smith et al.'s <1987> respective 
studies of Sheffield and Norwich NALGO branches.
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settlement which emerged from this period was one in which 
the Labour council defused the opposition of the unions by 
embarking on a programme structured around their defence and 
funded by the rate rises. The political was unified with the 
economic inside the unions, but far from by-passing 
labourism through militant trade unionism, as the reformers 
believed, the reality was precisely the opposite. The 
struggles and their settlement resulted in the conversion of 
the branches into an interest group lobbying the council, as 
against the more universal approach of the reforming 
leaderships. Unlike the labour process, where the branches 
failed to fully establish a mediating role, here the branch 
leaders found that they spontaneously gained a role of 
mediating between their members and the council.
The fallacies of the radical paradigm
In the light of what concludes this work - the start of 
redundancies in 1987 - it is tempting to see events as 
inevitable and certainly after 1982 a level of fatalism is 
justified. What invalidates such an assessment prior to 1982 
is that the actions of the reformers were based on their 
particular notions of radicalism and would have been 
different if they had different ideas. It is doubtful that 
this was the case after 1982. This is not to say that the
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political resolution of 1981 would have been avoided if only 
the reformers had a different theory; but in the light of 
the actual evolution of the branches the theory of the 
reformers acted as a disorienting factor, providing yet 
another limit to change.
The basis of this disorientation was that the reformers 
could not come to terms with two interconnected 
developments <34>. Firstly, there was the question of class. 
The working class is not a pre-formed revolutionary entity 
but an uneven and developing formation. In the local 
government context it evolved from the stasis of the post­
war consensus to a reformed collectivity, manifested in the 
reformers' challenge to sectional domination and the 
fragmentation of occupational groups within the branches. 
What was significant was not an abstract concept of what 
this collectivity ought to have been but rather what it was. 
This discloses two types of relation between members and the 
branch; first, there were relations based on a fragmented 
membership and its attendant hierarchies, and second, there 
were the forms of organisation associated with the branch 
collectivity which the reformers sought to introduce. A 
dominant theme observed in this work is the lack of active
34. These criticisms of the branch reformers are equally 
applicable to the Labour left (and for that matter other 
left-wing political forces within the borough) .
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involvement by workers in the branches <35>, which meant 
that one party to any interaction between members and 
leaders - the members - withdrew from active participation. 
With that withdrawal came the loss of the necessary tension 
I have associated with the progression of collectivity. The 
reformers' theoretical assumptions led them to concentrate 
on the problems of fragmentation; the latter issue found the 
reformers ill prepared. The fact that the branch members 
found it unnecessary to participate actively in their 
organisation did not mean that such a state of affairs was 
permanent. When they did need their organisations, they 
could only find fragments of a defeated and confused 
leadership.
This withdrawal of members gave rise to the second 
problem for the reformers: the gap between representative 
and members. The heart of the reformers' demise was not that 
the tension between members and leaders was lost, which was 
unavoidable, but that they were incapable of coming to terms 
with the limitations this placed on change. In particular, 
they were unable to cope with their representative role 
becoming bureaucratized and regulative. The consequent
35. Apart from those shown here there are a range of other 
reasons why workers may not involve themselves in a 
workplace organisation. For example, because of the unions' 
weakness at the workplace.
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disorientation was expressed in the divergent attitudes of 
actors: on the one hand, those who refused to accept these 
developments were rapidly marginalised; on the other, those 
who accepted them were unable to balance their militancy 
with their regulatory role. This fault line is shown in the 
ambivalence of my respondents' explanations of the demise of 
the branches, in which they expressed their respective 
ideological biases: for some it was a problem of gender, for 
some a problem of bureaucratisation of the branch, for 
others a function of the backwardness of the members. These 
diverse views arose from the same point: the defeat of their 
aspirations to construct a branch-based militancy.
For the reformers, the radical paradigm appeared to 
provide the most resolute conception of class but in reality 
offered an imagery of monolithic mass militancy which 
substituted for a conception of class. The working class 
turned out to be not what it was meant; once below the 
imagery it was class which contradicted their theory.
The modernisation of labourism?
From the late 1970s a view began to emerge within the 
literature that labourism had reached an impasse <Milliband 
1983, 1986, Panitch 1986, Coates 1983, 1988>. Although 
commentators lay different emphasis on its nature, the
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argument's core was that the era of Keynesian economic 
management was over and with it the economic base of 
labourism.
It has been axiomatic for Marxists that the capitalist 
system enters periodic crises symptomatic of the %crisis- 
ridden tendency of capital accumulation' <Clarke 1988>. The 
correlation between the crisis and working class resistance 
has, to say the least, been disjointed and sporadic.
Although the class struggle has on occasions reached a white 
heat, most notably in the miners strike of 1984-85, the 
working class imprimatur is the exception rather than the 
rule. What it is not possible to point to from the latter 
part of the 1970s is economic crisis manifesting itself in 
terms of what Middlemas <1979> called 'a political crisis of 
the state'.
The impasse argument rests on a conceptual slippage 
from a crisis of capitalism to a crisis of labourism. A more 
accurate view would be to assess this as a crisis for 
socialists, whose very concept of socialism has been 
challenged. Labourism, as an ideology structured around the 
dual structure of the labour movement and the need for a 
parliamentary as well as trade union mediation between 
labour and capital, has emerged from the fray intact - far 
more so than the socialists. What has gone is the specific
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form in which labourism was played out - the post-war 
corporatist structures.
The failure of the left was a major contributory factor 
in consolidating the rise of radical municipalism. The 
turning point for the Labour left was the early 1980s and 
what was to become radical municipalism was in fact an 
aspect of the defeat of the Benn movement for radicalising 
labourism. This study has been able to show an aspect of how 
the reformulation of labourism occurred. The events 
portrayed in this case study are a microcosm of working 
class evolution from post-war corporatism to post­
corporatism. This work has straddled a period in working 
class development which can be characterised as an 
interregnum - between the ending of the post-war corporatist 
structures and the beginning of what would appear to be a 
new consensual framework based on market principles. This 
has revealed a corresponding shift in the ideology of 
labourism <36>.
The key alterations seen in the Labour Party can be
conceptualised as the attempted 'modernisation of politics':
36. It is among labour movement activists that belief in the 
absolute necessity for a labour government is at its 
strongest; a view summed up by Peter Spencer's comment that 
'I have to have a labour government if the jobs of my 
members are to be protected'. The power of his argument is 
that a governmental solution is necessary to save jobs. That 
is the power of Kinnockism or new realism.
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a shift from an ideology based on post-war corporatism to 
one based on the emergence of a more diverse pluralism. 
Radical municipalism was a transitional ideology between the 
corporate and post-corporate working class. It is difficult 
to know how far the frontiers of working class organisation 
will be pushed back and exactly how a new social democratic 
version of post-corporatist consensus will take shape. With 
the old structures of working class organisation still 
fragmenting, the problem of its re-formation is unresolved. 
In areas such as Haringey it is mediated through the post- 
corporatist imagery of "community", in which the council 
acts as gatekeeper for scarce state resources. Thus radical 
municipalism dovetailed into Kinnocks new realism. Whilst 
this form of reconstituted labourism is able to rely on 
substantial support (even from the "left" of the trade union 
leadership) while the desire to avoid a fourth consecutive 
Labour defeat is overwhelming, the experience of Labour in 
power may serve to shatter this fragile unity.
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Discovering research
As with many first research projects, the core of this 
study arose out of my own experiences as a trade union and 
political activist. A short biographical sketch centred on 
the background to this work will illuminate the relation 
between this study, my background and the research material. 
I was born in Hornsey and have lived in Tottenham most of my 
adult life. I worked as a labourer on Haringey council from 
1979 until starting this project in 1986 (briefly returning 
in September 1989 until January 1990) <1>. I have been a 
member of either Hornsey or Tottenham Labour Party since 
1973, serving on the GMC and EC of both parties as well as 
holding such positions as education and TU liaison officer.
I joined Socialist Organiser in 1974. From 1980 I was a shop 
steward and from 1982 senior steward for my section. I have 
sat on a range of borough and London-wide shop steward 
committees, including setting up and being the first 
chairperson of the London-wide local authority workers joint 
shop steward committee - London Bridge.
1. Several years later the foreman who hired me told me the 
following: 'A few weeks after you started, Mick, someone 
came down and said, get rid of O'Sullivan, he's a trot. I 
though about it but as you're a Gemini and Gemini are nice 
people, I decided not to sack you.
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This work has had a long gestation period. Its origins 
go back to the mid-1970s and my dissatisfaction with what 
the left was saying about trade unions and by implication 
the working class. This dissatisfaction came from two 
sources: one was class and the other was politics.
My own working class background is sociologically
impeccable - my father is social class five and my mother
social class four. For myself, however, as someone who
obtained 'A' levels then a degree, it has never occurred to
me to consider myself one of the 'lads' <2>. It was not
until the early part of the 1980s that I began to become
conscious of class. To explain this rather strange sounding
claim, I have to go back to my late teens. I was fifteen in
1968; then it seemed anything was possible and that my
background and school experiences (a large secondary modern
with at the time the largest immigrant population in the
country) were universal. My assumption was that when I spoke
to my contemporaries, I was conversing with people from a
similar background. It was only through experience, for
which I have to thank the Labour Party, that I began to
2. The concept of 'the lads' to my knowledge is used by two 
groups of people, trade unionists and sociologists. It is 
used to designate working class men, as in trade union 
speech 'the lads will consider the offer' or in sociologese 
'the lads considered the offer'. Working class men do not 
describe themselves as the lads - which the computer 
thesaurus equates with 'boy', 'child', 'junior', 'immature'.
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understand class. The way in which the majority of members 
talked about the working class was as object and as a 
mediation for their own lives. This made me conscious of my 
background. I observed a middle class concern (one that in 
my experience extends throughout the left) which generated a 
dichotomy between workers as they should be and workers as 
they really are, a dichotomy which has been transposed to 
sociology <3>. I began to conceive of my background as 
providing an anchor for myself where workers should not be 
used as a mediation for the middle class to understand the 
world. Becoming conscious of this situation allowed me to 
understand that I had a view of two worlds: a working class 
world which was not mine but one I had inherited through my 
parents and the world of the downwardly mobilised middle 
class which was of course my world <4>.
Secondly, in the wake of the decline of industrial 
militancy under the 1974-79 Labour government, I began to 
assimilate from Socialist Organiser a theoretical 
understanding of this based on a conception of the unity 
between the industrial and political wings of the labour
3. In his comment on participant observation this was summed 
up by Jacobs thus <1970>: 'the presumption of social 
distance between the researcher and his subject vitiates 
that which he seeks to understand', p. viii
4. One of the upsetting things about this relation was that 
I became in part a conduit for an understanding of the 
working class.
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movement. From the mid-1970 I became convinced of the need 
for an inter-disciplinary linkage between the unions and the 
Labour party rather than treating them as separate entities. 
In the 1980s the way in which the revolutionary left acted 
strengthened this belief and it became more grounded as I 
not only observed left activity but participated in events 
surrounding the rise of municipalism.
These two aspects of my development, an understanding 
of class and a view of the labour movement, remained at a 
conscious level separate until the mid-1980. It was a 
gradual convergence between my understanding of class and 
the labour movement which formed the backbone to this work. 
It was the context in which I theorized radical 
municipalism. I watched in amazement as the left lost 
integrity, political culture and purpose. As a comrade of 
mine commented, radical municipalism saw the birth of the 
'me generation' in British politics <5>. What I have tried 
to convey is applicable to ''any town'', although the detail 
of this work resides in my relationship to my source
5. A small illustration of this occurred in 1985 over the 
surcharging of Lambeth and Liverpool councillors. At a 
national shop stewards meeting I chaired, instead of 
addressing the question 'can we deliver some form of 
action', the entire meeting was taken up with the SWP and 
Militant stewards arguing about whether they should be in 
the Labour Party.
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material. This relationship can be itemised under the 
followings points:
i) I was able to "read the labour movement sub-culture''.
Each area of social life can be regarded as a subculture
with its own values and procedures. Sharrock <1975>
discusses the relationship between a corpus of knowledge (in
this instance that belonging to the labour movement) and the
activities of its members. He states that:
the name is never intended to describe the persons 
amongst whom the corpus has currency but instead 
to specify the relationship which that corpus has 
to the constituency, a relationship which seems 
analogous to that of ownership <6> .
A knowledge of the labour movement then belongs to those of
the labour movement who will be conversant with its
procedures (as any priest would be with the church of Rome,
or a steam train enthusiast with the protocol for observing
their chosen object of desire). There would be no technical
barrier to their formal understanding of the documentation
or conversing with respondents: a case of 'interviewing
one's peers' <Platt 1981>. For example, a basic procedural
difference between trade union and Labour Party
documentation is that the utterances of trade unionists are
more likely to be considered due to their representative
6. W W Sharrock (1975): 'On owning knowledge', in R Turner 
(ed.): Ethnomethodologv. Penguin, Harmondsworth, p. 49.
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responsibilities. In this research my knowledge was 
amplified by my former participatory status which meant that 
I was not only conversant with the procedure but also the 
substance of the material. If an analogy with a map can be 
used, I recognised the map like anyone else conversant with 
the labour movement, but also I had the key to understanding 
the specific contours which made up the Haringey labour 
movement. It is not that either of these could not be 
learnt; it is just that I started this work with an 
understanding of the substance of that corpus of knowledge,
ii) I had a ready made network of labour movement contacts 
both within and outside the borough, whose knowledge I was 
able to draw upon. This can be illustrated in a number of 
ways: for example, I had to piece together from the network 
a set of the anti-cuts committee documents; or over a 
secondary issue in reviewing one of the local papers I was 
able to check up on why in the early 1980s the paper's 
attitude changed to one of hostility towards the council.
Was it because of a real sense of outrage over the rates?
The paper's reporters were 'networked' into the branch 
leadership, so I could ask them informally if they knew the 
answer. The replies I received led me to believe that this 
change was also to do with the internal problems the paper 
was going through at that time, which was to lead to the
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sacking of the NUJ members on the paper. This network meant 
that it was always possible to go beyond my official sources 
and check up on issues.
iii) I had unlimited access to archival material and 
respondents. In many cases respondents were colleagues and 
in two cases close friends. I had decided from the outset 
that my main respondents would be the central people within 
the branches (originally instead of two branches I have 
studied I was going to look at four) ; the work was never 
intended to be directly about the branch members. I also 
made a conscious decision that I would not interview anyone 
from either the Labour Party or the Labour Group in 
connection with either the Labour Party's development or the 
rate-rise and cuts debates. The reason for this was 
pragmatic. My focus was on the unions; to start a process of 
interviewing Labour Party members would have been to open up 
a substantial (albeit very interesting) "can of worms".
The choice of interviews was narrowed in only two instances, 
firstly my decision not to interview Harry Lister. Secondly 
I was told, in no uncertain terms, that I would not obtain 
an interview with those who initiated NALGO's black caucus. 
The failure to interview Lister is a major shortcoming. In 
the case of the black caucus, although at the outset of this 
work I was unaware of its importance, I had already realised
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that I would be unable to follow through on both race and 
gender and had decided to concentrate on gender. The 
reasoning behind this was that gender, unlike race, had 
arisen in the branch as part of the emergence of the non- 
aligned left.
Alongside this relationship to the material I brought to the 
research a number of preconceived ideas, the most important 
being that in carrying out research I was - whatever else I 
might be doing - engaging in a process of social mobility. I 
concluded that it would be self-delusion on any researcher's 
part not to understand that: however much they may wish not 
to, the very act of research is "talking to the natives" and 
bringing back the findings to the middle class world of the 
university. However sensitively this is carried out, for 
example James <1984>, and whatever motives are used (and 
everybody's motives are always for the best), non­
recognition of this relationship by the researcher is bound 
to perpetuate the illusion of equality and ultimately 
patronize the "natives" <7>. In my case I was caught in
7. It is difficult to convey the alarm with which I first 
read methods texts. In the pre-1980 texts, which showed the 
link between ethnomethodology and anthropolgy, the talk was 
of spying on the recipient (in British texts) and covert 
operations (in American texts). The later texts tended to 
conceal this through their relativism and by adopting the 
'English' attitude of being 'terribly nice'. See, for 
instance, Janet Finch <1984>: '"It's great to have someone 
to talk to": the ethics and politics of interviewing women'.
439
the unedifying situation where the price of potential entry 
into the sociological community was not my views but my 
experience - a piece of working class life.
The obvious course for this work would have been an 
ethnographic study. Although ethnography may well be part of 
a 'humanistic sociology', it is also the quintessence of 
looking at the natives. I had no wish to be a window though 
which workers spoke. The problem for me was how to distance 
my work from this kind of anthropology; the one way this 
could not occur was through proclaiming a special status for 
myself. A part of a Ph.D. is coming to terms with what 
sociology is and how it acts with the world. How was it 
going to be possible for me to overcome this problem and 
marry the theoretical and practical concerns of this work? 
This points to wider considerations in formulating a 
research design.
My second proposition was that it was patronizing to 
respondents to believe that you can conduct an interview 'on 
an absolutely equal footing' <8>. Goode and Hatt <1952> were
in C Bell and H Roberts (ed.s): Social Researching;
Politics. Problems. Practice. RKP, London, pp. 70-87.
8. This comes from F Zweig's <1949> study of Labour. Life 
and Poverty. Gollancz, London, cited by A Oakley <1981>: 
'Interviewing Women: A contradiction in terms', in H Roberts 
(ed.): Doing Feminist Research. RKP, London. Oakley uses 
Zweig as an instance of how to talk with respondents as 
equals, but the question remains how this Communist Party
440
right to assert that 'the interviewer's role is essentially 
middle class' <9>. There are a number of different levels at 
which this inequality operates, the central point being that 
interviewers appropriate what is usually considered the 
mundane knowledge of the respondent and transpose it into 
their intellectual corpus of knowledge. For example, in this 
work my concept of 'time bonus' is drawn from the 
respondents' mundane explanations of their working lives. If 
equality exists, then give the tape recorder to the 
respondents and let them do the research!
Finally I was concerned that there should not be an
ideological bias in the interviews. There are two approaches
to the problem of bias in the literature: the removal of it
through controlled interviews <Goode and Hatt 1952, Hyman et
al. 1955> or in the opposite view <Bell and Newby 1977, Bell
and Encel 1978, Oakley 1981> acceptance of the idea of 'all
research being political' <10>. The concern I had was more
mundane; it is a problem found, for example, in
Wainwright <1986> where she discussed the Sheffield labour
movement. She wrote that a number of its 'leaders' were the
children of prominent labour movement dignitaries; she was
intellectual could have an interview on an equal footing 
with his working class respondents.
9. W J Goode and P K Hatt <1952>: Methods in Social 
Research. Allen and Unwin, London, p. 188
10. Oakley, op. oit. p.54
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extremely affirmative in her response to this and supportive 
of the actions of these leaders. Now leaving aside the novel 
idea of socialist support for dynastic leadership, a limited 
knowledge of the Sheffield labour movement would show that 
these leaders were left Labourite and Stalinist. I am not 
passing judgment on this or Wainwright's support for them, 
but it should be flagged in the work. Without the 
ideological starting point of the respondent being flagged 
by the researcher, the reader is left to wonder where and 
how the views of people were formed. It is the height of 
naivete to believe that those active within the labour 
movement have somehow formed their views in a political 
vacuum. From the outset I conceived of the labour movement 
activists addressed in this work as public figures. They 
were all political actors, even if the process by which they 
assimilated their ideas was one of complete osmosis.
Putting the jigsaw together
Six months into this study the concerns mentioned above 
represented a set of unresolved dilemmas and loose threads; 
as with many Ph.D. students this represented the dilemma of 
how to make the transition from the general notion - I am 
going to undertake research - to the specifics of research. 
In this instance the transition from vague methodological
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precepts to a clearer conception under which this work was 
actually carried out, took place in a completely empirical 
way. My hesitations and concerns were to remain but once the 
specifics of the research got underway, I surprisingly found 
that they rapidly resolved themselves.
Getting the research underway meant beginning to read 
around my subject and assembling a chronology. A chronology 
seemed to me both an essential and a safe starting point (as 
it committed me to nothing) . It was, however, no small 
matter? not only did it stretch over a quarter of a century 
but I found that I was in fact writing up no less than eight 
chronicles of events: two unions, the local Labour Party, 
the rise of municipalism in London, the Haringey anti-cuts 
committee, the borough's inter-union committees, the 
demographic alterations in the borough and the council's 
evolution.
From being no small matter, once started the sheer 
volume of material involved in assembling these chronologies 
began to dictate the research method. This occurred in two 
senses: first, it began to show that I was assembling 
fragments of a political map of the borough: of vertical 
relationships within the institutions and horizontal 
relationships between institutions. This, however, also
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showed the limits of this documentation; as Mann <1967> 
commented:
a mere record of what is said, accurate though 
it might be, would tell only a small and rather 
misleading part of the full story <11>.
What this meant was that in assembling, say, the 
chronology of the NALGO branch, certain trends emerged such 
as the rise of a political agenda. To understand this, to 
get the 'full story', entailed cross-referencing my 
"reading'' of the documents with the secondary literature, 
other primary sources and the interviews of my respondents. 
Thus the forming of a chronology provided the structure 
around which an interaction between myself, the 
documentation, respondents' interviews and secondary sources 
was to evolve. This interaction of elements was to 
constitute my methodological framework.
11. P H Mann <1968>: Methods of Sociological Inquiry 
Blackwell, Oxford, p. 61
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Using th* documentation
The documentation entailed the assembling and
chronology of the following records:
Tabla 13:1 Major documentation
Institution type period
NALGO Minutes, correspondence, 
major negotiations
1965-1987
NUPE Minutes, correspondence, 
major negotiations
1965-1987
NUT Minutes 1978-1987
Craft
Committee
Minutes 1975 1987
Union-Council
consultative
committee
Minutes 1978-1981
Haringey cuts 
committee Minutes 1979-1981
Haringey 
union campaign
against Rate-capping Minutes @ correspondenc 1984-1986
Haringey Joint 
Union committee Minutes @ correspondenc 1985-1987
Labour Party 
Tottenham } 
Wood Green} 
Hornsey }
GMC, LGC, selected wards 
minutes and publications
1975-1987
London
Bridge Minutes 1984-1986
Haringay Council A range of documentation 1965-1987
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These records represented the core documentation used 
in this research. Alongside them I also used: the GLC 
Statistical Year books, census reports, the borough's own 
statistical records, the local newspapers and the files of 
left-wing papers such as London Labour Briefing. The vast 
bulk of this documentation was extremely mundane. It 
comprised public but workaday, practical texts. These public 
documents were not written for posterity, the authors never 
perceiving them as archival material. In my opinion it was 
only possible for me to deal with this bulk of material 
because I was already conversant with the corpus of 
knowledge of which it was part. To step even fractionally 
outside, as I had to when reading the official council 
documentation, was to enter if not an alien world, certainly 
a strange country.
The vast majority of this documentation is primary data 
gathered at first hand. Only in exceptional circumstances 
was it possible to cross-reference documentation with other 
sources. For example, the decision in March 1985 of the 
council during the anti-rate capping campaign to set a rate 
is documented in a number of texts, such as Stoker <1988> 
and Lensely et al. <1989>. The way in which I used the 
documentation can be classified in three ways. Firstly, 
using the material concerning the profile of the borough, I
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was concerned to give the reader a sense of change as 
background to this thesis. I brought together an eclectic 
batch of indices - from statistical data to Labour Party 
documentation - to make this point; it was not my concern to 
show that Haringey is 'an outer London borough with inner 
city problems' <12>. This set of documentation provided the 
context in which I explored change within the branch; in the 
two following sets of documentation it was the reverse: the 
documents only achieved substance by my ability to 
contexualise them.
The major division, however, was between the
documentation concerning the core union branches under study
and the various elements of the Labour Party and council.
This division had less to do with the quality or type of
documentation than the different relationship in which I
placed these documents. Due in part to my decision not to
interview Labour Party or Labour Group members, I was forced
to rely entirely on archive material to construct events
surrounding the Labour Party and the council within the
borough. The difficulty in researching debates concerning
rate rises at the London level was partly alleviated in
relation to the GLC by utilising interviews which I had done
12. This is the phrase (which is correct) that the council 
uses on every conceivable occasion; it has become a bit like 
the borough's motto 'Progess with Humanity'
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for a previous study. In giving the reader an interpretation 
of those events I was concerned that my own views about 
municipalism and my participatory status within these 
debates should not dictate outcomes.
Through assembling the documentation and literature on 
municipalism, it became rapidly apparent that juxtaposing 
the documents to this literature, particularly that on 
radical municipalism, revealed a major divergence. Thus the 
basis for my refutation of municipalism was not my 
subjective viewpoint but one grounded in the documentary 
material. The contrast between the findings of this study 
and the existing body of work helped provide a focus for 
this part of the research. However, tensions continually 
arose when I constructed scenarios as to the "meaning'' of 
the documentation. I am thinking particularly of the rate 
rise debates within Haringey. This is one of the major 
dangers of familiarity with your material. I found it was 
all too easy to project through the documents a series of 
ideas and start ascribing them to the writers of the 
minutes. Part of the discipline of dealing with these 
records was not to read more into them than they actually 
stated. This problem did not exist with the trade union 
documentation.
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The third category of documentation concerned the 
unions. Much more than the other documentation, this was 
flagged and referenced by my previous participation. These 
were always more difficult to 'read' than the Labour Party 
documents in regard to what they meant for the relationship 
between union representatives and their members. The 
documents could only reveal broad generalities - for 
example, in whose interest the branches were run - but could 
not reveal why this was the case. The working up of this 
primary documentation provided the basis on which I was able 
to overcome the pressure to do a participant observation 
thesis. It provided the basis on which I could re- 
contexualise both the respondents' statements and my own 
knowledge and in so doing advance the research process.
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Interviews
The following table provides a breakdown of the 
interviews undertaken for this work:
table 13:2 Break-down of interviews
Number of 
respondents
Number of 
interviews Time
Total
hours
9 1x9- 9 9 x lhour 9
5 2x5-10 2 x lhour 10
2 3x2- 6 6 x lhour 6
1 4x1- 4 4 x lhour 4
1 7x1- 7 7 x lhour 7
1 8x1- 8 8 x 1  hour 8
qroup of two 3x1= 3 3 x 1  hour 3
Total 18 46 48
This table shows a breakdown of the interviews carried 
out for this work. The tapes of my respondents can be 
classified into two categories: thirteen respondents from 
the case study union branches, ten from NALGO and three from 
NUPE, who were the "core respondents' * ? and five 
"background respondents" of whom three were activists from
outside the borough.
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Apart from my general conceptions about interviewing, I 
initially did not know what to make of access to this 
resource. It was only through the limitations of the 
documentation that one of the purposes of the interviews 
emerged. I started the interviews as a process of cross- 
referencing documentation; after my first interview I 
realised that here was another powerful source of material. 
For example, being informed by one respondent about the 
(undocumented) Duke House group, I was also told by him 
about the existence of its secretary and he smoothed the way 
for my interview of her. These two interviews provided the 
basis for the entire Duke House section, supplemented by 
cross-referencing with other relevant respondents.
A second strand subsequently emerged in the 
interviewing process; I was not out to 'discover men and 
women' <13>, that is, what lay behind the mask of their 
public lives, but rather their views and knowledge as public 
actors. This did not overcome the unequal nature of the 
interview relation but it overcame my worry about
13. Cited in B Burgess <1988>: 'Conversations with a 
purpose: the ethnographic interview in educational 
research', in studies in Qualitativ? Methedelagy, voi. 1 , pp. 137-155, JAI Press. Because of my relationship with my 
respondents I knew a great deal (though I am sure just the 
tip of the iceburg) about their private lives, but they had 
no major impact on this study.
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patronizing respondents. The point was by confronting 
respondents as a resource I was freed from the necessity of 
accepting as valid the immediacy of their utterances; I was 
able to treat them as rounded political actors. For me it 
opened the way to a substantial dialogue, as evident in 
utterances from myself and respondents such as 'rubbish', 
'nonsense', 'you've got to be kidding', 'you're wrong on 
that one' and a liberal sprinkling of 'well, I never knew 
that'. All these expressions denote argument and discovery 
and arose from pushing my respondents to ''think things 
through". Thus from the need to cross-check the facts a 
much more substantial picture began to emerge in relation to 
the unions through my respondents telling me their part of 
the story. As such the interviews took on a dual character; 
they were both a technical resource concerning what happened 
and they were a forum for dialogue and discussion. My 
interviewees were both respondents in that they provided 
''raw data*' to be interpreted, and informants in that they 
offered their understanding of the data. It was the 
relations between the documentation and the interviews which 
generated what I believe to be the heart of this work. For 
example, it was through my reading of the NUPE branch 
minutes, which from the caretakers' stand-point just did not
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add up, that I 'pushed' the NUPE secretary into revealing at 
least some of the caretakers' perks.
Technique, location and characteristics.
Because no individual had a complete picture of events 
in their union, let alone the wider issues under study, it 
was impossible (desirability apart) to have a standardized 
interview format. Although it meant that I did not have an 
interview schedule, unlike Cottle <1978> - who had 'no pre­
arranged questions, no ... interview schedule. It is a 
conversation in which I engage...' <14> - I did have what 
can be viewed as two sets of questions: firstly, concerning 
queries or anomalies which arose from knowledge prior to the 
interview, and secondly, concerning the respondents' work 
experience. Because of the type of respondent this fell in 
nearly every case into three broad bands: their experience 
prior to working for the Haringey, their 'rise' within the 
branch, which usually fused with their experience in office; 
and finally the situation after they had left office. The 
specific and the general tended to interact with each other; 
as I became more proficient I did tend to front load the 
first set of questions concerning queries and anomalies.
14. T Cottle <1977>: Private Lives and Public Accounts. New 
Viewpoints, New York, p.7.
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However, if there was a spark in the interview, I would let 
it run on around any given issue.
Carrying on from the premiss that interviews are an 
unequal relationship, the agreement by a party to be 
interviewed does not necessarily mean that they 'will come 
up with the goods'. Of course, I am not implying that the 
function of the interview is to get someone to tell you what 
you wish to hear; the point is rather that agreement to be 
interviewed does not guarantee the scope and depth of the 
reply the interviewer may wish for. I am sure I am not alone 
in quietly fuming at the respondents' passive resistance to 
questioning. Putting the respondent to work is the 
responsibility and task of the researcher. Hence a range of 
stratagems have emerged for transposing acquiescence to be 
interviewed into a productive interview <Burgess 1988,
Oakley 1981, Finch 1984> <15>.
From this starting point I evolved a number of
different interview strategies. I was as deferential as
possible about where to carry out the interviews which took
15. My point is that if the unequal basis of the interview 
contract is not recognised and the strategy of how to make 
the interviewee talk is elevated into a seemingly equal 
contract, then the implicit danger arises of patronizing the 
respondent; for example, I find it strange that Oakley 
<1981> is unable to see the request for information from her 
respondents as arising from a power relation.
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place in a range of locations: offices, my flat, pubs, the 
trade union centre. Breaking the rule about conducting 
interviews in private was a problem in terms of extraneous 
interruptions. A more substantial drawback was that on 
occasion the lack of privacy clearly inhibited the ability 
of the respondents to talk freely <Burgess 1988>. Where this 
happened I re-interviewed. The most uninterrupted of the 
interviews were the ones conducted in the pub, because there 
was no telephone. At their homes or offices, the respondents 
always had the option of answering the phone or not. 
Certainly it was a measure of success when an ansafone was 
put on.
I very rapidly noticed some characteristics of the 
interviews which pointed to a pattern in spite of their 
unstructured nature. Without exception no-one could remember 
either dates or the chronology of events. One of the few 
stock phrases I started to say was 'don't worry about the 
dates, no one can remember them*. Second, whenever 
respondents were speaking about themselves, there was a 
considerable emphasis on the I', that is, their own 
activities; and whenever an adverse option was given on a 
fellow trade unionist, the voice was lowered, emphasising 
the private nature of the interview regardless of location.
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I utilized a range of techniques from the passive to 
the deferential to the aggressive. The basic point of this, 
inside my notion of a dialogue, was to give the interviewee 
someone they could empathise with or hate, as long as they 
talked. Knowing the majority of my respondents meant that 
this was simply a matter of transposing my pre-conceptions. 
For a number of reasons this did not always work? for 
example, my more exuberant persona did not combine well with 
the most pedantic of my respondents? it was a clear error of 
judgment on my part which led to a bad interview. The 
biggest failure I encountered, however, was with a 
respondent whom I had worked very closely with in relation 
to the London Bridge joint shop stewards committee; he had 
now become a full time officer of his union. Through passive 
resistance and selective amnesia I noted after the interview 
that he wished to forget the entire set of events and his 
role within them. This problem also impinged on some other 
core informants.
None of the above would have been possible without the 
respondents being recruited to my project (a point seen most 
clearly in the case of non-respondents) . My respondents had 
two characteristics which made them responsive to the work 
(over and above any relationship with me) . As with most
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people, the lives and activities of my respondents normally 
go unrecognised <16>; in their case they were the unpaid 
'NCO's' of the labour movement. Also as with most people in 
public life, they (we) are opinionated. This rather simple 
conjunction provides a proclivity to talk. In line with 
Burgess <1988>, Finch <1984> and Oakley <1981> I had the 
pleasure of respondents saying that the interviews had acted 
as a kind of therapy and 'let them understand things 
better' <17>. In my view, the impulse behind the 
respondents' cooperation lay in their desire to understand 
why events had turned out the way they had.
16. Finch op.cit. p. 72.17. It would an interesting exercise to see what the common 
denominators are in soliciting this response.
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